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(Bib. Ind. Edn.)

BY THE LATE. LOL. G. A. JACOB.

[*Continued from The S. B. Studies, Vol. II, P. 28*]

In the bhāsya on Ait. Br. iii. 47 (Vol. 2, p. 225), viz. "जामि वा एतद्यज्ञे क्रियते यत्र समानीभ्यामृग्भ्यां समानेऽहन्यजतीति," Sāyaṇa again explains जामि by आलस्य, but adds "प्रयुक्तयोरेवर्चयोः पुनः प्रयोगस्य चर्वितचर्वणसदृशत्वेनाऽनुचितत्वात्" but Haug translates it 'laziness.'

On p. 669 of Jhā's translation of Tantravārtika (2. 2. 10) we read :—"When it so happens that between the offering of 2 cakes there is no other action to be performed, then we have the flow of jāmı [i. e. जामितादोष] and hence the mention of the removal of jāmi [i. e. अजामित्व] must be taken as enlogizing that action which would be laid down as to be performed between the 2 offerings and from this it follows that, in the case in question, what has to be enlogized is the sacrifice *Upāṃśu* which is distinctly laid down as to be performed in the interim [अन्तरा]."

The Nyāyasudhā on 2. 2. 10 says :—

जामि वा इत्युक्तम् । सोदर्यवाचि जामिशब्दलक्षितस्य साद‍श्यस्य नैरन्तर्यानुष्ठाने सत्यालस्याद्यापादकत्वेन दोषत्वात् etc.

"दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत" 598,604 607,620,635,682, 697.

"दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेत" (T. S. 2.5 6.1),–195, 526,597: with दर्शपूर्णमासौ etc,510,737.

"दर्शो वा एतयोः पूर्वं, etc." 552.

"दश चमसाध्वर्यवः etc." 399.

दश दाडिमानि an example of अनुपपन्नार्थवचन,—13,497 (an अनर्थकवचन). [Mahābhāsya vol 1. p. 53].

दशमुष्टिपरिमित सोम, 152—3 ; 303.

"दशमुष्टीर्मिमीते," 302.

"दशयज्ञायुधानि" (T. S. 1.6.8.3),–214. (See under यज्ञायुध).

"दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि" 225,230, 372. (See ग्रहैकत्वन्याय in *Maxims*, iii).

दाक्षायणयज्ञ. a peculiar modification of the new and full moon sacrifices originated by the Dākṣāyaṇas—a royal family. [See Śat-p. 2 4.4 and Eggeling's long note at the beginning of it.]—179,180.

दानहोमपाकाः, 716.

दाशतय, ten-fold, relating to R. V. with its 10 mandalas,–253.

दीक्षणीयेष्टि 'consecration offering' — (Eggeling on Śat pa 3.1.3),—335.535,566.

"दीक्षाः सोमस्य," 391.

"He cuts (a tree for) a sacrificial post at the time of initiations" (Kunte).

"दीक्षासु यूपं छिनत्ति," 551. Cf Āpast. Śrauta X. 4.14 (with कारयति).

दीर्घसोम = सोमयागविशेष (Mādhava), 301.

"दीर्घसोमे सन्तृत्यादृधृत्या" (T. S. 6.2.11.3), 301.

"दुर्वर्णोऽस्य भ्रातृव्यः," (T. B. 2.2.4.6), 326.

दुष्टेषु हि ज्ञानं मिथ्या, 8.

"दृतिनवनीतमाज्यम्". 'butter consisting of butter [long-stored] in a leather vessel' [for use at a श्येन sacrifice]. —431.

["Nārāśaṃsa. 'pertaining to Nārāṣaṃsa (man's praise, i. e. Agni, or Soma, or the Fathers),' is the name given to certain remains of soma-libations sacred to the Fathers, which in the nine soma cups, are temporarily deposited under the axle of the southern soma-cart, till they are drunk by the priests at the end of the libation." Eggeling on 3.6.2.25].

नारिष्ट होम, 564 (also X. 401). See **नक्षत्रेष्टि** in Index to Jhā.

नावनीत, freshly-boiled butter, 96.

"**नासोमयाजी संनयेत्**" (T. S. 2.5.5.1), 596.

"**नास्या अन्नमद्यात्**" (T. S. 2.5.1.6). 325-6.

नास्ति दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नम्, 17.

निगद, the name of certain yajuṣ mantras which being addressed to others are recited *loudly* (See under **मन्त्र** in the Index to Jhā),—129,131,292.

निधन, the final or concluding word of a Sāman, to be sung in chorus by the Prastotar, Udgātar, and Pratihartar (See Eggelings long note on iv. 2.5.10). **हीष्** is the *nidhana* at the end of **सौभरसाम** to be sung by one desiring rain, 165—6.

निनयन, pouring out of Sacrificial water, [See Śatap. i. 9.2.32. 33, and Kunte s note on 4.2 14], 477.

नियोगतः, necessarily, or necessity, 643.

निरालम्बन, 'without support (i. e. ideas without external objects—the **निरालम्बनवाद** or Idealism of the Buddhists),—8.

निर्मन्थ्य, 'fire produced by friction' to be taken in its literal sense in vedic texts,—96.

निविद्, N. of short detached formulas inserted in a liturgy etc. (See Eggeling s note on 1.4.2.1. and translation of iii.9).

"**निवीतं मनुष्याणां** etc.," (T. S. 2.11.1), 312.

निवृत्ति, cessation of application (in opp. to **प्रवृत्ति**. See Kunte on 3.7.12), 392.

Index defines it as "The technical term for the address to a god inviting him to partake of the offering it was followed by the yājya, wh: accompanied the actual oblation."]

"पुरोहितं वृणीत." 731.

पुष्कर, the bowl part of a ladle.—564. [See Eggeling on 1.3.1 1, and Vedic Index.] Apast Śraut xiv. 24.12.

पूतीक an authorized substitute for the soma plant [See Vedic Index].—383,659—60.669.

पूर्णक,a man's name(?) (See Kunte's note on 3.2.30),—268,615.

"पूर्वस्यां दिशि एता देवता: etc.",643.

"पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे etc.," 13.

"पूर्वेणाग्निं गृह्णाति etc.", 595.

"पूर्वेणुरमावास्यायां वेदिं करोति," 553.

"पृथुपाजवत्यौ धाय्ये" 'those two verses. The first of which begins with the word पृथुपाज are Dhāyyā ? (Kunte, See R. N. 3.27.5.6. and Apast. Śrauta, 19.18.3). 570.

"पृषदाज्येनानुयाजान्यजति" (T. S. 6.3.11.6) 457,560,563,568. [In Śatap. 2.5.2.41 Eggeling rende s पृषदाज्य by "clotted butter." and in a note adds '(lit. mottled butter) is clarified butter mixed with sown milk.']

पृष्ठसामन् See वैराजपृष्ठ.

पृष्ठाकोट, 'twisting of the back'—in turning from side to side to point out and explain difft things to a pupil. Kumārila (p. 416) explains it thus :—

"धरणिगतानेकद्रव्यप्रत्येकनिरीक्षणे पुनः पुनः पृष्ठं कुटिलीक्रियत इति तत्सामान्येन पृष्ठाकोटाभिधानम्" See Trans p. 570],—125.

पोत्रीया The Rik verses to be recited by the potā priest,—407, 421. (T. B. 3.12.9.5) Cf. Apast. Śr. xxii. 24.8,9.

"पौण्डरीकेऽश्वसहस्रं दक्षिणा." 329.

"पौर्णमासीमेव यजेत भ्रातृव्यवान् etc." 648—9,655.

पौष्णपेषण, an offering to pūshan,— 305,306—7.

the चात्वाल whilst remnants of cake etc are eaten and drunk (See Jhā's *Prābhākar. Mī.* pp. 172,199,218),—253,474—5,477,698.

प्रतिपद्, a Rik to be recited at the beginning of a Stotra (Mādhava).

[In Āpast-Śrauta iv. 9.2. The word **प्रतिपदि** is explained by "**प्रथमायामृच्यारंभे वा**" in the com ! In the Index Garbe renders it introductory verse'],—297.

प्रतिप्रधानमावर्त्तन्ते गुणाः, 287. See a passage on 16. (See Maxims, Part iii).

प्रतिप्रसव, a counter-order, an exception, 750.

"**प्रतिप्रस्थातः सवनीयान्निर्वपस्वेति प्रेष्यति**"

प्रतिसमानी: There are 2 examples of this verb (perhaps from Śrauta Sūtra) on p. 542. The abridged St Petersborg *alone* shows **नी** with the 3 upasargas, and gives Apast. Śrauta 7.14.8 (**प्रतिसमानीय**) as an example.

प्रतिहोम, a supplementary oblation to be offered when certain ceremonies have been omitted during a Jyotistoma (See Mādhava and Kunte on 6.5.40)717—8.

प्रतीक (?), 155—6.

प्रत्यक्ष, defined,—6.

प्रत्यक्षस्तु क्रेशो याग , 642.

प्रत्यगात्मन्, 'The individual himself'—395. See *J.R.A.S.* 1914, p. 304.

प्रत्याम्ना ('प्रत्याम्नेत्' in Sūtra 6.4 30), 'To take the place of,' to be substituted for something else. The noun **प्रत्याम्नाय** is used in explaining it, wh according to the Vāchaspatyam, means '*a substitute*'. So, too, **प्रत्याम्नान**. Yet, in his Index to the Āpast. Śrauta Sutras, Garbe renders both of them '*Corollary*' !,—691.

प्रत्याम्नाय, 692 (See above)

"**प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः**", 223.

(Paribhāṣā. See Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p. 57 etc).

"प्रदोषमग्निहोत्रं होतव्यं व्युष्टायां प्रातः", 648—9.

"प्रपिष्टानां कर्तव्या" (i. e. the रशना is to be made of crushed दर्भ),—378.

प्रभुत्वयोग, 'the relation of lordship or ownership' (with reference to the meaning of सर्वस्व in connection with विश्वजित), 742—3.

प्रमगन्दो राजा (Ṛv iii. 53.14) : The king of the Kikaṭas. See Vedic Index, 58.

प्रमत्तगीत, 'sung by (or song of) a mad man or drunkard' (See same in Mahābhāṣya vol i, p. 3),—160. 231.

प्रयत्नेनान्विच्छन्तो न चेद्दोषमवगच्छेमहि etc. 8. (Quoted in Nyāyamanjri, p. 173).

"प्रयाजशेषेण हवींष्यभिघारयति" 457.

प्रयाजा: 'fore offerings'—"oblations of clarified butter introductory to the chief Sacrifice" (note to Śatap. 1.3.2.8). There are 5 of them corresponding with the 5 seasons (1.5.3.1),—563.

"प्रयाजे प्रयाजे कृष्णलं जुहोति" 367,531. (T. S. 2.3.2.3. and Āpast. Śrauta xix. 21.10).

प्रयोगकाला द्विहितदङ्गं सदनुपकारकं भवति, 438.

प्रयोगप्राशुभावात् 'on all of rapidity of utterance (?),—537.

प्रवर The call to Agni or to a priest to assist at a Sacrifice (See Śatap. 1.4.2.1, and 1.5.1.1-Also *Kunte* on Sūtra 3.5.44 and *Vedic Index*),—128,360—1.

प्रवर्ग्य, the offering of heated milk as introductory to a Soma Sacrifice, 304. (See Eggeling on 3.4.4.1).

प्रवीण; a sequence determined by the procedure, or order of commencement (of a series of acts, to be followed throughout),—537,542,550,587.

प्रसह्यकारिन्, 101,682.

प्रस्तरप्रहरणन्याय, 252,698—9. (See Maxims iii).

'प्रस्तोता प्रस्तौति etc.", 397.

"प्रहृत्य परिधीन् जुहोति हारियोजनम्" (cf· Apast Srauta xiii. 17.1), 509.

प्रहेलकं, a sweetmeat (a Purodās'a as such),—94.

प्राक्रमिक 'one who undertakes much without finishing anything' (Said to occour in com. on Gout. Dharma Śāstra 9.73). **प्राक्रमिकोऽयं कापुरुषः** 504.

"**प्राचीनवशं करोति**" (T. S. 6. 1. 1. 1.) 317.

"**प्राचीं देवा अभजन्त**" (Ditts),—316.

"**प्राचीमाहरति** etc. (cf T. B. 3.2.1.3) 472 (**प्राची** is the name of a *branch*—not of a region).

"**प्राणभृत उपदधाति**" [**प्राणभृतः** is the name of certain bricks forming one of the layers of the Sacrificial altar. Śatap. viii. 1.17],—105.

"**प्राणापानावेवाभ्यमन्थत्ते**' (T. S. 2.5.2.4). 322.

"**प्रातः प्रातरनृतं त वदन्ति** etc.", 198. (Ait Br. v. 31, vol. 3, p. 192).

प्रातरनुवाक, 'morning-hymn' ["the Prātaranuvāka, or morning-prayer has to be recited by the Hotri in the latter part of the night before any sound (of birds etc.) is to be heard. It may begin immediately after midnight and conclude as soon as day light appears." Eggeling's note on Śatap. 3.9.3.10. For other references See *Vedic Index*.],—407,409,551

प्रातर्दोह, 377.

"**प्रायणीयेष्टि**, 'opening Sacrifice',—345 (Śatap 3.2.3, and See Eggeling's long note on para 6 of same).

प्रायदर्शन (Sūtra 2.3.16 "**विशये प्रायदर्शनात्** is rendered by Kunte—"In case of doubt the generality of texts (ought to determine the sense), and by Jhā—"In a doubtful case, the correct conclusion is arrived at by a *perception of similarity*",—184.

प्रायिक 'usual',—125,126,127.

प्राये (in Sutra 2.2.12 **'प्रायेदर्शनाच्च'** is rendered thus by Jhā:—"Also because the Sacrifice in question is mentioned in Vedic texts *as if it were* a primary Sacrifice." Kunte's transn. of the Sūtra is:—"(It is an original statement) because something is *frequently* described (as principal and important)",—146.

प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्याय (See **प्रवृत्ति**), 542.

प्राशित्र The portion of the Havis eaten by the Brāhman at a Sacrifice. [In a note on , 1.7.4.10 Eggeling says:—"According to Kāty. iii. 4,7 the *prātitra*, or Brāhmaṇa's portion, is to be of the size of a barley or pippala berry"], 241,676.

प्रासन: The throwing of the black deer's horn into the pit (**चात्वाल**) as in Śat. 4.4.5.2 and T. S. 6.1.3.8,—478—9.

प्रीति, secular pleasure, the desire of gain, is said to be the motive for man's action,—435,438.

प्रीतिर्हि स्वर्गः स्वर्गश्च प्रीतिं प्रार्थयते,—500.

"**प्रैतु होतुश्चमसः** etc.",—349, 350,356 (Śatap. 4.2.1.29 and *Āpast. Śr.* xii. 23.13).

प्रैष, 'an order',—408,423,772. ["A liturgical term meaning 'direction' or 'invitation', repeatedly found in later Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas': *Vedic Index*].

प्रैषार्थकारिन् The performer of the sense of a Sacrificial direction,—424.

प्रोक्षणी (in Sūtra 1.4.11), to be taken in its literal (**यौगिक**) sense,—95.

"**प्रोक्षणीरासादय:** etc",—95,423,772 (*Āpast. Srauta* 2.3.11).

फलचमस, 'a cup contaning crushed figs of the Jricns Indica with Sour milk, as a Substitute for Soma juice (See com? on *Āpast. Sraut* xii. 24.5), 362, Said to be inferior to Soma, 381.

* 'If they should rise up without completing it'—i. e. if they should fail to carry it to completion.

* Āpast. Śaruta xiv 24. 1.

*ईर्त्सेत्=सिद्धिमिच्छेत् *Paraskara Grihya* 1.5 718

* *Sankhayana* Śr. ii. 20 1

वाक्यभेद, 'Split of the Sentence,'—133. [See Note on p. 177 of voli, of Thibaut's Transn of Vedāntabhāṣya.]

"**वाग्वै देवेभ्योऽपाक्रामद्यज्ञायातिष्ठमाना**" (T. S. 6.1.4.1),—478.

"**वाग्वै हविष्कृत्**" (Śatap. 1.1.4.11 and note), 250.

वाजपेय, "N. of one of the 7 forms of Soma Sacrifice (offered by kings or Brāhmaṇas aspiring to the highest position, and preceding the Rājasūya and Bṛihaspati-Sava)". *MW.* It is dealt with in Śatap. v. 1. 1 etc. See, too, Eggeling's preface to vol. iii, pp xi and xxiii. For this sacrifice **नीवार** is prescribed instead of **व्रीहि** [Jai. ix. 2.40],—91,153,410, 416,419,456,507,772. [*See Vedic Index*]

"**वाजपेयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत**," 456.

"**वाजपेयेनेष्ट्वा बृहस्पतिसवेन यजेत**," 507,514.

"**वाजस्य मा प्रसवेन** etc," 419 (T. S. 1.1.13.1)

वाजिन 'whey,' from which the curds (**आमिक्षा**) have been separated,—157,448,449,450. [See *Vedic Index*]

वाजिनन्याय, 449.

"**वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम्**": ['The whey (vājina) is offered to the (divine) coursers, i. e. the regions or quarters' (Eggeling's note on ix, 5.1.57. See too, 2.4.4.22, and *Vedic Index*.],—157,449.

II.—STUDIES IN HINDU LAW.

BY GANGA NATHA JHA.

Chapter III.

Judicial Procedure.

In this Chapter we shall reproduce the words of Nārada, whose work, among the *Smṛtis*, contains the fullest and most comprehensive description of the subject, and as such may be regarded as the oldest complete account. Nārada's Smṛti has been translated by Jolly, but from a minor version of the text (as explained by himself in his edition of Nārada's Text, Bib. Indica). But for our present purposes, as affording a glimpse of the subject as dealt with by an old Smṛti-writer, this minor version is sufficient. We shall, however, supplement it with explanations from some of the older Digests, and also with certain verses which are quoted by these as Nārada's. The most important among these verses are those dealing with the procedure to be adopted regarding the filing of the Plaint, the Answer and so forth. In the next Chapter an attempt shall be made to codify the Procedure as deduced from the various Smṛtis, with explanations from the more important Digests.

I *Introductory.*

1. Virtue having become extinct among men, judicial procedure has been established; and the king having the privilege of inflicting punishments, has been instituted judge of law-suits.

2. Written proof and witnesses are the two expedients to be resorted to for ascertaining disputed facts in a contest between two litigants.

3. Law-suits are of two kinds, attended by wager, or not attended by wager; attended by wager are those, where it is promised in a written declaration to discharge *a certain sum over and above the fine in case of defeat.*

4. In a law-suit attended by wager, the loser has to pay the wager made by himself, and a fine, to the king.

5. But the declaration is pronounced to be the essence of a judicial proceeding: if he gets the worst of it, the claimant loses his cause; if he gets the better of it, he wins it.

6. Family-councils (*kula*), companies (of artisans), *shreṇī*, assemblies (of cohabitants), *gaṇa*, an appointed judge (*adhikṛta*). and the king himself are resorts for the trial of law-suits; and among these, the last in order is superior to the preceding.

Medhātithi (Manu 8.2) explains this verse; where '*shreṇī*' is described as 'organisation of persons belonging to the same trade', 'trade-guilds';—'*gaṇa*', 'tribes', as 'companies of builders and other artisans'; he distinguishes '*shreṇī*' from '*gaṇa*' as consisting in the fact that, while the former may consist of artisans working singly, the latter consists of such artisans only as work together. He quotes another explanation, whereby '*kula*' stands for *neutral or disinterested person.*

7. The Law, the issue of the case, the conduct of the parties, and an edict from the king: these are the four feet of a judicial proceeding; each following is weightier than the preceding.

This is quoted by the *Aparārka* (P. 597).

8. Law is based upon truth; the issue of the case depends upon the deposition of the witnesses; the conduct of the parties becomes manifest at the trial; the king's Edict depends upon the king's pleasure.

As rendered above by Jolly, the verse does not give good sense. It is read and explained by the *Aparārka* (P. 597)

differently from the above. Reading *'Sabhye'* for *'Satye'* (which is apparently Jolly's reading), it explains the first clause as 'Law is dependent upon the members of the Court'. It proceeds to explain:—'vyavahāra', Judicial Procedure, is said to be dependent upon witnesses, because the decision is based upon these latter.—*'Charitram'* stands for *custom* prevailing at the time in the country and in the family or tribe; and this is dependent upon *'pustakaraṇa'*, i. e. document; as those customs alone are to be regarded as authoritative which have been reduced to writing. [Jolly's reading appears to be defective]—*'Shāsanam'* stands for the *suppression of the wicked*; and this is dependent upon the 'king's orders' or 'Edicts'.—Among these 'the following is weightier than the preceding' (verse 7): For instance (a) Judicial Procedure supersedes the Law in the case where a Religious Student having committed a crime, the legal punishment for which is 'death', if the witnesses, with the clear intention of saving the man from that penalty, depose falsely; in this case the Court cannot acquit the man;—(b) Judicial Procedure is superseded by Custom in a case where it is proved that a man has committed adultery with a woman, and he deserves to be punished for it; but if the woman is found to belong to a tribe put down on the king's records as one among whom adultery is not considered wrong, then the man escapes punishment;—(c) Custom is superseded by the King's Edict in a case where though the written local custom is that the Brāhmaṇa's house should not be entered by the king's officers, yet if a Brāhmaṇa's house is known to harbour thieves, the officers shall enter it under orders of the king.

The explanation of the verse as given by Parāsharamādhava (P. 14) favours Jolly's rendering.

9. A judicial proceeding is said to have four courses, because it takes a different course according as the different expedients of conciliation etc. are adopted. It is said to benefit four, because it protects the four orders.

10. It is said to regard four, because the perpetrator of the deed, the witnesses, the judges, and the king are equally concerned by it. (Ch. ii 18).

11. Because it promotes justice, gain, glory, renown, therefore it is said to produce four results.

12. The eight constituent parts of a judicial proceeding are the king, his officer, the assessors, the law-look, the accountant, and scribe, gold and fire for ordeals, and water for refreshment.

13. Recovery of a Debt, Deposits, Concerns among Partners, Abstraction of Gift, Breach of promised Obedience,

14. Non-payment of Wages, Sale without Owner-ship, Non-delivery of a commodity sold, Rescission of Purchase,

15. Breach of Order, Contests about Boundaries, the Duties of Man and Wife, the Law of Inheritance, Violence,

16. Abuse and Assault, Gambling, and Miscellaneous Disputes; these are the eighteen heads of dispute.

17. Of these again there are one hundred and eight subdivisions; therefore a judicial proceeding is said to have a hundred ramifications, owing to the diversity of men's claims.

This verse is quoted in the Aparārka (P. 597).

18. Because it is instituted from one of these three causes: love, anger, and cupidity, therefore it is said to have three causes; these are the three motives for going to law.

19. It is said to have two kinds of claims, because they rest either on suspicion or on facts; on suspicion, if the defendant has frequented bad society; on facts, if the stolen goods are produced.

20. Because it concerns two parties, it is said to have two sides; of these the charge is called claim, the rejoinder answer.

21. Because both true and false statements are made n course of a judicial proceeding, it is said to have two

courses: a true statement is one agreeing with the facts, a false one is a wrong one.

22. A dutiful king shall check falsehood where it has not been checked by others, and strive after truth, since it is justice that happiness springs from.

23. Therefore a king having seated himself on the throne of judgment, should discard interested motives, and deal even-handed justice to all his subjects, as if he were Vaivasvata himself.

24. He should carefully examine all claims, one after the other, according to the respective rank of the claimants, considering what would be useful or injurious, and just or unjust.

25. Taking the law-code for his guide, and abiding by the opinion pronounced by the chief judge.

This is quoted by the Aparārka (P. 600) as laying down the necessity of appointing a Judge; and in support of the view that if a case is being tried by the King himself, the Judge should also be there to advise him.

26. Firstly, the litigants have to appear before the court, secondly the drift of their dispute has to be expounded, then comes the examination, and lastly the sentence ; thus the trial of a law-suit consists of four parts.

27. The trial should be conducted discreetly and skilfully, and without neglecting either sacred or profane rules of conduct.

The Aparārka (P. 600) quotes this in support of the view that all kinds of laws have to be considered and reconciled.

28. Where religious and secular rules are at variance, the secular rules have to be put aside and the religious precepts to be followed.

Cf. Yājñavalkya —*Arthashāstrāttu balavad dharmashāstramiti sthitih.*

29. The law ordains to take logic for one's guide, when the sacred law cannot be applied, for the evidence in a law-suit is more decisive than the law, and overrules the law.

30. Let the judge proceed slowly in all trials relating to debt and so on, on account of the intricacy of law-cases and the insufficiency of memory.

31. If the defendant does not speak, he must be confined and punished according to law, and if he does not refute the statement of his adversary, he has to pay the money, which he is sued for.

32. A charge relating to a cow, land, gold, a woman, theft, the two kinds of insult, and violence, has to be answered immediately. [Cf. Mitākṣarā, P. 280]

33. One may wait for one day, for five, or three days, or three half-months, or seven days, if the claim relates to a debt or the like.

34. He who tries to enforce a claim, without giving notice to the king previously, shall receive a severe punishment, and his claim shall be rejected.

35. A claimant may arrest his adversary until the arrival of the summons, if the latter tries to evade the claim he is about to prefer, or does not refute his charge.

The *Aparārka* (P. 607) quotes this verse and explains 'summons' as the 'summons-bearer'.

36. Arrest is four-fold: local, temporary, inhibition from travelling, and from pursuing one's occupation; and the person under arrest is not allowed to break it.

The *Aparārka* (P. 607) quotes this verse, and adds the following explanation: The arrest is 'local' when the culprit is prevented from entering certain places; it is 'temporary' when food is denied to him for a certain time;—'occupation', such as cultivating of land and so forth.

37. No culpability attaches to him who breaks an arrest put upon him while crossing a river or while passing a forest,

in an inhospitable country, or, generally speaking, in perilous circumstances.

38. One who, having been arrested at a proper time, breaks his arrest, is to be fined and one arresting improperly is liable to penalty.

39. One desirous of celebrating his nuptials, afflicted with an illness, about to perform a sacrifice, distressed, sued by another party, employed in the king's service,

40. Cowherds while tending their cattle, husbandmen in the act of cultivation, artisans engaged in their trades, soldiers engaged in warfare,

41. A minor, a messenger, one about to give alms or fulfilling a vow, and one surrounded by difficulties, must not be arrested by the adversary nor summoned by the king.

These three verses are quoted in the *Aparārka* (P. 607).

42. A person arraigned, not having refuted the adversary's charge, cannot bring forward any claim, nor is it allowed to injure one accused by another party by trying to intimidate him.

43. No one must alter the charge he has brought before the judge; he who rests his claim on different grounds from those first adduced by him, loses his cause. (Cf. *Mitā.*, P. 272).

44. Nor must one bring forward a false claim; for it is a sin unjustly to accuse a man; the punishment inflicted in such lawsuits falls upon the claimant.

45. A man may delay his answer, as long as the law permits it; if he does not speak in the judicial assembly, or alters his former statements, it shows that he is in the wrong.

46. He who does not obey the summons or, having appeared before the court, does not answer the charge, is to be fined by the king as having lost his cause.

47. After the sentence has been passed, evidence is to no purpose, unless it consist in the deposition of witnesses, or in documents, referred to in a former stage of the trial.

(This is quoted in the Aparārka P. 630).

48. As the powers of rain are lavished upon ripe grain, so evidence is no longer useful, if once the decision has been passed.

49. Even false statements are examined if made in proper time; but what is left unsaid through inadvertency has no effect, even though it be true.

50. He who thinks a law-case to have been wrongly decided and judged, may have it tried anew, if he pays the double amount of the fine inflicted.

51. If an unjust sentence has been passed, the judges have to pay the fine; for nobody certainly commits an offence without being liable to punishment for it.

52. Whether it be through passion, ignorance, or avarice, that a judge pronounces an unfair opinion. he must be considered as no assessor of the court, and the king should severely punish that sinful man.

53. But a king, especially, who is careful to discharge his duty, must endeavour to distinguish right from wrong, because human minds are subtle.

54. There are men who bear false testimony from avarice; and there are other wicked men who forge written documents.

55. Therefore both documents and witnesses have to be carefully examined by the king, the former by inquiring into the condition of the writing, the latter by inquiring into the nature of their deposition.

56. There are skilful men who imitate the hand-writing of others; therefore similarity of handwriting affords no conclusive proof.

57. Liars may have the bearing of veracious men, and veracious men look like liars. Men in general appear in various shapes; thus caution is required.

58. Hence it is right to examine a fact strictly, even though it occurred in the inquirer's own sight. He who ascertains facts by rigid investigation, does not deviate from justice.

Additional verses (not translated by Jolly) quoted and explained in the Aparārka:-

1. 'No law-suit shall be admitted—which is filed by one against several persons, or which is filed against women or slaves, or that between teacher and his pupil, or between father and son, or between husband and wife, or between master and servant';—and it adds the following explanations:- One man cannot sue several persons simultaneously; if he has claims against several persons, he should file them separately;—if one has claims against women, he shall sue their guardians; but milkmaids and women selling wine may be sued by themselves;—similarly for claims against slaves, their masters have to be sued.—If the pupil has been chastised by the Teacher in accordance with law, it is not open to the pupil to prefer against him a charge of assault. Similarly in the case of father and son. (P. 610)

2. 'Before the Defendant has filed his answer, the Plaintiff shall set forth in writing all that he desires to state.' (P. 611)

3. 'That man should be permitted to make his statement first whose suffering may be greatest, or whose suit may be most important,—not necessarily one who has filed his suit first'. (P.611)

4. 'When the Plaintiff has stated his claim, the Defendant should state his answer traversing the claim, which

should be firm, definite, consistent, set forth in clear language';—i.e. in words which do not stand in need of amplifications or explanations.

5. 'This answer may be in the form of (1) Denial ('The claim is untrue'—'I know nothing of this claim'—'I was not present at the time of the transaction'—'I was not even born at the time')—or (2) Admission (of the truthfulness of the claim),—or (3) Confutation—admitting the claim but confuting it (as already paid)—or (4) Citation of a Previous Decision.' (Pp. 612-613)

6. 'In criminal cases, the person who committed the offence first should be punished more heavily; where the two parties assaulted each other simultaneously, the punishment should be equal'. (P. 617)

7. 'A party is *non-suited* in four ways : (1) By making an answer which does not touch the claim, (2) by vitiating the proceedings, (3) by not answering the summons, (4) by not making an answer, and (5) by absconding after being summoned'. (P. 621)

[What is meant by 'vitiating the proceedings' is explained in the following verse:—]

8. 'Even on the clear presentation of facts, if he does not accept it,—after having denied a fact, if he reverts to it,—after having declared that he has witnesses in support of his contention, if he fails to name them,—the party should be declared *non-suited*.' (PP. 621-622)

9. 'If the parties should come to a mutual understanding, after the suit has been filed, and the Plaint and the Answer duly presented,—they should be fined double the amount of the claim.' (P. 622)

10. 'In a case where several claims have been filed against a man, and he has denied all of them,—if only a part of the claim is substantiated, the man should be made to make good all the claims'. (P. 625)

II.

On Courts of Justice.

1. One who is not appointed to be a member of the court must on no account speak at the trial of a law-suit; but by him, who has been appointed, an impartial opinion ought to be given.

2. Whether appointed or not appointed, one who is conversant with the law has a right to speak; for he whose conduct is regulated by the law, delivers a speech inspired by the deity.

This verse is quoted by the Aparārka (P. 604).

3. For the trial of all law-suits persons familiar with many branches of science should be appointed; no prudent man would entrust this task to a single person, though a virtuous one.

4. Whatever judgment ten men versed in the Veda and jurisprudence, or three men familiar with the Veda, pass upon the case in hand, is right and valid sentence.

5. The king alone, being the supreme ruler, is entitled to decide knotty law-cases; therefore private man should not pass a sentence alone; his opinion would leave room for doubt.

6. The king should appoint, as members of the court, honest men of tried integrity, who are able to support the burden of the administration of justice like bulls bearing heavy load.

7. The assessors of the king's courts of judicature should be men skilled in matters of law, sprung from good families, veracious, and impartial towards friend and foe.

8. Either the court must not be entered, or law and truth must be openly declared; but that man is a criminal who either says nothing, or speaks falsely.

9. But judges who, after having repaired to the court, sit there in silent meditation, and do not deliver a candid opinion, as they ought, are all guilty of a deliberate falsehood.

10. One quarter of the iniquity committed falls upon the party in a cause, one quarter on his witnesses, one quarter upon all the assessors of the court, and one quarter on the king.

11. Therefore should a judge, when he has entered the court, divest himself from both love and hatred, and deliver a fair opinion, in order that he may not go to hell.

12. The king is blameless, the judges are absolved from iniquity, the sin falls upon the sinner's head alone, when those who deserve punishment receive it.

13. When all the members of a judicial assembly opine, "this is right," the court is relieved from the dart of iniquity; but the dart remains in the wound, if they do not say so.

14. That is not a judicial assembly where the elders are missing, nor are they elders who do not pronounce a just opinion, nor is that a just opinion which is against equity, nor is that equitable which is contaminated with fraud.

III.

On Evidence by writing.

1. Written proof, witnesses, and possession, these are the three kinds of evidence, on which the right of property rests, and by means of which a creditor may recover his loan.

2. A document remains always evidence, witnesses as long as they live, and possession becomes evidence after a lapse of time; thus it is propounded in the law-books.

3. What a man is not possessed of, that is not his own, even though there be written proof, and even though witnesses be living; this is especially the case with immovables.

4. If a man foolishly suffers his property to be enjoyed by strangers, it will become those strangers' own through the effect of possession, although the proprietor is known to be alive.

5. Whatever property a proprietor sees with his own eyes being enjoyed by strangers, without for ten years asserting his rights, may not be recovered by him.

6. Because he has been indulgent and looking on without asserting his rights, therefore he will be nonsuited, if (cf. C13) he prefers a claim after the expiration of the above-mentioned period.

7. If he is neither an idiot nor a mere child, and if the chattel is being enjoyed by a stranger while he is near, his property in it is extinct by law, and the adverse possessor shall keep it.

8. Pledges, boundaries, the property of children, common deposits, sealed deposits, women, and goods belonging to the king or learned Brahmins are not lost to the owner through their being possessed by a stranger.

9. Even pledges etc., are lost, if strangers have enjoyed them for twenty years before the owner's eyes; the property of women and of kings is excepted from this rule.

10. The property of women and of kings can never be lost, even though it be enjoyed for hundreds of years by strangers who have no title to it.

11. Where possession exists, but not title whatever exists, there a title, but not possession alone, can confer proprietory rights.

12. A title having been substantiated, the possession becomes valid; it remains invalid without a proved title.

13. He who simply declares himself possessed of a commodity without having a title to it, is to be considered as a thief, in consequence of his pleading such illegitimate possession.

14. He who enjoys without a title for ever so many years, the king of the land should inflict on that sinner the punishment of a thief.

15. What a man possesses without a title, he must not alienate, being only the possessor of it; but after the death of the possessor such possessions devolve upon his family.

16. In cases falling within the memory of man, possession of land with a title makes evidence. In cases extending beyond the memory of man, the hereditary succession of three ancestors is admitted as evidence, though the title be not produced.

17. If a man is accused by him whom he has injured by taking possession of his property. he cannot escape defeat; only what has formerly been possessed by his fathers, and inherited by him in order, is his legitimate property.

18. When possession has been held, even unlawfully, by three ancestors, including the father of the present occupant, that cannot be taken away from him, as having gone in order through three lives. [This is quoted by Medhātithi on Manu 8.148],

19. Common deposits (*anvāhita*), stolen goods (*hṛta*), unspecified deposits (*nyasta*), deposits for whose delivery a certain period has been fixed (?) (*balāvaṣṭabdhayāhitam*), and what is being possessed in secret (*'apratyakṣaṃ yad bhuktam'*), are six things possessed without a title.

[Jolly's rendering is defective. Medhātithi (on Manu

8.148) has explained this verse as follows: '*anvāhita*' is that deposit which is fraudulent, what is actually deposited being different from what has been previously shown;—'*hṛtam*' is what is *stolen* by breaking open a wall etc., while '*balāvaṣṭabdha*' is what is robbed by open violence; '*yāchita*' is what is obtained by begging; '*nyasta*' and '*apratyakṣam*' are as rendered by Jolly.]

20. If a litigant dies while a law-suit about possessions of his is pending, the son has to prove his title, the fact of his possession being insufficient to decide the suit.

21. What has been in the hands of three ancestors for a very long time, though they had no title, cannot be lost, having gone in order through three lives.

22. After the death of a creditor, even witnesses are no longer of avail, except if a statement made by the creditor himself on his death-bed has been preserved.

23. For after the death of an adversary the deposition of his witnesses loses its force, an attested document only being capable of influencing the sentence in this case.

24. But if a man not unsound in mind has preferred a legitimate claim, a witness may give evidence even after the claimant's death, in case it be in a matter touching the six cases of deposit and the rest.

25. In all business-transactions the latest act shall prevail, but in the case of a gift, a pledge, or a purchase, the prior act has the greater force.

26. A contract of delivery and receipt may be made, with a view to gains by the lender on the principal sum, while remaining with the debtor; it is called a loan on interest, and money-lenders acquire their substance by it.

27. What is given by force, what is by force enjoyed,

by force caused to be written, and all other things done by force, Manu has pronounced void.

28. If the creditor's claim ceases to be admissible through length of time, he may still substantiate it by means of a document, if his tribe acknowledge his claim, or if he has a pledge, or can prove occupancy of the land in question.

29. Written proof is declared to be of two sorts, the first, in the handwriting of the party himself, the second, in that of another person, the former being valid without subscribing witnesses, the latter requiring to be attested: the validity of both depends on the usage established in the country.

30. That instrument which is not adverse to peculiar local usages, which declares the nature of the pledge made, and which is consistent in import and language, is termed proof.

31. That instrument is not termed proof, which is executed by a person intoxicated, by one under duress, by a female, by a child, and that which is effected by force, by intimidation, and by fraud.

32. A written contract loses its validity in that case also, if the witnesses, creditor, debtor, and writer be dead, unless its validity be insured by means of a pledge.

33. If anything has been received or a public announcement been made, a contract retains its validity even after the death of the witnesses.

34. Pledges are declared to be of two sorts, movable and immovable; both are valid when there is actual enjoyment, and not otherwise.

35. An instrument which has been produced in due season, proclaimed in public, and repeatedly called into

remembrance, remains always evidence, even after the death of the witnesses.

36. An instrument, whose purport nobody has heard of, which has remained unknown, or become the object of a law-suit, has no validity, not even while the witnesses are living.

37. In the case of an instrument being deposited in another country, or burnt, or badly written, or stolen, time must be allowed, if it be in existence; if it be so in existence, the evidence of those who have seen it must be resorted to.

38. If there exist doubts about a document, whether it be genuine or not, its authenticity must be proved by the handwriting of the party himself, by evidence of the contract, which it records, by peculiar marks, and by reasonable inference.

39. If a document bears the name of a stranger and is designed for a different purpose, its authenticity has to be established with especial care by examining the connexion and former dealings of the two parties.

40. A document written by the party himself must be authenticated by examining the writing, and an attested document be authenticated by examining the witnesses. Witnesses are overruled by documents, not documents by witnesses.

41. If a document is split in two, or torn, or stolen, or effaced, or destroyed, or badly written, another document must be executed. This is the rule regarding documents.

IV

On Evidence by Witnesses and by Ordeal.

1. In doubtful cases, when there are two conflicting parties, the facts have to be ascertained by the deposition of witnesses, as to what was seen, heard, or understood by them.

2. He has to be considered as a witness who has witnessed a deed with his ears or eyes; with his ears, if the perpetrator of the deed has been speaking; with his eyes, if he has been committing an action.

3. Eleven descriptions of witnesses are recognised in law by the learned, five of which are made, and the remaining six are not made.

4. A witness by record, by memory, by accident, by secrecy, and by corroboration, these are the five classes of made witnesses.

5. But the witnesses not made have been declared by the wise to be six-fold, of which three are not appointed.

6. The fellow-villagers, a judge, a kindred, one authorized to manage the affairs of the parties, one deputed by the claimant.

7. In family disputes, persons of the same family shall be witnesses. A smaller number of witnesses than three is objectionable, and they should be blameless, decent, and intelligent persons.

8. They may be either Brahmans, or Vaishyas, or Kṣattriyas or else unimpeachable Shudras. Each of these shall be witness for persons of his own order, or for any order, if there are no witnesses of the same order.

9. Among companies of artisans, men who are artisans shall be witnesses; and men of one tribe among those of the same; foresters among those living outside; and women among women.

10. And if in any association, etc., any one falls out with his associates, he shall not bear testimony with regard to them; for they are all his enemies.

11. The incompetent witnesses too have in the law-books been declared by the learned to be of five sorts, by reason of interdict, of delinquency, of contradiction, of voluntary deposition, and of intervening decease.

12. Learned Brahmans, etc., by interdict; thieves, etc. if their delinquency has become public; by reason of contradiction, i. e. if there is no agreement between the witnesses in a law-suit.

13. Voluntary deposition is when a man comes and offers his evidence without having been asked to do so. Incompetent by intervening decease are all witnesses after the death of the claimant, except those instructed by him on the point of death.

14. Learned Brahmans, ascetics, superannuated persons. and religious devotees, are those incapacitated by interdict: there is no other reason given for it.

15. Thieves, public offenders, violent persons, gamblers, murderers, are incompetent from delinquency; there is no truth in them.

16. If the statements of witnesses, who have been summoned by the king for the decision of an action, do not agree, they are rendered incompetent by contradiction.

17. He who, without having been appointed, comes and offers his evidence, is termed a spy in the law-books: he is not worthy to bear testimony.

18. How can any person bear testimony, if the claimant is no longer in existence, whose claim should have been heard ? Such a person is an incompetent witness by reason of intervening decease.

19. If both parties in a dispute have witnesses, the witnesses of that party shall be heard which has brought forward the claim.

(This is quoted by the *Aparārka* P. 624).

20. In such cases only, where the claimant is worsted in the trial, the witnesses of the defendant have to be examined.

(This is quoted in the *Aparārka* P. 624).

21. For the defendant answers word for word to the charge brought forward by his adversary; and indicating every error in the assertions of the latter, he points out the true state of the case.

22. No one should secretly confer with a witness summoned by his adversary; neither should he cause him to differ with another: a person resorting to such practices loses his suit.

23. If a witness dies or goes abroad after having received the summons, those who have heard his deposition, may give evidence; for a second-hand statement is evidence also.

24. Even after a great lapse of time a written document does not lose its validity; if a man can write, he should commit it to writing himself; if he cannot write himself, he should not cause it to be written by others.

25. The deposition of witness by record remains valid up to the eighth year, that of a witness come by accident remains valid up to the fifth year.

26. The deposition of a secret witness remains valid up to the third year; the deposition of a witness by corroboration is declared to lose its validity after one year.

27. Or no definite period is adhered to in judging the validity of a deposition; for those learned in law have said that testimony depends upon memory.

28. He whose intellect, memory, or hearing, has never been deranged, may give valid evidence even after a very considerable lapse of time.

29. But six different kinds of law-cases have been indicated by the wise, in which witnesses are not concerned; evident signs take in these cases the place of the deposition of witnesses.

30. One taken with a firebrand in his hand is manifestly an incendiary; one taken with a weapon in his hand is

known to be a murderer; if a man and another man's wife are seen to play with one another's hair, the man must be an adulterer.

31. One who goes about with a hatchet in his hand, is a destroyer of bridges: one who is carrying an axe, is a destroyer of trees.

32. One covered with hideous marks is a public offender. In all such cases witnesses are superfluous: only in the last-mentioned case of violence close scrutiny is required.

33. Some one might make marks upon his person on purpose to injure an enemy. Therefore persons of acute perception should investigate such cases.

34. One interested in the subject-matter, a friend, a servant, an enemy, one perjured, a sick or infamous person, cannot be made a witness.

35. The king cannot be made a witness, nor mean artificers, nor public dancers and singers, nor a slave, nor a cheat, nor one exhausted, nor a decrepit old man, nor a woman, nor a child, nor a potter.

36. Nor can the following persons be made witnesses: one intoxicated, a madman, a negligent or distressed person, one extremely grieved, a gamester, a village priest, one who is gone out upon a long pilgrimage, one engaged in transmarine commerce, an ascetic, a scholar;

37. One deformed, a single person, a learned Brahman, a man of a vile class, an eunuch, a public dancer or singer, an atheist, an apostate, one who has deserted his wife or his holy fire, one who makes illicit offerings;

38. One who eats from the same dish as the defendant in a law-suit, a servant, a member of the highest class, kinsmen, one formerly perjured, a dancer, one who lives by selling poison (?), a snake-catcher;

39. A poisoner, an incendiary, a butcher, the son of a Shudra, one excluded from society, one oppressed by

fatigue, a public offender, one exhausted, one who has suffered his fire to go out;

40. One who associates with people of wicked habits, an idiot, a seller of oil or roots, one who is possessed by a demon, an enemy of the king, weather-prophets, and astrologers;

41. A juggler, an avaricious or cruel person, enemies of a company of merchants, or an association of kinsmen, an irreligious man, one self-sold, one who has a limb too little, a Bhagavritti;

42. One who has bad nails or black teeth, a leper, one who betrays his friends, an idiot, a seller of spirits, a murderer, a leather-manufacturer, a lame man, an outcast, a forger;

43. An impostor, one who has eaten too much, a robber, a follower of the king;

44. One who sells men, animals, meat, bones, honey, milk, water, or butter, a Brahman, and a member of a twice-born class who is guilty of usury;

45. A man sprung from a good family, who neglects the duties of his class, a panegyrist, one who serves low people, one who quarrels with his father, and a mischief-maker.

46. Nor a child, a woman, one man alone, an evil-doer, relatives, and enemies, because they would bear false testimony.

47. A child would speak falsely from ignorance, a woman from levity, an evil-doer from habitual depravity, relatives from affection, enemies from desire of revenge.

48. By consent of both litigants even a single person may be a witness, and must be examined before the court.

49. One who is oppressed by the conscience of his

guilty looks as if he was ill, is constantly shifting his position, and runs after every man;

50. Who suddenly coughs without reason, and draws repeated sighs; who scratches as if writing with his feet and who shakes his arm and clothes;

51. Whose countenance changes colour, whose forehead sweats, and whose lips become dry; who looks above and about him;

52. Who talks a great deal without restraint, like a man in haste, and without being asked, such a person is manifestly a false witness, and should receive severe punishment.

53. The above-mentioned persons, slaves, impostors, and the like, shall nevertheless be admitted to bear testimony, with due consideration of the weight of the case in hand.

54. In all cases of violence, theft, adultery, and both kinds of insult, the witnesses should not be scrutinised.

55. He who does not give his evidence, although he has related what he knows to others, deserves extreme punishment; for he is worse than a false witness.

56. If a witness speaks falsely through covetousness, he shall be fined a thousand panas; if through distraction of mind, two hundred and fifty, or the lowest amercement; if through terror, the middling amercement; if through friendship, four times the lowest;

57. If through lust, ten times the lowest amercement; if through wrath, three times the next or middlemost; if through ignorance, two hundred complete: if through inattention, a hundred only.

58. The judge, having summoned the witnesses, and bound them down firmly by an oath, shall examine them

separately, all of them familiar with the rules of duty and acquainted with the circumstances of the case.

59. Let him cause a priest to swear by his veracity, a Ksattriya by his horse or elephant and his weapons, a Vaishya by his kine, grain, or gold, a Shudra by all possible crimes.

60. By ancient holy texts, which extol the pre-eminence of truth and denounce falsehood, let him inspire them with deep awe.

61. If there be contradictory evidence, the plurality of witnesses decides the case; if the number of witnesses on both sides in a law-case is found to be equal, the defendant must be absolved.

62. The deposition of the witnesses loses its validity in this case on account of the subtlety of evidence by witnesses. But if a litigant is, by the act of fate, abandoned by his witnesses in a law-suit.

63. The wise will not have him absolved even through an ordeal. If a witness gives unmeaning evidence, the deposition of the appointed witnesses being full of meaning, his testimony is as good as ungiven.

64. If the witnesses were to disagree with one another as to place, time, age, matter, usages, tribe, or class,

65. Such depositions, too, are worthless. If the witnesses name too low or too high a sum,

66. This too must be known to make no evidence. This is the rule of witnesses.

67. If, owing to the negligence of the creditor, both a written contract and witnesses are missing, and the defendant denies his obligation, three kinds of measures may be had recourse to:

68. Repeated admonitions, subtle ratiocination, and,

thirdly, an oath : these are the measures which a judge should successively resort to.

69. He who does not refute his adversary's statements, though he has been called upon to do so repeatedly, three or four or five times, will consequently be bound to pay the debt.

70. If the defendant has resisted such an admonition, he shall aggress him by subtle ratiocination founded upon place, time, and matter, upon the connexions of the party, circumstantial evidence, the nature of the case, and so forth.

71. If reasonable inference also leads to no result, let him cause the defendant to undergo one of the ordeals, by fire, water, proof of virtue, and so forth, according to the time of the year and to the strength of the defendant.

72. He whom the blazing fire burns not, whom the water soon forces not up, or who meets with no speedy misfortune, must be held veracious in his testimony on oath. He is freed from the charge: otherwise he is guilty.

73. Let ordeals be administered if an offence has been committed in a solitary forest, at night, in the interior of a house, and in cases of violence, and of denial of a deposit.

74. The same rule holds good in regard to women accused of bad morals, in cases of theft and robbery, and in all cases of denial of an obligation.

III.—THEISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

By Gopi Nath Kaviraj

Part II

The Non-theistic Systems.

I have given in the foregoing pages a bare outline of the different theories relating to the origin of things. I now propose to deal more particularly with the principal notions of some of the recognized schools of non-theistical philosophy which bear, directly or in a remote way, on the problem of Theism. An exhaustive treatment of the subject is *prima facie* impossible within the compass of these pages, but I have nevertheless endeavoured not to exclude from my scope or dismiss unexamined any of the more important doctrines.

A. The Chārvāka view.

First and foremost among the philosophies which deny the existence of a Personal God stands the material school of the Chārvākas. Though this school of thought owing to its gross sensationalism had never succeeded in striking its roots deep into the soil of the country it still possessed an interest, almost unique in character, partly theoretical—in the eyes of controversialists, and partly even practical, though only to a very limited number. Its doctrines, if doctrines they could at all be called, were most mercilessly exposed by all the other systems, orthodox as well as heterodox ; and if they have survived to-day they have done so simply as so many ill-formulated theses without any pretention to speculative value.

Tradition ascribes to Brihaspati the foundation of the philosophy of materialism*. An adherent of this school of thought is therefore usually known as Bārhaspatya. Cf. Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha, pp. 210—18; Sarvadarśana Sangraha (Poona Ed.), p. 4. That Brihaspati was not a mythical personage is evideant from the Sūtras extant in quotation under his name:

The founder.

Cf. (1) Bhāskara Bhāsya on the Vedānta Sūtra 3.3.53:

(a) पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि ।†
(b) तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा ।
(c) तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम् ।
(d) किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवद् विज्ञानम् ।

(2) Śaṅkara's commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra 3. 3. 53:

(a) तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम् ।
(b) मदशक्तिवद् विज्ञानम् ।
(c) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।‡

* It is hard to say anything conclusively in regard to the identity of this Brihaspati with the scholar of the same name who is associated with the foundation of a school of politics. Bhāsa in the Pratimā (5th Act) and Kauṭilya in his Arthaśāstra refer, the latter very frequently, to Brihaspati as the author of an Arthaśāstra; and it is interesting to observe that in the विद्यासमुद्देश section of Kauṭilya's work Mysore Ed. p. 6) where the views of different Ācharyas are cited as to the number and names of sciences fit for study Brihaspati is quoted as holding that वार्त्ता and दण्डनीति are the only branches of knowledge which deserve to be specially cultivated: आन्वीक्षिकी and त्रयी—the sciences dealing with the supersensuous—are ignored as of subsidiary importance. May not this be a fact of some historical significance?

† Noted in the Bhāmati, Nir. Ed., p. 767.

‡ These 3 Sutras occur elsewhere also; Varadarāja in his Kusumāñjalibodhanī quotes the Sūtra marked (b) in the same form; the Sūtra defining the Self appears also in the same form in the Gītā Bhāṣya of Sankara (18 5_0) and Śiva Sūtra and with slight verbal alterations in the Pratyabhijñāhṛidaya (under Sūtra 8), thus: चैतन्यविशिष्टं शरीरमात्मा ।

Nilakaṇṭha on the Gitā:

(*a*) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।
(*b*) काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थः ।

(The last 2 Sūtras are also quoted by Madhusūdana, Nilakaṇṭha and Dhanapati in their commentaries on the Gitā (16-11).

(4) Sadānanda in the Advaita Brahmasiddhi:

(*a*) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।
(*b*) काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थः ।
(*c*) मरणमेवापवर्गः ।

We have already dealt at some length with this view in the preceding pages where we observed that it had been one of the main dogmas of the Lokāyatika sect. We now pass on hurriedly to describe some of the other tenets of the school.

The doctrines

Among these we may mention first of all the doctrine of the four elements. The Chārvākas believed, very much like the Buddhist Philosophers, that Ākāśa was not an element at all; it was a Void, an absence of आवरण. Only the four elements in their atomic condition were held to be the basic (root) principles in Creation. The external world, the sense-organs as well as the physical organisms were supposed to be the products of these primordial types of matter.। But how this production comes to be possible is a question left unexplained. All kinds of causes, known or unknown (अदृष्ट), being rejected, and the guidance of an Eternal Intelligence being regarded as superfluous, the materialist is left with the only alternative open to him, viz. to say that this production results from the fortuitous concourse of the blind constitutive particles of matter. Nothing further can be said on this head. It would be illegitimate, so it is urged, to demand an explanation where no explanation can be given.

To the Materialists Life and Consciousness are practically equivalent, and are both believed to originate from Matter. Sentience and the phenonema of mental life are material properties and need not imply a distinct immaterial substance as the Self. It is admittedly true that Consciousness is not observed to inhere in the particles of matter, either severally* or even collectively, but this is no argument against the fact that when these particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner not yet scientifically explicable they are found to show signs of life. This peculiar collocation of the atoms results in the formation of the organism (शरीर).† This is the Self (आत्मा).

That consciousness is a function of the body may be proved by a process of logical demonstration, e.g. by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference (अन्वय and व्यतिरेक). (a) Thus we find by observation, and there is no instance to the contrary, that for the manifestation of consciousness body is an inalienable factor and that discarnate consciousness is not possible. This shows that between organism and consciousness there exists some necessary bond, viz. that of Causality. (b) And Universal experience as expressed in judgments like "I feel hot, I feel tired" seems to vouch for the truth of this view. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But it would not be

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* It appears that some of the older materialists did actually attribute consciousness to each of the atoms. But the view does not seem to have obtained currency.

† As to how this peculiar collocation or organisation results it is answered that the union of parents is the immediate cause, and as a period of Universal Dissolution is not admitted the difficulty about the first origin of Life and Consciousness does not arise. Brahmānanda's Com. on Siddhānta bindu, p. 52.

so were not the body the substrate of consciousness. (c) Apart from this there is another proof in favour of the causal relation between Matter and Consciousness. This is afforded by the description in medical literature of the properties of particular preparations of food and drink (e.g. Brāhmīghṛita) conducive to the development of the intellectual powers.*

Problem of Karma Vāsanā

(i) First, since the body is declared to be the agent (कर्त्ता) of all actions it should, on grounds of logical consistency, be held morally responsible for their natural consequences. But this is scarcely possible: (a) The particles which go to the formation of the body are always in a state of flux, so that the body which performs an action (कर्म) at one moment does no longer persist at the next to feel its reaction (भोग). (b) And even if this *momentary* fluctuation be not admitted it is nevertheless undeniable that the body suffers change: the bodies in two different periods of life are different from each other, for otherwise they could not have different sizes. The appearance of a different size implies that the former size is destroyed which is possible only when the subject in which it resides (i. e. पूर्वशरीर) is also destroyed.

Problem of Jnāna Vāsanā

(ii) Secondly, the material theory is incompetent to account for the facts of memory and recognition (स्मृति & प्रत्यभिज्ञा). Necessity of thought demands that memory and the original experience (अनुभव) which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject, but this identity of reference would not be possible if the subject were not fundamentally an unchangeable unity.

To these alleged objections the Chārvāka replies that they are more apparent than real. For the second difficulty may be easily got over by supposing that the traces (संस्कार) left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted

* See Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 439—440.

(संक्रम) from the prior moment to the succeeding moment i. e. from the material cause (उपादान) down to its direct product (उपादेय).

As to how this may be possible one may consider, the Chārvāka says, the analogous instance of the transferrence of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. Here the only condition observed to be necessary is the presence of a relation between the two objects. And between a cause and its effect—the case under consideration—such a relation does undoubtedly exist. The unity of reference may also be ensured by the admission that the impressions, though transferrable, do pertain to, i. e. are preserved and revived (reproduced) in, a single line or Causal series.

As regards the first point the position of the Chārvāka prevents him from recognising its cogency as an objection. An inveterate foe of the doctrine of Adṛiṣṭa, he finds no justice, natural or moral, in the government of the Universe, so that the very question of the necessity of logically unifying *Karma* with its *phala* does not appear to him as a problem calling for solution. Bhoga–the experience of pleasure and pain-is not determined by a previous *Karma* (पूर्व कर्म), but comes by Chance (यदृच्छा) over which there is no control. This being so, the subjective unity sought for to explain the synthesis of cause and effect needs hardly a ground for establishment.*

But even if it were needed we could find it in the unity of the organism. Recognition testifies to the identity of the body through all its changing states; and this recognition can not be pronounced false as in the case of nails pared and renewed, for there is no chance here as in the example cited of the body being once destroyed and then substituted by a fresh

*This frame of mind will make intelligible the principles of conduct involved in teachings like ऋणं कृत्वा घृतं पिबेत etc.

one of a similar kind. The fact of recognition which is brought forward as subversive of the alleged momentariness of an object appearing one in consciousness is fatal also to the mutability of the organism.*

Besides the above, there are three more views of the material school according as the Self is identified with (1) the sense-organs (इन्द्रिय), with (2) the principle of Life (प्राण), or with (3) Mind (मनः).

The advocates of the first view set forth that the senses are really the intra-organic conscious agents. This view is based on the facts that consciousness and bodily movements (चेष्टा) follow from the initiation of the senses and that the judgments expressed in "I am blind &c" showing the identity of the Self with the sense organs are universally accepted as valid. Vātsyāyana thus describes the view: तानीन्द्रियाणीमानि स्वस्वविषयग्रहणाच्चेतनानि, इन्द्रियाणां भावाभावयोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथा भावात् । एवं सति किमन्येन चेतनेन । (3.1.2)*

The second view consists in maintaining that as the senses depend for existence and operation on the Vital Principle this principle itself is really the source of intelligence. The fact that the presence and absence of the senses involve the origin and non-origin of knowledge does not necessarily point to their agency; the fact may be equally explained on the hypothesis of their instrumentality. Moreover, if agency were to be assigned to the senses there would ensure an

*Nyâyamañjarī, p. 437, lines 16–19.

†Cf. also Vedānta Sāra (Jīva. Ed., 1915) pp. 95-96; Siddhānta-bindu, with Ratnāvalī (Adv. Mañj Ed.), pp 56-57, 63-64; and more particularly Vivarana Prameyasaṅgraha, p. 181, lines 13-24.

insurmountable difficulty in consequence of the absence of organs about the origin of action. Again, the question arises: which of the senses is the agent—each of them severally or all combined? In the former case, is the agency simultaneous or successive? Now it is absurd to think that the agency belongs to all the senses indifferently, for the object of one sense never becomes cognisable to another and the senses are never known to work concurrently in producing an effect. The alternative of simultaneity is of course out of the question. As to the remaining contention that each of the senses may be an agent *in succession*, the reply is: if each of these be an absolutely independent agent, as asserted, it is likely that in case of conflicting movements due to varied resolutions the balance of the whole bodily organism should be upset, but this is never known to happen. But if the senses were subservient in their functions to the guidance of a Superior Entity it would be reasonable to hold this latter to be the true Self rather than the senses. This Entity is Prāṇa, the principle of Persistence during Sleep and Wakeful Condition alike*.

Finally, we may mention the view which claims that Consciousness is a quality of the Mind†. Brahmananda, in his commentary on the Siddhānta bindu (Advaita Mañjari Ed., p. 57), explains the grounds on which this theory is founded, stating that the other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense-knowledge (निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान), but it is mind

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*Vidvanmanorañjinī (Jīva Ed, 1915, pp. 96-97). Cf Brahmānanda's Com. on Siddhāntabindu, p. 57, lines 13-14.

†See Vedānta Sāra, p. 97; Nyāya Sūtra 3.1.16; Nyāya Kandalī, p 72, 25-26 Nyāyamañjarī, p 441; Vivaraṇa Prameya Sangraha. pp. 181—182. This old materialistic doctrine of मनश्चैतन्य was recently revived with fresh vigour by the late Mm. Rākhāla Dāsa Nyāyaratna; see his *Tattvasāra* with his own commentary as well as its refutation by Pandit Hari Dāsa Śāstrī, M A.

alone that introduces into such knowledge the element of determinateness. For this reason, as well as because it controls by virtue of its power of Volition (सङ्कल्प) the outer organs and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be absent (e. g. on the plane of existence called *Svapna*), the Mind is the true Self.

Senses the only sources of right knowledge

In these different views there is perfect agreement as to the number of *pramāṇas* recognised, for all of them admit that perception is the only way of gaining a right knowledge of things. Inference is not a valid proof, in as much as the Universal and Necessary relation on which it is based cannot be discovered. In other words, it is practically impossible and logically incongruous to ascend, merely by a process of multiplication of individual instances (भूयोदर्शन) from limited sense-experience to a knowledge of Universal Truths (सर्वोप-संहारिणी व्याप्ति). Bare enumeration of facts, however far it may be carried, hardly suffices to find out the element of Necessity involved in generalisations. Perception is unable to establish the truth of Induction. For though perception may tell us e. g. that *this* particular A is related to *this* particular B this knowledge would hardly justify its extension in the form of '*all* A's are related to B's.' What right have we, with the limited faculties at our command, to jump into the Unknown and assert a Categorical Universal proposition? Moreover, the assertion of such a proposition would presuppose the elimination of all accidental factors (उपाधि विधूनन). But how is the absence of these factors to be made known? Perception would not avail where these are by nature supersensuous, and the validity of inference as a proof has been already controverted. There would thus cling an abiding suspicion, not removeable by any means accessible to man, as to the truth of every universal judgment.

Thus according to the Chārvāka perception being the only criterion of existence whatever is not perceived is held to have no existence at all : यन्नोपलभ्यते तन्नास्ति. This view naturally leads up to scepticism. But for practical purposes probability (संभावना) alone is sufficient*. Thus at the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the *probability* of fire, and not of its *certainty*, and this is enough for all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called Inference. The notion of pramāna as being the basis of certain knowledge is due to Chance Coincidence (संवाद) between the knowledge which led to the activity (प्रवर्तक ज्ञान) and the attainment of the object in which the activity is fulfilled (प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य), i. e. harmony between thought and object.

Possibility of practical life not overthrown

From the above sketch of the philosophical notions of the materialists it can well be seen why there is no room for God in this system. The usual arguments held out by the theists have not for them the force of persuasion. Adṛiṣṭa or even the principle of physical causality being denied, it is idle to argue, they would say, that God is the moral Governor of the world adjusting the *Karmas* of the jīvas, or that He is the Universal Agent—the author of the contingent phenomena. And to one to whom the Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility it is equally

Rejection of the Divine Principle

*So far this view is exactly what Arcesilaus is said to have asserted in reply to the Stoic's objection that scepticism makes life impossible, viz —"Probability is the only rule of practical life". This is the doctrine of Probabilism The difference, however, lies in this that while Arcesilaus doubts all knowledge, including even sense-perception, the Chārvāka leaves margin for it.

vain to attempt showing that from them the existence of a Omniscient Spirit could be inferred. And last but not least, Inference itself (अनुमान) is denied. The senses do not confessedly reach Him and verbal testimony falls under the category of inference. There is no means of ascertaining, therefore, that an all-knowing, all-powerful spirit exists. Nature (स्वभाव), and not God, is the watch-word of this school*.

(*To be continued*)

*The position of the Lokāyatikas is thus summarised in the Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha, p. 211, : भूतचतुष्टयमेव तत्त्वं, प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणं, स्वभाववाद एव पारमार्थिकः ।

IV. GLEANINGS FROM THE HISTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA LITERATURE

By Gopinath Kaviraj,

Prefatory Note

The history of Nyāya Vaiśesika Philosophy remains still to be written, and the time does not seem to be yet ripe for undertaking at present a work of this kind in as thorough a manner as might be desired. In the meantime a good deal of spade work will have to be done: thus, it will be necessary to survey the whole field carefully and have an accurate and up to date knowledge of the resources available for this purpose.

Suali, Faddegon, Keith,—to name some among many—have rendered brilliant services to the cause of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy by their invaluable works. But as their had necessarily to rest on insufficient data none of these works can properly claim to be a history of philosophy, presenting a consistent and exhaustive account of the development of thought in all its shades.

As regards bibliography Mr. Chakravarti's paper on 'Navya Nyāya in Bengal' (in the J. A. S. B.) is excellent; but its scope is narrow and it is a bit too scrappy. Dr. Vidyābhūsaṇa's posthumous 'History of Indian Logic' is interesting; but though apparently exhaustive it suffers from the same limitations, and I believe to a much greater extent; and it seems that the book needs a careful revision, especially, where it treats of the bibliography of the mediaeval and modern schools.

The following pages represent an humble, but further, contribution in the field, made on the basis of the available

data, in the hope of helping to prepare the ground for a systematic History of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. These data consist among others in the study of (a) about 1500 Manuscripts in original on the subject belonging to the Library of the Government Sanskrit College Benares and to certain local private Collections, and of (b) others as reported in the various Catalogues and Notices of Mss.

The History of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy is expected to follow soon. But its accomplishment and publication will naturally depend upon those of the bibliography herewith presented.

The Ancient Section of the work needs a separate and special treatment: it has been therefore omitted from these pages and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the "Studies."

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

THE MEDIAEVAL PERIOD.

In the following pages we shall start at once with the mediaeval period and proceed slowly with the course of time, reserving for a separate study the early history of the Literature of the systems and its bibliography.

It is assumed that the mediaeval age of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools of thought opened with the eighth century, when the writings of Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda had already become things of the past There is no doubt that the Hindu Nyāya Sāstra suffered a temporary eclipse in these times under the overshadowing influence of Buddhist (and Jain) Sciences of Reasoning. It is probable that the Buddhist monasteries of Nālandā, Vikramaśilā, &c. had some share in bringing about this end. That individual scholars of extraordinary powers rose in defence of Buddhist Philosophy and set themselves to the task of demolishing whatever they found inconsistent with the accepted notions of their schools is beyond a shadow of doubt. And this they did more from a vindictive zeal than from any righteous or sensible motive. The name of Dharmakīrti as one among many such polemic authors may be cited in this connection.

The curtain rises with the appearance on the scene of Bhāsarvajña, the author of Nyāyasāra, in Kashmir and of Trilochana, the tutor of the great Vāchaspati Miśra, on the plains.

I. BHĀSARVAJÑA.

As far as our present knowledge extends it may be said with justice that Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra stands unique in the history of the Mediaeval School of Nyāya philosophy in India. But the work has not been thoroughly examined yet, and I believe that a careful analysis of its contents will yield results of great historical interest. It would be foreign to

the purpose of these pages to enter into an examination of this kind, but some points may be noted in passing.

A. (a) In the first place I take up the question of the number of pramāṇas. Here Bhāsarvajña is very emphatic in his assertion that (1) Pratyakṣa, (2) Anumāna and (3) Āgama are the *only* pramāṇas to be recognized (pp. 30^{8}, 34^{10-11}), the other alleged pramāṇas, including upamāna, already coming under the above. The rejection of upamāna,* to which the old School held fast with such tenacity, is certainly characteristic, and is probably to be accounted for as the effect of the influence of Yoga Philosophy (cf. Yo. Sūt. 1.7) †, which might have acted upon it directly or through the Pratyabhijñā philosophy.

(b) While setting forth the means to be adopted for realising Mokṣa, Bhāsarvajña prescribes **क्रियायोग** consisting of

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* The Sarva Siddhānta Saṁgraha, in its section on Nyāya (VI. 5 = p. 24^{9}), observes चत्वार्यत्र प्रमाणानि नोपमानं तु कस्यचित्. This कस्यचित् I interpret as referring to Bhāsarvajña whom we know as the earliest writer among the Naiyāyikas admitting the threefold character of pramāṇas. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the statement of the famous Kārikā in Sureśvarāchārya's Mānasollāsa, II. 17-18 (Mysore Ed., pp. 49-50), which also occurs in the Tārkikarakṣā (p. 56), viz.,

> प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः काणादसुगतौ पुनः ।
> अनुमानं च तच्चाथ साङ्ख्याः शब्दश्च ते अपि ॥
> न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन ।

where Mallinātha explains the word न्यायैकदेशिनः as भूषणीयाः, i.e. followers of the doctrines of भूषण or भासर्वज्ञ; for भूषण being a work of Bhāsarvajña, see *infra*.

† Though Sankhya too admits three pramāṇas (Sāṃ. Sūt. 1.99—101 ; Sāṃ Kārikā 4), its influence on Bhāsarvajña's work was nothing. The possible allegation of Vaiś. influence, if well founded, would be more to the point. But it does not appear that Bhāsarvajña had much sympathy with this school.

तपः, स्वाध्याय and ईश्वरप्रणिधान. This, he holds, is to serve as a helping practice for the sterilisation of *kleśas*, and, through a graduated course of what are technically called Sādhanas viz. यम, नियम and the other योगाङ्गs, for the attainment of Samādhi. This is exactly the view expressed in Yo. Sūt. II. 1.

(c) It also appears that the classification of prameya* in Nyāyasāra (p. 34), viz. into हेय, तन्निवर्त्तक, आत्यन्तिकहान and हानोपाय follows on the lines of the Yoga Sūtras II. 16-17, 25-26† (cf also Vijñānabhikṣu's Introduction to Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhāṣyam). That Bhāsarvajña had exactly these Sūtras in his mind would follow as a plain corollary from a

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* *I fail to see any ground in Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa's statement* (Intro. to Nyāyasāra, p. 2) that Bhāsarvajña "treats only one topic, viz प्रमाण, in his work," for the whole of the latter portion of the book (pp. 34[12]-41[9]) is devoted to a consideration of the *prameyas*. It is immaterial that his formulation of the prameyas should differ from that of the older school.

† We need not suppose that this fourfold division of prameya in Nyāyasāra is based directly upon an analogy of the 4 *ariya saccas* of the Buddhists (cf. Saṃyutta Nikaya, V. 420-2). But as to the further question whether some of the Yoga Sūtras themselves, as we have them to-day, originated under Buddhistic influence, it would be out of place to suggest any reply here. It is enough for the purpose in hand to concede that the Yoga Sūtras in their present form and Vyāsa's Commentary upon them are earlier than Bhāsarvajña's day; and this I believe will be readily allowed. We may also remember that in Bhāsarvajña's time or even before it, the doctrines and practices of Yoga had been widely in currency in Kashmir. That peculiar form of Kashmir Śaivaism which goes by the name of Pratyabhijñā Darśana had already been evolved as a compromise between the Theism of Yoga and the Advaita of Śankara; and in this Darśana, therefore, Yoga occupies a prominent position. Living in such a religious atmosphere, it was not strange that Bhāsarvajña should have been deeply influenced in his doctrines by Yoga.

comparative study of Nyāyasāra p. 34[18] (हेयं दुःखमनागतम्) and Yoga Sūt. II. 16.

(d) Bhāsarvajña's definition of प्रत्यक्ष may be cited as a further example of how yoga deeply influenced his whole mental outlook. Perceiving that Gautama's प्रत्यक्षलक्षण (Ny. Sūt. 1.1.4) does not apply to the transcendental visions of the Yogins* for which the contact of an object with the sense organs is not a necessary precondition and which with him had a profound reality, he was constrained to alter the प्रत्यक्षलक्षण accordingly, thus: योगिप्रत्यक्षं देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थग्राहकम्।

B. It may seem, however, that the introduction into a Nyāya work ideas and practices which we have been accustomed to associate with Yoga is of the nature of an accident. But as a matter of fact it has a historical significance which grows deeper in interest the more our acquaintance is widened with the course of ancient and mediaeval philosophy. For, though Yoga in its wider form has been practically accepted by every system of Indian philosophy, its relation with Nyāya is in some manner more special, and perhaps fundamental. Here are, for example, some instances recorded in literature where the expression *Yauga* is employed invariably to indicate "a professor of or pertaining to Nyaya:"

(i) नैशेषिकनैयायिकयोः प्रायः समानतन्त्रत्वं देलुक्यमते क्षिप्ते यौगमतमपि क्षिप्तं वाच्यम्।

Syādvāda Mañjarī (Yaśo Vijaya Jaina Series, p. 628).

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* It is strange that whereas Nyaya Sūtras do not recognise योगिप्रत्यक्ष at all, the Vaiś. Sūtras dwell upon it at great length (cf. Vaiś Sut. 9.1.11-15). Neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara take note of it The latter, on the other hand, definitely asserts सन्निकर्ष to be sixfold, and is silent on what is known as अलौकिक सन्निकर्ष. It would seem that before the days of Tattvachintāmaṇi the difference between लौकिक and अलौकिक सन्निकर्ष was not positively declared in a Nyāya treatise. Cf Raghunātha's Padārtharatnamālā, p. 7[11-13]

(ii) नैयायिकानां यौगापराभिधानानां

Saddarśana Samuccaya Vṛtti, by Guṇaratna, p.49.

(iii) ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षज्ञानवादिनां यौगानां च मतमपाकर्तुम्

(That this is the view of the Naiyāyikas is well-known (cf their theory of anuvyavasaya). It is ascribed to them in the most unequivocal terms by Ananta Vīrya himself, at p. 49 of the above gloss; thus,

ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षत्वादिति नैयायिकाः ।

(iv) प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात् पञ्चावयवमिति योगाः ।

Ibid, p. 44.

(v) नापि सामान्यविशेषौ परस्परानपेक्षौ इति यौगमतमपि, &c.

Ibid, p. 44.

(vi) Cf Rāja Śekhara's Saddarśana Samuccaya (Yaśo-Vijaya Jaina Series), pp 8 & 12 (verse 23)*

These evidences, though coming from sources not recognised as orthodox, need not be summarily dismissed as calling for no attention. [But cf Nyāya Vārttika, Ben. Ed., p. 105, under Sutra 1 1.29 where the word "Yauga" is employed in the sense of "Naiyāyika."] Their cumulative weight is considerable. Besides, the Sarva Siddhānta Sangraha of Śaṅkara (pp. 24[11], 28[3], [10-12]) affords distinct proof in support of a relation existing between Nyāya and Yoga, for it is maintained there that according to Nyaya Mokṣa follows directly from Yoga, a doctrine which it shares in common with the Pātañjala system (as distinguished from the Sāṅkhya where

* Cf also: नैयायिकसांख्ययोः कयाया भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति योगानामभौतिकानीति सांख्यानामिति वार्त्तिके यौगानां नैयायिकानाम् ।

(Nyāya Siddhantamālā of Jayarāma, Ms of Bābu Dīkṣita Jade fol. 16a7-b)

jñāna is held to be the immediate cause of Mukti*). The Nyāya Darśana, in its present form, contains some Sūtras (4-2.38-49) where the practices of Yoga are strongly recommended.

From the above it seems to be pretty clearly made out that the relation between Nyāya and Yoga was an intimate one, and Bhāsarvajña in laying stress upon certain Yoga practices in his treatise on Nyāya was not guilty of irrelevancy. His exposition was only a reflection—dim but faithful—of the then existing medleian condition of this philosophy. But how, under what ascertainable influences, this fusion came about is a question to which no thoroughly convincing answer can be returned at present. Probably the right explanation will be found, *inter alia*, in the discovery of a bond of historical unity between these schools, and in my opinion this is sup plied by the original Śivāgama or its philosophical counterpart, the so-called Īśvaravāda, out of which not only the present form of Yoga and Nyāya, but the later Śaiva philosophies also may have well arisen and gradually crystallised themselves into independent systems.

At any rate in Nyāyasāra Śaiva influences are clearly discernible in many places. On p. 39 Bhāsarvajña observes that two things are requisites as immediate antecedents fo a direct vision of the Supreme Self (called here Śiva) and Final Release (**निरतिशयं श्रेयः**) to follow, viz. **परवैराग्य** (known as **अनभिरति**) and **परा भक्ति** towards Maheśvara. This śloka is quoted :

यदा चर्मवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः ।
तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दुःखस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥

(श्वेताश्वतर उपनिषत् VI. 20).

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* See *Ibid*, pp. 36 40 & 41. Cf Sa Sut 3 20—ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः। The Yoga view, as represented in Sarvasiddhānta Saṅgraha, is briefly this :

गुरूपदिष्टविज्ञातो नष्टाविद्योऽपि पुरुषः । देहदर्पणदोषांस्तु योगेनैव विनाशयेत् ॥

It is, as we know, a stock verse among the Śaivas (cf Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, Śaiva Darśana). The inculcation ,23) of course, but it may be due in both cases to Śaiva influence. And similarly when we find in Nyāya Sāra, p. 35, the concept of Īśvara expressed in language like 'ऐश्वर्याविविशिष्टः संसारधर्मैरीषदप्यसंस्पृष्टः परो भगवान् महेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सकलजगद्विधाता ' it is hard to decide between Yoga and Śaivism as its probable source. The definition here given is taken almost *verbatim* from Yoga Sūtras 1.24-54, but then it is likely that these Sūtras themselves were originally of Śaiva formulation. It may be remembered that the word ईश्वर or महेश्वर as found in Nyāya & Yoga) was originally a name of Śiva, as the corresponding word पुरुष (of Sāṅkhya), or rather its derivative पुरुषोत्तम, came to mean Nārāyana.* [We are not concerned here with the metaphysical contents of the terms ईश्वर and पुरुष or पुरुषोत्तम but only with their sectarian meanings.] In this way then the philosophy of ईश्वरवाद is brought into close contiguity with the Śaiva theology, and we can understand why Śankara (Ved. Sūt. 2.2.37) should have arrayed in a line (under Īśvaravādins†) such opponents as the

* This would be a confirmation of what Guṇaratna actually says in his commentary on Haribhadra's *Saḍdarśana Samuccaya* : Rājaśekhara (षड्दर्शनसमुच्चय, pp. 34,42-43) too mentions the fate that the Sāṅkhyas were worshippers of Nārāyaṇa (नारायणपराः) and the Yogins of Iśvara or Śiva (ईश्वरदेवताः). In this connection the conception of Śiva as the Yogin *par excellence* may also be remembered as implying that Yoga was theologically a Śaiva system.

† This is not the right place to enter into a discussion of ईश्वरवाद and its relation to the other *Vādas* which arose in ancient India, in attempting to solve the problem of Efficiency (निमित्तत्व) and the Origin of Motion. In a general sense Nyāya too, while dealing with this question, must come under the category of ईश्वरवाद. The fact that Nyāya Sūtras 4.1.20-21 are directed against ईश्वरवाद does not indicate, however, that this view is repudiated as altogether

advocates of Yoga, Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika and other Śaiva doctrines. [It is to be remembered that the अधिकरण of ईश्वरवाद is explained in Ratnaprabhā, Bhāmatī and Ānandagiri as bearing on माहेश्वरमत]*

It is historically interesting to note how the element of Bhakti has come to find a place in Bhāsarvajña's work. The notion that Bhakti is the invariable antecedent of Jñāna is admittedly very old in India. Certainly the conception was familiar as an integral part of the theology of Nyāya (Vaiś.) when the Sarvasiddhānta Saṅgraha was written, for its importance is recognised there: the doctrine of भक्ति (= Faith ?; perhaps the word is here an equivalent of श्रद्धा and has not yet assumed the highly emotional colouring of the later age) and the parallel doctrine of Grace (प्रसाद) are accepted as essential in this twin system, so that Mokṣa or Realisation of the Self's Identity is held in both the Schools to ensue through Faith (भक्ति) and Divine Grace (प्रसाद), the mutual difference of the Schools being that while Nyaya adhered to Yoga as the direct antecedent of Mokṣa, Vaiśeṣika kept away from it. The beginnings of this doctrine may be traced back to a remote past (perhaps even to the pre-upaniṣadic period), but its connection with Nyāya remains for investigation. I suppose that here, too, as elsewhere,

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unwarrantable; it means simply that the extreme form of this doctrine as illustrated in the so-called पाशुपत दर्शन in Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha (e.g. निरपेक्षकर्तृत्व of Iśvara, meaning that the Agency of Iśwara is free and spontaneous, and *not determined by* the Karmas of the Jīvas) is incompatible with its general background. Cf. Tāt. Ṭīkā, p. 418, lines 13-14.

* Rāja Śekhara & Guṇaratna take
शैव = नैयायिक (called तपस्वी in स्याद्वादमंजरी)
& पाशुपत = वैशेषिक ।
These are two out of the 4 Māheśvara sects. Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri differ from this view.

the influence of Śaivaism is palpable. [Bhāsarvajña notes the भक्ति element alone, but we may be sure that he had nothing to say against the corresponding element of Grace too, which occurs in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a high authority with Bhāsarvajña, as with all Śaiva philosophers.]

D. Another point to which attention may be briefly drawn in a study of Nyāyasāra is the recognition of a distinction between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in their earlier (but post-Vātsyāyanīya) forms in the conception of Mokṣa The former held that Mokṣa consists in the attainment of the essentially blissful character of the Self, involving of course cessation of all Pain (which embraces, among other things, the sensible pleasure too), but the latter, unable to conceive of any higher pleasure than what passes for it in the world, were reluctant to admit that in Mokṣa happiness persists. Their view of Mokṣa was thus negative, as consisting in the absence of all the *viśeṣaguṇas* of the Self, including with other qualities दुःख as well as सुख & ज्ञान. Bhāsarvajña notes this distinction (pp 39-41)* and taking side with the Naiyāyika (p. 41[7-8]), thus concludes " अनेन (i.e. नित्येन) सुखेन विशिष्टा आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्षः (cf. Guṇaratna's report of this view, pp. 93-94).† That such a distinction did really exist between the two systems during a certain period would be evidenced by the two definitions of मुक्ति in Sarvasiddhānta Saṅgraha :

(i) Under "Vaiśeṣika pakṣa" we have (V. 35-36)—

तत् (परमेश्वर) प्रसादेन मोक्षः स्यात् करणोपरमात्मकः ।

* The Commentators Bhaṭṭa Rāghava (Ben Sk Coll Ms. 162, fol 98a4) and Jaya Siṃha Sūri (pp 282, 284) plainly ascribe the two views as expounded in Nyāyasāra to Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya

† This view, which latterly came to be associated with Nyāya, had been recognised as a पूर्वपक्ष in Vātsyāyana's Commentary on Ny. Sūt. 1.1.22.

करणोपरमे त्वात्मा पाषाणवदवस्थितः ।
दुःखसाध्यसुखोच्छेदो दुःखोच्छेदवदेव नः ।

(ii) Under "Naiyāyıka pakṣa" (VI. 41-43)—

नित्यानन्दानुभूतिः स्यान्मोक्षे तु विषयादृते ।
वरं वृन्दावने रम्ये शृगालत्वं वृणोम्यहम् ।
वैशेषिकोक्तमोक्षात्तु सुखलेशविवर्जितात् ॥*

Whether this Ānanda element found admission into Nyāya directly through Vedānta or through its Kashmirian representative—the Pratyabhijñā School of thought—cannot be ascertained. But the authorities quoted (cf Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Ed., p. 40^{10-13}) by Bhāsarvajña are worthy of note.

I think the above will suffice to bring out the historical importance of this neglected treatise, and serve as a plea for its wider appreciation.

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It was not known whether Bhāsarvajña had written any other work, besides the one under notice. Neither Vidyābhūṣaṇa nor Suali seems to have anything to say in this regard. But Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, whose ṭikā on Nyāyasāra may be pronounced to be the oldest extant Commentary on the book supplies positive proof to show that Bhāsarvajña had written a gloss called **भूषण** on his own work. I do not entertain any doubt as to the identity of this Bhūṣana with the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa mentioned by Guṇaratna (p. 94^{6}) and Rājaśekhara

* The śloka occurs in a slightly variant form in the following Ślok- :—

वरं वृन्दावने रम्ये शृगालत्वं वृणोम्यहम् ।
न च वैशेषिकीं मुक्तिं प्रार्थयामि कदाचन ॥'

The expression "न च वैशेषिकींमुक्तिं" is significant. Over against the above stands, however, the statement in the Naiṣadha (17.75)— मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे &c. which may be explained as either due to confusion (common in the later period) or as referring to the original system instead of its mediaeval modification.

(p. 10[7]) as the oldest of the 18 commentaries on Nyāyasāra. And it is this to which Jaya Sinha Sūri in his Commentary on Nyāyasāra so often refers.* Here is what Bhaṭṭa Rāghava says (I quote from Ms. 162 of the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares) : वस्तु स्मरणाज्ञानेति पाठान्तरं (cf Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Ed. of Nyāyasāra Text, p. 2^{9-10}) तिष्ठति तत् पण्डितम्मन्यपाठकदोषादित्युपेक्ष्यम् । भूषणे च भासर्वज्ञेरज्ञानस्य यागादेरिति व्याकुर्वद्भिरीदृश एव पाठः कण्ठतोऽपि प्रतिष्ठितः ।

Fol. 116^{4-5}

In Nyāyasāra the reading generally met with is this :—स्मरणाज्ञानव्यवच्छेदार्थमनुभवग्रहणम्, i. e. the word अनुभव in the definition of pramāṇa (viz. सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्) is employed to guard against the possible inclusion of स्मरण and ज्ञान. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava criticises the above as pedantic, and for his own part approves the reading स्मरण and अज्ञान. The ground of his preference, he adds, is that Bhāsarvajña himself has established that reading (अज्ञान) with the stamp of his sanction in commenting on the word in भूषण.

In continuation of the evidence of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava we may point out that in Nyāya Līlāvatī Vallabhāchārya also refers to Bhāsarvajña as the author of Bhūṣaṇa. Thus—

तादिदं चिरन्तनवैशेषिकमतदूषणं भूषणकारस्यातित्रपाकरम् ।
तदिदमनाम्नातता भासर्वज्ञस्य यदयमाचार्यमप्यवमन्यते।

(Nyāya Līlāvatī, Nir. Ed., p. 33).

The question here relates itself to the existence of संख्या as an independent guṇa. The author of Bhūṣaṇa denies it as unnecessary, and thus breaks loose from the traditional ideas of the school (cf. Vaiś. Sūt. 1.1.6 and Praśastapāda, p. 111). Hence, the above remark.†

* Cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa Ed. न्यायतात्पर्यदीपिका, pp. 56,64,65,67,80,87.

† In commenting on Nyāyasāra (Vidyābhūṣaṇa Ed., p. 3^{3-5}) Bhaṭṭa Rāghava makes the following observations, showing that according to Bhāsarvajña संख्या & पृथक्त्व as separate guṇas have

Again, Chitsukha quotes in his Tattvapradīpikā (N. Sāg. Ed., 1915, p. 224), under the name of Bhūṣaṇakāra (भूषणकारभाषितं) the definition of Viparyaya as मिथ्याध्यवसायो विपर्ययः ।

A glance at Nyāyasāra (Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Ed., p. 2[8]) would show that this is Bhāsarvajña's own definition. [Observe that here also Bhāsarvajña leans towards Yoga. Cf. Yo. Sūt 1.8]

Pratyaksvarūpa, in his commentary on Chitsukha's Tattvapradīpikā, quotes the definitions of *Saṃśaya* and *Pratyakṣa* as given by the author of Nyāyabhūṣaṇa in these terms; (1) तथाच 'अनवधारणज्ञानं संशयः' इति वदतो न्यायभूषणकारस्य वदनसरोरुहं व्याहृतिहिमाहतम् (p. 222) & (2) 'सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम्' (p. 230). These definitions occur in the Nyāyasāra. In the same manner Malliṣeṇa also quotes (in the *Syādvādamañjari*, p.65, Yasovijaya Jain Series) Bhāsarvajña's definition of *Pramāṇa* as that of the author of Nyāyabhūṣaṇa Sūtra. These are further arguments in favour of the proposed identity of the authors of Nyāyasāra and Bhūṣaṇa.

The full title of Bhāsarvajña's Commentary was as already stated Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, which for convenience of reference came to be shortened into mere Bhūṣaṇa. While expatiating on the famous passage in Kiraṇāvalī— तस्माद् वरं भूषणः कर्मापि गुणस्तल्लक्षणायोगात् (Vindhyeśvarī Prasād's Ed., p. 160)—Vādīndra mentions the fuller name of the book. Thus,

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no existence, but that in the manner of प्रमेयत्व they reside in all the padārthas alike :

अत्र संख्याग्रहणे प·मते ' द्रष्टव्यम् । स्वमते तु संख्यापृथक्त्वयोः सकलपदार्थनिष्ठत्वेन सामान्यवत्त्वाय वात् । यथा हि प्रमेयत्वव्यवहाराद् सकलपदार्थेषु प्रमेयत्वं तथा संख्यापृथक्त्व तयोः सप्तपदार्थेषु पृथक् पृथक् इत्याद्यबाधिता बुद्धिरतात्त्विकायां मृषा भवेत् ।

Fol. 14a[3-5]

(Cf. Nyāya Līlāvatī. The author of Upaskāra (7.2 1) thus puts the view of Bhūṣaṇa on संख्या—स्वरूपाभेद् एकत्वं, स्वरूपभेदस्तु द्वित्वादिकम् । Cf. also Guṇa Kiraṇāvalī, p 192).

in his Rasasāra we read- कर्म गुणः सामान्यवत्त्वे स्पर्शानाधारत्वे च सति द्रव्याश्रितत्वात्। सामान्यवत्त्वे सति कार्यानाधारत्वादित्यनुमानाच्च कर्म गुण इति न्यायभूषणकारः। *

Mm. Haraprasāda Śāstrī, in his Preface to "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts", p. ii, distinguishes the न्यायभूषण known as the Commentary on Nyāyasāra from the Bhūṣaṇa referred to in the pages of the Tārkikarakṣā (pp. 341, 351 & 353). The latter, he observes, is "a Vṛtti on the Nyāya Sūtras". [Cf. also f. note 1 in Kiraṇāvalī (guṇa), pp. 160, 192.] Suali, in a note at p. 59 of his work, seems also inclined to accept this view. But nowhere are the grounds clearly stated. Possibly it is supposed that as all the three references to Bhūṣaṇakāra in the Tārkikarakṣā, bear on निग्रहस्थान—a subject to which the Nyāya Sūtras have devoted a lengthy discussion, the Bhūṣaṇa must be a gloss on these Sūtras. But I fear this supposition is vitiated by what I might call the fault of 'undue extension' (गौरव). It is more likely that passages quoted in Tārkikarakṣā have been taken from the section dealing with the varieties of निग्रहस्थान in Bhāsarvajña's Commentary on Nyāyasāra (cf. also Tārkikarakṣā, p. 351^{10-11} & Nyāyasāra p. 26^{16-17}). As to whether the statements attributed to Nyāyabhūṣaṇa by Ratnakīrti (Six Bud. Ny. Tracts, pp. 11, 58) are really those of Bhāsarvajña himself in Bhūṣaṇa or of a distinct author of that name, I cannot presume to judge.

* Rasasāra, p. 4, edited by Gopinath Kaviraj (Benares Sarasvati Bhavana Texts No 5). But on p. 7, in defending the orthodox view as to the independent character of कर्म as a category, the author of Rasasāra himself refers to the shortened form of the name : एतेन कर्मापि गुण इति भूषणोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः। सामान्यवत्त्वे सति संयोगविभागजनकत्वव्यवस्थाप्यजातित्वान्निमित्तगुणव्यवहारस्य वा कर्मणि बाधादनुमानसत्त्वेऽपि साधयितुमशक्यत्वात्।

II TATPARYĀCHĀRYA

The name of this author seems to have well nigh disappeared from the subsequent history of the literature. But it would appear from references by earlier writers that he had been a man of considerable influence. Udayana quotes his view on Prāmāṇyavāda in his Ātmatattva Viveka* (Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañchānana's Ed., p. 65[20]), and though it is set aside there as being irreconcilable with the system of traditional Nyāya (न्यायसम्प्रदाय) to which he himself belonged, the mere fact of its being quoted by an eminent scholar like himself† would constitute a claim for its propounder to a wider recognition.

Mm. Vindhyeśvarī Prasad Dube (Intros. to Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with Kiraṇāvalī, p. 28) and the late Mm. Chandra Kānta Tarkālaṅkāra (Intro. to his own Commentary on Kusumāñjali-Haridāsī, p.ii) identified this Tātparyāchārya with Vāchaspati Miśra, the author of Tātparyaṭīkā ; but this will have to be given up now in view of the decisive statement of Vallabhāchārya in the Nyāyalīlāvatī :

तदियमनाम्नातता भासर्वज्ञस्य यदयमाचार्यमप्यवमन्यते । तथा च तदनुयायिनस्तात्पर्याचार्यस्य सिंहनादः "संविदेव हि भगवती"त्यादि ।

(Nir. Sāgara Ed., p. 33 [10-12])

From this passage it is evident that Tātparyāchārya was a follower (possibly a direct successor or even Commentator) of Bhāsarvajña, and that his attitude towards the orthodox school, like that of his own Guru, was often not quite a

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* एककोटिनियतो ह्यनुभवो निश्चयः । ज्ञानतद्धर्मग्राहिणि च ज्ञाने न द्वैधमिति व्यवस्थितिरेव तस्यापि प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः परत एवेति न्यायसम्प्रदायः । अत एवेति विशेषणात् तादृशस्य स्वत एवेति तात्पर्याचार्याः ।

† For another reference to Tātparyāchārya see Vāchaspati II, Khaṇḍanoddhāra, p. 81.

pliant one. The dictum ascribed to him in Nyāyalīlāvatī is quoted in full by Śaṅkara Miśra in Upaskāra (7. 2. 26), by Jayarāma in Nyāya Siddhāntamālā (fol. 120 a[1])* and by Vāchaspati II in Khaṇḍanoddhāra (Ben. Ed., p. 103), where it stands thus :

संविदेव हि भगवती वस्तूपगमे नः शरणम् । †

It is an appeal to Intuition or Immediate Perception as against the formal testimony of Authority for the ascertainment of the real character of an object (वस्तूपगम). ‡ This would

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* Ms. of Babu Dikshita Jade of Benares.

† It is quoted in Parimala, a com. on महार्थमञ्जरी (V. 32) by Maheśvarānanda, thus : संविदेव भगवती विषयसत्त्वोपगमे शरणम्, etc. (p. 80, Trivand. Ed.)

‡ In Nyāyalīlāvatī, for example, the question arises as to whether सङ्ख्या as an independent guṇa is to be admitted. The Sūtrakāra and Praśastapāda both vouch for its separate existence, but Bhāsarvajña, and with him Tātparyāchārya, emphatically deny it, setting at naught the weight of all tradition, apparently on the simple but ultimate ground of संविद्विरोध. It is interesting to note that *Saṃvit*, or as it is somewhere in a more restricted sense denominated "pratīti", as the final arbiter for all decisions, is practically admitted by all. [Cf. Śaṅkara Miśra's remarks in Upaskāra on the Samavāya Sūtra (cf also Jayanta, p 312] Precisely the same attitude of mind is evinced by the opponent in Nyāyamañjarī when he defies the authority of Praśastapāda on the strength of what he calls "प्रतीति" (Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 136[24], 137[2]) Thus, referring to the statement of Praśastapāda (Viz. Ed., p. 24), viz. तत्राकाशकालदिशामेकैकत्वादपरजात्यभावे पारिभाषिक्यस्तिस्रः संज्ञा भवन्ति, the opponent, anxious to establish the pratyakṣatva of Kāla declaims:" नेदं दैविकं वचनं यदनतिक्रमणीयम् । न च वचनेन प्रत्यक्षत्वमप्रत्यक्षत्वं च व्यवस्थाप्यते । प्रत्यक्षत्वं हि ऐन्द्रियकप्रतीतिविषयत्वमुच्यते । तच्चेदस्ति कालस्य नीरूपस्यापि प्रत्यक्षता केन वार्यते ।

Viz. Ed., pp 136[27]-137[3].

Viewed from our present standpoint the drift of the opponent's

seem to correspond, in one of its aspects, to the Pratibhā of the Yoga system (Yo. Sut. 3. 54) described as immediate and all embracing, as distinguished from अनुमान and आगम which are remote. [cf "सर्ववस्तूनि संविदेकशरणानि &c" in Pramāṇa Pārāyaṇa by Śālikanātha, Upamāna Chap. (Pandit, Old Series, Vol. I, p. 153). संवित्, comprising अनुभूति (=प्रमा, there being no false presentation according to Prābhākaras) and स्मृति (संस्कारमात्रजा संवित्) is a favourite word with the Prābhākaras.] The epithet भगवती as applied to संवित् is strangely reminiscent of Kashmir Śaivaism or Pratyabhijñā Darśana, where the expression भगवती संवित् or its equivalents are of frequent occurrence*. (Jayasinha Sūri speaks of प्रत्यभिज्ञा as भगवती in his Commentary on Nyāya Sāra, Vidy. Ed.,p.266).

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argument would appear to be this : That आप्तवचन is acceptable in so far as it does not clash with our experience, but as soon as it happens to differ its validity is impugned (cf the view दृष्टार्थे वेदानां प्रामाण्यं नान्यत्). Of course in a sphere beyond human experience its validity stands undisputed. A curious doctrine this and is open to grave objections. But such seems to have been the position of the opponent here concerned.

* Cf Kṣemarāja—

A. In Pratyabhijñā hṛdaya (Kashmir Series, Vol. III).

(a) सर्वान्तरतमत्वेन वर्तमानत्वात् तद्भित्तिलग्नं विना न कस्यचिदपि स्वरूपानुपपत्तेः संविदेव भगवती 'मध्यम्'।

P. 37[13-15]

(b) यदा तु उक्तयुक्तिक्रमेण सर्वान्तरतमत्वे मध्यभूता संविद्भगवती विकसति etc

P. 39 [1-2]

(c) परशक्तिरूपा चितिरेव भगवती स्वतन्त्रा etc

P. 2 [6-7]

(Note the use of the term चितिशक्ति in Yoga)

(d) चिदेव भगवती स्वच्छस्वतन्त्ररूपा

and B. In Commentary on the Śiva Sūtras, called Vimarśinī (Kashmir Series, Vol. I)

(a) परा भट्टारिका संविद् इच्छाशक्तिप्रमुख स्थूलमेयपर्यन्तं विश्वं वमन्ती

It is probable therefore that Tātparyāchārya was a native of Kashmir.

III.—TRILOCHANA.

Ratna Kīrti (950 ?)* in his Apoha Siddhi ("Six Bud. Ny. Tracts, p. 13) and Ksanabhangasiddhi (Ibid, pp. 58,70) quotes to refute the views of one Trilochana. No definite data are available to determine the identity of this author, except what appears from a study of the meaning of the

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It may be mentioned by the way that the Sloka

संविद् भगवती देवी स्मृत्यनुभववेदिका ।
अनुभूतिः स्मृतेरन्या स्मृतिः संस्कारमात्रजा ॥

ascribed by Gaurikānta to the text of Tarkabhāsā in some recensions has a like significance. The characterisation of संविद् by the epithets भगवती and देवी is notable. Moreover, its description as the Supreme Witness (for such would be the meaning of स्मृत्यनुभववेदिका, lit. the witness of अनुभव and स्मृति or of the whole mental life) rather than as a mere state of consciousness, while bringing it close to the Vedantic conception of साक्षी, is a sure mark of its relation to the Trika philosophy of Kashmir.

*Dr. Vidyābhusana (Med. Ind. Logic, p. 140, footnote 2) makes the older Ratnakīrti, a contemporary of Rāja Vimala Chandra (650 A.D.)—the author of Apohasiddhi and Ksaṇabhaṅgasiddhi. But the internal evidence of the works does not justify this view. How, for example, could a man of the 7th Century have quoted from an author (e g. Vāchaspati) who lived undoubtedly so late as 841 A.D. at the earliest ? To avoid falling into this absurdity I prefer to take the author of Apohasiddhi &c. to be the younger Ratna Kīrti whom Dr. Satis Chandra himself describes as the guru of Ratnākara Śānti (Ibid, p 140) in the University of Vikramasilā. Ratnākara's time being 983 A.D. I have placed Ratnakīrti in the middle of the 10th Century. [N.B. This is an indirect corroboration of the plea for an earlier date (than 976 A D.) for Vāchaspati Miśra]

extracts given by Ratna Kīrti, viz. that he had been an established Nyāya writer before the 10th Century. Mm. H. P. Śāstrī (Preface to Six Bud. Ny. Tracts, p. ii) identifies him with the teacher (विद्यागुरु) of the great Vāchaspati Miśra* and it is likely that he is right.

IV.—VĀCHASPATI MIŚRA.

The greatest name in the history of Philosophy of this country is perhaps that of Trilochana's pupil Vāchaspati Miśra. His wide and deep erudition in all the branches of Indian Thought earned for him the rare distinction of being called सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र (Master of all Sciences)—a distinction seldom grudged by his successors. It is difficult to glean anything from his numerous works in which traces of his personal predilections in any direction might be detected. His all-round scholarship and sympathy with diverse ways of thinking makes such an attempt almost impossible.

While the Vedantists claim him as their own, saying that he had been in his previous existence the great Vārttikakāra Sureśvara himself, one of the direct disciples of Śaṅkarāchārya, Udayana pays homage to him rather as a great authority in Nyāya and comments on his work. So with Mīmāṃsā, Sāṁkhya and Yoga—everywhere the stamp of his genius is unmistakeable.

Similarly it might appear that Vāchaspati was a Śaiva in faith. His obeisance to Bhava (Intro. to Bhāmatī, Verse 3, and to Nyāya Kaṇikā, Verse 2), to Piṇākī (Tāt. Tīkā, Intro. Verse 1) and to Vṛṣaketu (Intro. to Tattvavaiśāradī, Verse 1. Cf. Tātparya Ṭīkā, p. 513^{12-13}), might be cited as an illustration of his belief. But his devotion to

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*Both Udayana and Vardhamāna speak of Trilochana as Vāchaspati's Guru. And Vāchaspati himself says in the Tātparyaṭīkā:

त्रिलोचनगुरून्नीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः ।
यथामानं यथावस्तु व्याख्यातमिदमीदृशम् ॥

Vishnu* and to Ganeśa is equally patent (See Intro. Verse 1 in Nyāya Kanikā and Verse 4 in the beginning of Bhāmati).

It appears from a reference to Udayanāchārya's Tātparyapariśuddhi that Vāchaspati's tutor was Trilochana†. But in the Introduction of Nyāya Kanikā, Verse 3, Vāchaspati thus says:

अज्ञानतिमिरशमनीं परदमनीं न्यायमञ्जरीं रुचिराम् ।
प्रसवित्रे प्रभवित्रे विद्यातरवे नमो गुरवे ॥

Are we to understand this passage as containing an implied allusion to his Guru's work, Nyāya Mañjari?

Hall's remark (Bibliography, pp. 5, 9, 21, cf Auf.'s Cat Cat. I,p. 560 Ind Off Cat., p 719) that मार्त्तण्डतिलकस्वामी was the name of Vāchaspati s tutor was obviously due to a misinterpretation of the 4th Verse of the Introduction of the Bhāmati, viz

मार्त्तण्डतिलकस्वामिमहागणपतीन् वयम् ।
विश्ववन्द्यान् नमस्यामः सर्वसिद्धिविधायिनः ॥

Here Mārtanda, Tilakasvāmi and Mahāganapati are the names of three distinct gods The belief that their worship ensures success is a very old one and is recorded in Smṛti literature (Cf Yājña Sm. 1 293, see also Bala Śāstri s Ed, Bhāmati, p 1, f note 3) Mārtanda is doubtless the Sun and Mahāganapati the once famous god of that name (Anandagiri in his Śankaravijaya testifies to the existence in the days of Śankarāchārya of a sect of Gānapatyas worshipping महागणपति as the Supreme Self See Chap. XV, Bibl. Ind.

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*It is striking that though the descriptions of the Deity in the first benedictory verse of Nyayakanika approaches to the definition of Īśwara in Yoga Sutra it is as Visnu and not as Īswara or Śiva that the Deity is conceived.

†See also Mm. H P. Śāstri, Preface to "Six Bud. Ny. Tracts" p. ii.

Ed, pp. 106-110. For a description of Mahāgaṇapati see Gopīnath Rao's "Hindu Iconography", Vol.I, Part I, pp. 55-6).

From the two concluding verses (5 & 6) of the Bhāmatī* it would appear that Vāchaspati undertook to compose this-his greatest work during the reign, and perhaps at the request, of one Rājā Nṛga. And it is just probable, considering the praises lavished upon this king, that he had been Vāchaspati's own patron. But who was he? That he was not a mythical figure may be almost taken for granted†. According to Vāchaspati he was a king of a generous nature, accomplished in the Śāstras and highly famed for his wonderful deeds. And it is further said that the deeds which he had performed with such remarkable ease (लीलामात्रविनिर्मित) were, not merely beyond the actual power of other kings who would seek to imitate him, but even above their comprehension (मनसापि दुष्कराणि). I have found a passage in the Bhāmatī which would seem to set in a clearer light the meaning of the above The kīrtis already named are here specified as magnificent palaces and pleasure gardens. It occurs under Ved. Sūt. 2.1.33 and may be quoted here in full: न चाद्यापि न दृश्यन्ते लीलामात्रविनिर्मितानि महाप्रासादप्रमदवनानि श्रीमन्नृगनरेन्द्राणामन्येषां मनसापि दुष्कराणि नरेश्वराणाम् । (Nir. Sagar Ed., p.406)

There cannot be much uncertainty as to the age in which Vāchaspati Miśra flourished. For in his Nyāyasūchi-

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* नृपान्तराणां मनसाप्यगम्यां भ्रूक्षेपमात्रेण चकार कीर्त्तिम् ।
कार्तस्वरासारसुपूरितार्थसार्थः स्वयं शास्त्रविचक्षणश्च ॥
नरेश्वरा यच्चरितानुकारमिच्छन्ति कर्तुं न च पारयन्ति ।
तस्मिन् महीपे महनीयकीर्तौ श्रीमन्नृगेऽकारि मया निबन्धः ॥

†Cf Amalānanda in Vedānta Kalpataru (Viz. Ed., p. 246): आचार्यं या महीपतिर्महीचकार (Appaya dīkṣita in the Kalptaruparimala prefers the reading महयांचकार । See Parimala, Viz. Ed., p. 406)तस्य नाम नृग इति ।

nibandha he himself assigns 898 (वस्वङ्कवसु) as the date of its composition, and though the era to which the number refers is left unmentioned it is likely that we have to take it standing for Vikrama Saṃvat, and not for Śakābda. The year would then correspond to 841 A.D.*

Regarding the native place of Vāchaspati tradition and opinion of scholars are equally divided. From the evidence of a śloka found in the Introduction of Nyāya Sūtroddhāra† Mm. H.P. Śāstri infers that he was an inhabitant of Mithilā. But this can hardly be accepted as a correct view. The author of Nyāya Sūtroddhāra was Vāchaspati II and was not identical with the author of Bhāmatī and other works.

Vāchaspati was a voluminous writer, mostly of commentaries. In Nyāya‡ two works have come down to us, of which

* Cf. (i) Suali, Introduzione allo studio Filosofia Indiana, p. 58 ; (ii) Woods, Yoga system of Patanjali (H.O.Series, Vol. 17), Introduction, pp. XXI-XXIII ; (iii) Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p.51 ; (iv) Chakravarti, J.A.S.B., 1915, pp. 262,400. As opposed to the above I may set the view of Mm. H.P. Śāstri (Preface to Śāstri's Notices, Vol II, p.XIX & "An Examination of the Nyāya Sūtras" in J.A.S.B., 1905, p.246) who is disposed to maintain the Śaka theory. With all respect for the Śāstriji's erudition in this field I beg to differ from him on this point, for the simple reason that Vāchaspati ought to be placed at a sufficiently long interval from Udayana (984 A.D.) to enable the latter to conceive of the idea of writting a Commentary upon his work.

† Śāstrī's Notices, Vol.II., No.118, p 98 (cf. Preface XIX).

‡ Vāchaspati has left his speculations almost on every orthodox school. I say almost, because no work has yet been found dealing exclusively with the Vaiśeṣika system in its alienated form. But though not discovered, such a work may be still existing. In Sāṅkhyā his Tattva Kaumudī has become a standard treatise and more than superseded Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya, and in Yoga the Tattva Vaiśāradī may yet claim the supreme place of honour. His

one is a mere booklet attempting to fix the number of Gotama's Sūtras and their readings. It is known as Nyāya

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Nyāya Kaṇikā, a Commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's Vidhiviveka, is as good a tract in Mīmāṃsā as the Bhāmatī is incontestably in Vedānta. It is not a work on Nyāya, but on Mīmāṃsā ; and it is a pity that a scholar like the late Mm. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his posthumous work on "The History of Indian Logic" (p. 314) makes the curiously blundering statement: "Vāchaspati Miśra's *Nyāya Kaṇika*, a work on logic, is not now available." The work was published in Benares as early as the year 1907 A.D. and is even now available in print. The word *Nyāya* seems to have led Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa to the belief that it was 'a work on logic', though it is well known that many celebrated Mīmānsā works have a similar designation. Cf. Mādhavāchārya's *Nyayamālāvistara*, Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Nyayaratnākara*, *Nyāya ratna mālā*, etc. Tattvabindu is a small original paper devoted to discussion of Sound. Tattva Samīkṣā (Bhāmatī, Nir. Sāgar Ed., p.996; Tāt. Ṭikā, p.57) or Brahmatattva Samīkṣā (Bhāmatī, Nir. Sāg. pp. 15, 466 & Tātparya Ṭīkā, p. 394) and Brahma Siddhi (Nyāya Kaṇikā, p. 80) are two other Vedantic works, now lost, by Vāchaspati, to which he himself makes passing references. [Hall, p. 87, and Amalānanda (in Vedānta Kalpataru, Viz. Ed , p. 558) make Tattva Samīkṣā a Commentary on the Brahmasiddhi.] Of all his works Brahmasiddhi, Brahmatattva Samīkṣā & Nyāya Kaṇikā (mentioned in Bhāmatī, pp. 15, 466,996, in Tātparya Ṭīkā, pp.394, 395, 467; in Tattva Vaiśāradi under Sūt. 4.14) seem to be the earliest, and Tattvabindu mentioned in Bhāmatī, p.996, Tattva Vaiśāradī and Bhāmatī the latest. Tātparya ṭīkā is earlier than Tattvakaumudī (cf Kaumudī under Kārikā 5), but later than the earliest group. From the expression "न्यायसांख्ययोगानां वेदान्तानां निबन्धनैः" in the Bhāmatī (concluding verse 2) it appears that Tattvavaiśāradī and Tattvakaumudi are both earlier than the work. It is thus clear, as orthodox tradition has ever maintained, that Bhāmatī was the last work from Vāchaspati's pen. [In Cat. Cat. p.560 three more works are attributed to Vāchaspati, viz. Brahmatva Saṃhitoddīpanī & Vedāntatattva Kaumudī in Vedānta & Yuktidīpikā in Sāṅkhya.]

Sūchīnibandha. The other is a commentary on Uddyotakara's Nyāya Vārtika known as Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Ṭīkā. He is said (Buhler's Catalogue of Sk. Mss. in the Private Libraries of Gujrat etc. 4, p. 24) to have also written a Commentary on Nyāyaratna, apparently an older treatise which is now lost. *

The Nyayatattvāloka, noticed in the India Office Catalogue, pp. 610-611, was the work of the younger Vāchaspati Misra, and not of the author of the Tātparya ṭīkā.

V.—JAYANTA

The determination of the time of Jayanta, the author of Nyayamañjari does not seem to be beset with much difficulty.

Gaṅgeśa's reference to him as जरन्नैयायिक shows that in the latter's time he had been an established authority.

There does not seem to exist any positive evidence in confirmation of the alleged quotation by Jayanta from Vāchaspati Miśra's works.

(a) Mr. Chakravartī's statement (J.A.S.B., Sept. 1915, p.262, f.Note I) that "Bhāmatī is quoted as an authority in Nyāya Mañjarı" is apparently founded on the foot note by Mm. Pandit Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī (Ny. Mañj., p.120) where the śloka—

* May it not be the same Nyāyaratna which Bhāsarvajña in Nyāyasāra attributes to the authorship of his own Guru ?

Presumably the work had been of great merit and enjoyed a wide celebrity before the time of Vāchaspati Miśra, or he would not have undertaken to write out a Commentary upon it. And this would be perfectly in keeping with the encomiums bestowed upon it by Bhāsarvajña.

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपद्यते ॥

is erroneously ascribed to Bhāmatī under Sūtra 2.1.11. The śloka as a matter of fact does not belong to Bhāmatī, where it is introduced as तदुक्तम्. It occurs originally in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya, I.34.

(b) Gaṅgādhara (Preface to Ny. Mañj., p.1) says that in the sentence तदपि परिहृतमाचार्यैर्जातं च संबद्धं च इत्येकः काल इति वदद्भिः (Ny. Mañj., p.312 [1*]) the word आचार्यैः is to be understood as a reference to Vāchaspati Miśra whose Tātparya Ṭīkā on Sūtra 2.1.32 contains the following statement: अथासम्बद्धस्य विद्यमानत्वं तत् सत्यपि पृथग्गतिमत्त्वे नावयविनोऽस्ति जातः सम्बद्धश्चेत्येकः कालः (p.267). Now, though the dictum जातः &c. found in Ny. Mañj. does really occur in Tātparyaṭīkā it may not have been the original pronouncement of Vāchaspati. For in view of the practically insignificant interval between their periods of life* it is hard to believe that Jayanta should have spoken of Vāchaspati in such term as आचार्याः at all. It is more probable that the dictum had been even then, as later (cf. Upaskara on 1.2.3), a familiar one, and that the आचार्य, referred to by Jayanta, may have been an ancient authority.

As for the personal history of Jayanta nothing more is known than what his son Abhinanda has recorded in the Introduction of his Kādambarī Kathāsāra. It is said there that Jayanta's 5th ancestor, named Śakti, had emigrated from Gauḍa and settled in Dārvābhisāra, a country which Dr. Bühler located on the frontiers of Kashmir (Ind. Ant., Vol.

* Vāchaspati lived in 841 A.D. and Jayanta, being the great grandson of Śakti Svāmī, the minister of king Muktāpīḍa Lalitāditya of Kashmir could not have been far removed from him in age. Possibly both were contemporaries, one older and the other younger.

II. p 102)*. The village of Gauramūlaka, which Jayanta's grandfather Kalyāna Svāmī is said to have acquired in consequence of having performed a सांग्रहणी sacrifice†, is mentioned as Ghoramūlaka in the Rājataranginī, VIII, 1861. According to Dr. Stein it was situated in the territory of Rājapurī within the boundaries of Dārvābhisāra (Kalhana's Chronicles of the Kings of Kashmir, by Stein, Vol. II, pp. 144-5, foot note to verse 1861‡.

* Dr. Stein makes it comprise "the whole tract of the lower and middle hills lying between the Vitastā and Chandrabhāga" (See Stein's Trans, Vol. I, p. 32, foot note to verse 180).

† अस्मत्पितामह एव ग्रामकामः सांग्रहणीं कृतवान् स इष्टिसमाप्तिसमनन्तरमेव गौरमूलकं ग्राममवाप। Nyāya Mañjarī, p. 274. Dr. Stein has fallen into a twofold mistake here (i) in taking Abhinanda to be the author of Nyāyamañjarī and (ii) in calling Jayanta's father by the name of Kānta. The second mistake, based on Buhler's false rendering (Ind Ant II, p 104) evidently arose from a misunderstanding of the following verse of Kādambarī Kathāsāra:

अगाधहृदयात्तस्मात् परमेश्वरमण्डनम्। अजायत सुतः कान्तश्चन्द्रो दुग्धोदधेरिव

Here the meaning is plain enough. The word Chandra has to be taken in a double sense signifying the name of the son as well as the Moon. The epithet कान्त would be applicable in both the cases. That this interpretation is the right one would appear from the fact that Jayanta himself mentions Chandra as his father in the end of Nyāya Manjarī (p. 659[1])

‡ A geneology of Jayanta's family, constructed from the statements of his son, is appended below:

ŚAKTI (Gauḍa Brāhmana of the Bharadvāja Gotra)

MITRA

ŚAKTISVĀMIN, minister (मन्त्री) of king Muktāpīda (Lalitāditya) of the Karkota family. (See Raj. Tar. IV 42).

KALYĀNA SVĀMIN, a great Sacrificer and Yogin.

CHANDRA, a great Controversialist

JAYANTA.

King Śaṅkaravarman whom Jayanta describes as **धर्मतत्त्वज्ञ** and to whom he attributes (p. 271) the credit of having suppressed the **नीलाम्बरव्रत**, apparently a very obscene rite, cannot be identified with certainty. From Jayanta's words it would seem, as Col. Jacob has rightly guessed (J. R. A. S., 1911, p. 511), that the king was a Jain*.

Jayanta was known to his contemporaries as a **वृत्तिकार** (Ny. Mañj., p. 659[17]; cf. Kādambarī Kathā Sāra, Introduction) or the author of a gloss on the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama.† Probably Nyāya Mañjarī is the gloss here referred to. Guṇaratna in his Commentary on Ṣaḍdarśana Samuchchaya. ascribes to Jayanta a Commentary on Nyāya Sāra, named Nyāya Kalikā. It is not known whether this Commentary is now extant. Būhler notices a work of the same name by Jayanta in his Kashmir Report (Nos. 385-7, p. CXLV)‡, but until its contents are examined it would be impossible to say anything as to its identity.

The style of Nyāya Mañjarī deserves special mention. It is unique of its kind, racy, humorous, brilliant, with a poignancy that is almost biting in its pointedness§. It is

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* There was a king of this name in Kashmir, but the anachronism of his time (883-902 A.D.) and the fact of his being described by Kalhana as a worthless prince (V Taranga) precludes the possibility of this identification.

† Cf. Rājaśekhara's Ṣaḍdarśana Samuchchaya, p. 10[3].

‡ Cf also Stein, Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss., Jammu, p. 148, No. 1553. The opening benedictory śloka of this Commentary is the same as in Nyāya Mañjarī (p. 1, verse 1), but the concluding verse runs thus:

अजातरसनिष्यन्दमनभिव्यक्तसौरभम् । न्यायस्य कलिकामात्रं जयन्तः पर्यदीदृशत् ॥

It is likely, considering the meanings of the words °कलिका and °मञ्जरी, that the former was a smaller work on the *same* subject (i e. a gloss on the Nyāya Sūtras). However, this is only a conjecture.

§ Abhinanda thus describes the style of his father:

सरसाः सदलङ्काराः प्रसादमधुरा गिरः । कान्तास्तातजयन्तस्य जयन्ति जगतां गुरोः ॥

wonderfully eloquent, sweeping everything before its tremendous rush-the arguments of the Laukāyatikas as mercilessly as those of the Mīmāṃsakas. All through the work there runs a deep vein of religious earnestness-a sense of personal conviction-which renders its remarks on the views of the opponents so caustic and bitter. Thus, for instance, we read on p. 204—

ये त्वीश्वरं निरपवाददृढप्रमाण
सिद्धस्वरूपमपि नाभ्युपयन्ति मूढाः ।
पापाय तैः सह कथापि वितन्यमाना
जायते नूनमिति युक्तमतो विरन्तुम् ॥

Cf also on p. 236.—

मीमांसका यशः पिबन्तु पयो वा पिबन्तु बुद्धिजाड्यापनयनाय ब्राह्मीघृतं वा पिबन्तु वेदस्तु पुरुषप्रणीत एव नात्र भ्रान्तिः ।

The general Śaiva Culture of Kashmir exercised a marked influence on Jayanta's personal creed. He was a Śaiva through and through. In his discussion on theism he shows a decided bias towards the Kashmirian form of this faith. Like Bhāsarvajña and other Śivaite philosophers he too conceives of the Divinity as Śiva (p. 200[11'25]) and predicates of Him 5, rather than 3, of the 9 Viśeṣagunas pertaining to the Ātman. It is interesting to note that among these qualities, all eternal, we find both धर्म and सुख (besides the usual trio, viz. ज्ञान, इच्छा and कृति). He says—धर्मस्तु भूतानुग्रहवतो वस्तुस्वाभाव्याद् भवन् न वार्यते तस्य फलं परमार्थनिष्पत्तिरेव । सुखं त्वस्य नित्यमेव नित्यानन्दत्वेनागमात् प्रतीतेः p. 201[12-14]). Now in the mouth of a Naiyāyika this would appear to be a remarkable confession. For though strictly speaking धर्म is not denied to Īśvara in the orthodox system (cf. Ny. Vartika, Benares Ed—यो धर्म ईश्वरं नासौ तत्रैश्वर्यं करोति किन्तु प्रत्यात्मवृत्तीन् धर्माधर्मसञ्चियानुगृह्णाति (p. 464[5-6]) it is admitted only as a matter of concession. Thus Uddyotakara expresses his own views —न चेश्वरे

धर्मोऽस्ति (Ny. Vā., p. 464[6]) and एतत्तु न बुध्यामहे यथा बुद्धिमत्तायामीश्वरस्य प्रमाणसद्भावो न चैवं धर्मादिनित्यत्वे प्रमाणमस्ति &c. (Ny. Vā., p. 464[13–15]). Vāchaspati, too, says almost the same thing (See Tāt. Ṭīkā, p. 420[21–3]). Similarly as regards the existence of नित्यसुख and its presence in Īśvara (and with some, in the *mukta ātmans* as well), the usual evidence of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika is decidedly against it. The following words of Udayana may serve as the pith of their arguments:

नित्यं तु सुखं न सत्यं योग्यानुपलम्भबाधितत्वात् ।
श्रुतिस्तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेत्, न । योग्यानुपलम्भबाधिते तदनवकाशात्,
अवकाशे वा ग्रावप्लवनश्रुतेरपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।
[Ātmatattva viveka (Tarkapañchānana's Ed., p- 95[14–17])]*

VI.—VYOMAŚIVĀCHĀRYA.

Vyoma Sivāchārya, as the name indicates, seems to me to have been a Śaiva Saint of the South. Though a high authority on Vaiśeṣika philosophy his name has practically been forgotten. Rājaśekhara, in his commentary on the NyāyaKandalī (Nyāya Kandalīpañchikā), credits him with the authorship of a commentary named Vyomavatī on Praśastapāda's Padārtha dharma Saṅgraha. This commentary was long believed to have been lost, but it has recently been recovered and a transcribed copy of it exists in the Government Sanskrit Library Benares, from which it appears that the work more than ordinarily deserved the renown which it once universally enjoyed. It is likely that the Āchārya of whom Udayana speaks in the Kiraṇāvali is no other than Vyomaśiva, and that Śrīdhara also presumably made use of his predecessor's work in writing the Kandalī.

Vyomaśiva was the leader, at any rate a learned represen-

* Comparing the statements of Jayanta and Udayana it appears that their attitudes towards Āgama were quite distinct. In this regard in spite of slight differences Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña side together.

tative of a distinct section of Vaiśeṣika school and commanded a great influence on contemporary and subsequent thought. He accepted Śabda as a separate pramāṇa and had no sympathy with the people who suggested that the Vaiśeṣika did not admit the independence of verbal testimony as a valid source of knowledge. In regard to this view of his Maṇibhadra gives the following report in commenting on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśana Sāmuchchaya (Chowkh. Ed., p. 63)-यद्यपि श्रीलूक्यशासने व्योमशिवाचार्योक्तानि त्रीणि प्रमाणानि, तथापि श्रीधरमतापेक्षया अत्र उभे एव निगदिते । It is clear from this that there was already a split in the school which was due perhaps to the interpretation of the true import of the Sūtra (Vaiś) 9. 3. 3., and was not of comparatively recent occurrence. Among the advocates of dual pramāṇa we find the names of scholars like Śrīdhara, Śivāditya, Vallabhāchārya, Udayana (?), Rājaśekhara (see his Ṣaḍdarśana Samuchchaya, Yaśovijaya Ed., verse 114, p. 11) &c*. And Sureśvarāchārya, in his Manasollāsa, II. 17 (Mys. Ed., p. 49), also subscribes to this view†. On the contrary, the interpretation of Vyomaśiva is confirmed by the statements of Śaṅkarāchārya in the Sarvasiddhantasaṅgraha (V. 33, p. 22) and of Jinadatta in the Viveka Vilāsa (Bhand. Rep. 1883-'84, p. 462)‡.

The only other references to Vyoma Śiva which I have hitherto found in Sanskrit philosophical literature occur in

* Gauḍapādāchārya, while commenting on Sāṅkhya Kārikā 4, plainly refers to the Vaiśeṣika opinion as being in favour of the duality of pramāṇa : यद्यपि वैशेषिकैः शब्दो नाभ्युपेयते तथापि ते न प्रमातरः (Ben-Ed., p.5).

† Cf. Jayanārayaṇa's Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha in the vernacular, p. 45.

‡ वैशेषिक मते तावत प्रमाणांत्रतय भवेत । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च तार्त्तीयिकमथागमः (Vivekavilāsa). In the बृहद्वृत्ति to Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (Ben. Ed. p. 666) the Vaiśeṣikas are credited with the theory of three pramāṇas: इदं च वैशेषिकमतेन प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलक्षणं प्रमाणत्रयमुपन्यस्तम् ।

Vādīndra's Rasasara*, and Vallabha's Nyāyalīlāvati (Bomb. Ed., p. 98).

VII.—UDAYANĀCHĀRYA

The last great representative of the older schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika was beyond question Udayanāchārya.

Jayanta and Vachaspati Miśra wrote on Nyāya, while Śridhara wrote on Vaiśeṣika, but the credit of combining for the first time the two allied systems into a joint form† is, according to tradition, due to Udayana. And it was he who made the most pronounced effort to combat the anti-thiestical tendencies of his age by bringing philosopby to the service of theology. His Ātmatattvaviveka & Nyāya Kusumāñjali

* एतेन स्वसमवेतविशेष्यविशिष्टत्वे सति स्वाश्रयैकजातीयव्यवच्छेदकौ विशेषगुण इति व्योमशिवाचार्योक्तमपि लक्षणं प्रत्युक्तम्। स्वाश्रयैकजातीयपदेन नवान्यतमस्य विवक्षितत्वात् (Rasasāra, p. 11).

† For instance, in Nyāya Kusumāñjali which being an independent treatise afforded ample opportunities to the author for sufficient freedom of expression we find in several places the characteristic doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika fused up with one another. To take one example : The Vaiśeṣika does not admit Upamāna and Śabda to be separate pramāṇas, but Udayana, in agreement with the orthodox Naiyāyika's standpoin (Ibid III. 12, Benares Ed., pp 52–57 & pp 57 etc), makes it a definite point to prove that their separate character cannot be gainsaid. But on the other hand while dealing with the question of Svapna or dream-consciousness he subscribes to the usual Vaiśeṣika view of the point with some modification : Thus though the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika are both at one on the falsity of dream-consciousness, the former considers it as a kind of स्मृति, whereas the latter makes it fall under the category of अनुभव and so distinct from स्मृति. Udayana agrees with the Vaiśeṣika in so far as he maintains the presentative character of dream-consciousness (तस्मादनुभव एवासौ स्वीकर्तव्यः , Ny. Kusu., V., Ben. Ed. p. 147), but differs from him in holding that even dreams may come occasionally true (अस्ति च स्वप्नानुभवस्यापि कस्यचित सत्यत्वं, संवादात, Ibid)

are the best polemical treatises ever written with the avowed object of disposing of the Buddhist contentions against the doctrines of Ātman and Īśvara and of placing their truth on a firm and secure footing.

There is no doubt now as to the age of Udayanāchārya. He lived in the fourth quarter of the 10th century as evidenced by the following śloka at the end of his Lakṣaṇāvalī :

तर्काम्बराङ्कप्रमितेष्वतीतेषु शकान्ततः ।
वर्षेषूदयनश्चक्रे सुबोधां लक्षणावलीम् ॥

This gives 906 Śakābda or 984 A. D. for the composition of Lakṣaṇāvalī and as this was not probably his very last piece his period of life may be carried some more years forward.

Udayana was a contemporary of Śrīdhara, but it is not possible with the resources now available to determine which of them was the older. His Lakṣaṇāvalī was 7 years earlier than the Kandalī, but there seems to be reason to believe that his Kiraṇāvalī was a later work. Besides the case already cited by Pandit Vindhyeśvarī Prasad Dube (Preface to Nyāya Kandalī, p.21, f. note 5) where the view of Śrīdhara appears to be cited and refuted in the Kiraṇavalī, there is one positive instance of a similar kind. Thus the view on तमः as the imposed blue colour which is associated with Śrīdhara's name (cf Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha & Dinakarī) is rejected in the Kiranavalī (pp 19–20) ; and though the name of Śrīdhara is nowhere mentioned by Udayana it is nevertheless sure that his views were familiar to him. But Udayana did not live to complete the work thus initiated which broke off abruptly in its course with बुद्धिग्रन्थ. I think that on the death of Udayana Śrīdhara, still living, began to revise his book in the light of the criticisms made, not failing however in his turn to cast a fling at Udayana whenever occasion permitted. This is my own suggestion

and may be accepted as a tentative explanation of the otherwise quite unintelligible fact of both Udayana and Śrīdhara quoting and refuting each other's views*.

Udayana was a Śaiva, and though professedly a Naiyāyika he had the highest regard for Vedānta in its most rigorous and unfalsified form. His notion of Nyāya, too, was unique. His conception of the mutual relations of the various systems of Indian philosophy, orthodox and heterodox is extremely interesting. I am reminded here of the remarkable passage in the Ātmatattvaviveka where he attempts to show that in its gradual ascent along the path of mokṣa the soul is confronted with views which broaden out more and more. The different schools of philosophy representing the varied views thus obtained in passing are conceived to form a graduated series, arranged according to an ascending scale of spiritual realisation, and in such a scheme the lower is always supposed to be a stepping stone to the higher and is to be *superseded* by it.† Udayana's works may be thus tabulated :

A. Commentaries on

(a) Gotama's Sūtras (न्यायपरिशिष्ट)

(b) Praśastapāda's Padārthadharma Saṃgraha (किरणावली). It was the last work of Udayana, and contains references to Ātmatattvaviveka and Nyāyakusumāñjali (p 147).

(c) Vāchaspati Miśra's Nyāya Vārtika tātparyaṭīkā (न्यायवार्त्तिकतात्पर्यपरिशुद्धि or न्यायनिबन्ध).

* For Śrīdhara referring to Udayana's views, see Preface to Nyāya Kandalī, p. 21, f. note 3.

† This attempt at Synthesis, though incidental, may be taken to be one of the earliest of its kind on record, and though brief is matchless in its grandeur. Sarvajñātma Muni's earlier attempt (in Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka) and Madhusūdana's (in Prasthānabheda) and Vijñānabhikṣu's (in his Introduction to Sāṅkhya pravachana Bhāṣya) later ones pale before it in comparison.

B. (a) आत्मतत्त्वविवेक (known also as बौद्धाधिक्कार or बौद्धधिक्कार). This was probably one of his earliest works. It is a splendid production, and represents probably the most vigorous defence of the Theory of Self on behalf of Nyāya against the merciless assaults of the Buddhist philosophers.

(b) न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि, consisting of 5 chapters, partly in prose and partly in verse. It contains a reference to Ātmatattvaviveka.

(c) लक्षणावली*. This is a very useful booklet, containing a series of definitions of terms partaining to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It was composed in 906 Śakābda or 984 A. D. and was therefore earlier than the Kiraṇāvalī which succeeded the Nyāya Kandalī written in 991 A. D. So I do not find any warrant for Mr. Chakravartī's opinion (J. A. S. B., Sept., 1915, p. 263) that the Kiraṇāvalī preceded Lakṣaṇāvalī. The fact that the last śloka of Lakṣaṇāvalī is the same as the opening verse of the Kiraṇāvalī really proves nothing. For we might as well argue from this fact that the former was earlier than the latter.

(d) प्रबोधसिद्धि, an original treatise in Nyāya, probably compiled from Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vāchaspati (cf. T. Rakṣā, p-308^{9-11}). Varadarāja refers to it four times in the Tārkikarakṣā (pp. 189-190, 308, 343 & 357), and though he does not attribute it to Udayana by name

* Mallinātha in his Commentary on Tārkikarakṣā makes Udayana the author of Lakṣaṇamālā (pp 179^{9}, 225^{18}), but this seems to be a case of erroneous ascription. Lakṣaṇamālā was the work of Śivāditya and not of Udayana. Probably the mistake arose from a confusion of Lakṣaṇamālā with Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī. That Varadarāja does not refer to Udayana's work follows from the facts that once (p. 179) he explicitly mentions Lakṣaṇamālā by name as the source of his quotation and that in both the cases the statements cited do not occur in the Lakṣaṇāvalī.

there can be no doubt about Udayana's authorship of it* from the fact that Varadarāja once speaks of the author as Āchārya (p. 308^{10-11}), a term generally reserved by the later Naiyāyikas for Udayana (and sometimes for Vāchaspati also).†

VIII.—ŚRĪDHARA

As the author of Nyāya Kandalī, a Commentary on Praśastapāda's Padārthadharma Saṃgraha, Śrīdhara's reputation has come down to posterity. He was a great scholar, the last of that glorious band whose depth of learning was commensurate with their range of studies. In Nyāya his fame is known to be well established: later writers have always acknowledged his authority, and though some of his personal opinions, such as the view on तमः‡, are rejected in the subsequent history of this philosophy, the eminence of his position in the world of Indian thinkers remains still unaffected by it.

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* Cf. Intro to Tarkikarakṣā, p. 7; Aufrecht, Cat. Cat I, 65 (here the name appears as वैद्य-सिद्धि).

† For example, see Tārkikarakṣā, p. 159^{13-14}, where Varadarāja quotes Udayana's definition of Viśeṣa under the name of आचार्याः (Mallinātha makes आचार्य = किरणावलीकार). Cf. Tārkikarakṣā, p. 107^{5-6} (तदेतत् सर्वं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ प्रपञ्चितमाचार्यैः), p. 65^{3} (लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानमित्याचार्याः), pp 85^{6} 86^{1-2}, &c and also p, 77^{1} (see Mallinatha's note).

‡ His view might appear to be outlandish to one accustomed to the usual way of thinking. To him तमः (darkness) is not mere अभाव as with the orthodox Naiyāyika nor a kind of द्रव्य made up of atomic particles as with the Mīmāṃsaka, but it is the blue colour and is therefore a quality (cf, for a summary of the different views on darkness, Athalve, Tarkasaṅgraha, Notes, pp $^{78-79}$). Śrīdhara thus sums up his own conclusion on the question: तस्माद् रूपविशेषोऽयमत्यन्तं तेजोऽभावे सति सर्वतः समारोपितस्तम इति प्रतीयते।

Kandalī. p. 9^{23-24}

Sridhara is fortunately one of those few writers in the history of India who have left some account of themselves. He says in the Nyāya Kandali, pp 330-331, that he was born in the village of Bhūrisisti in Southern Rādha (=दक्षिणराढायां भूरिसृष्टिः) His parents' names are given as Baladeva and *Acchokā* (or Abbokā), and it appears that the Kāyastha gentleman named Pāṇḍudāsa, at whose request he undertook to write this Commentary, was his patron.

Besides (a) न्यायकन्दली* which was composed in 913 Saka (त्र्यधिक दशोत्तर नवशतशाकाब्दे) or 991 A. D. Sridhara had also written—

(b) अद्वयसिद्धि, an original work in Vedānta (Kandali, p. 5)

(c) तत्त्वप्रबोध, an original work in Mimāmsā (Kand., pp. 82, 146), and

(d) तत्त्वसंवादिनी (Kand., p. 82).

Mr. Chakravarti notes (loc. cit.) that Sridhara's Nyāya Kandalī was "little used in Bengal or Mithilā". But this does not seem to me to have been exactly the case, at least so far as Mithilā is concerned. For though undoubtedly it was not so widely read as Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī† and was confined to the specialists alone, its studies continued for some centuries uninterrupted, and it was during these years of its flourishing condition that Commentaries used to be written upon it. Padmanābha wrote a Commentary upon it (Nyāyakandalīsāra) as he had done upon Udayana's parallel work, and looking at the

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* संग्रहटीका (Kand. p. 159), was not a Commentary on some treatise named Samgraha (=Kaṇāda Samgraha?), as is usually supposed, but it was the name of the Kandalī itself If we remember that the Kandalī was the Commentary on the Padārtha dharma Samgraha, we can make out the meaning of the term.

† But in Kashmir, it would appear from Buhler's Report, it enjoyed a greater popularity.

opening verse of this commentary it would seem that Vardhamāna and other earlier writers had also commented upon it.* With the evidence for these Commentaries, all by Maithilas, before us it would be hard to accept Mr. Chakravarti's statement regarding *Mithilā* as true. But as to the fact of the general disuse of the book in Bengal there exists no ground for raising any question. It is really a mystery how a work written in Bengal, by a Bengali author and with real claims to appreciation should have gone out of fashion in the country of its birth. It seems to me equally inexplicable how this work, just like Bhāsarvajña's Nyāya Sāra, could find such vogue among the Jain logicians. Rāja Śekhara wrote a Commentary upon it (Nyāya Kandalīpañjikā. See Peterson's Report 3.272) and refers to it in his Ṣaḍdarśanasamuchchaya. Guṇaratna, in his gloss on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśana samuchchaya and Malliṣena in Śyādvāda mañjarī (Yaśovijaya Ed., p.56) also refer to it, & so do many other Jaina writers.

IX.—ŚIVĀDITYA MIŚRA

The earliest reference of Nyāyāchārya † Śivāditya Miśra is found in Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya where the former's definition of *pramā* is strongly denounced. Śriharṣa's time being the 12th Century (M. Chakravarti, in J.A.S.B., 1915, p. 264), Śivāditya may be placed a century or more earlier.

* Thus in t e śloka

उपदिष्टा गुरुचरणैःस्पृष्टा वर्धमानाद्यैः
कन्दल्याः सारार्थास्तन्यन्ते पद्मनाभेन ॥

Intro. to Nyāya Kandalī, p. 4.

the expression स्पृष्टा वर्धमानाद्यैः plainly implies the existence of Commentaries upon the work by Vardhamāna and other authors gone befoie.

† S'aṅkaıa Miśra employs this epithet for S'ivāditya's name ıu his Commentary on Khaṇḍana Khādya (Ben. Ed., p. 144).

He seems to have been the author of two original works, both in Vaiśeṣika viz. (a) सप्तपदार्थी and (b) लक्षणमाला (See Pratyaksvarūpa's Commentary on Chitsukhī, Nir. Sāgara Ed., p. 180 ; and Śaṅkara Miśra's Commentary on Khaṇḍana, p. 144).

Pandit Vindhyeśvarī Prasād Dube (Intro. to Praśastapāda Bhāṣya and Nyāya Kandali, Viz. Series, p. 19, f. note 2) assumes the identity of this Śivāditya with Vyomaśivāchārya, the author of a Commentary on Praśastapāda Bhāṣya. This assumption is not tenable. Probably this mis-identification proceeded from a confusion due to similarity of names and to an erroneous reading in one of the Mss. of Saptapadārthī (cf Tailaṅga Rāma S'āstrī's Ed. of Saptapadārthī, Preface, p. 1. and the Text p. 80, footnote).

Mr. Chakravartī (J. A. S. B., 1915, p. 262) attributes to S'ivāditya the credit of having added the Category of abhāva to the sixfold group of the older writers. But this view cannot be accepted without some reservation. For if it is meant by what he says that Śivāditya was the earliest known philosopher who gave to abhāva a place of importance in the discussion of Categories and that he was *not* its introducer the view may be pronounced probable. But if it implies, as it seems to do, that he *added* it as a fresh Category not hitherto recognised in the system, the error is apparent. The distinctive position of the Vaiśeṣika in the order of Indian Systems would suffer a deadly shock with the disappearance of Abhāva. It forms, with Samavāya and Viśeṣa, the keystone of the whole system. It is true that in the older works (e. g. Vaiś. Sut. 1. 1. 4; Praś. Bhā. p. 6; cf. Sāṅ. Sūt. 1. 25: Kandalī, p. 331[4]) six categories are explicitly enounced, but it does not mean that abhāva is not recognised as real. The reason why it is excluded from the usual formulation of the Categories, all positive, is thus stated by S'rīdhara:

अभावस्य पृथगनुपदेशः भावपारतन्त्र्यान्न त्वभावात् (Kandali, p. 7")1. With the Vaiśeṣika, (unlike the Sāṅkhya), for whom प्रतीति (added to, but in a greater measure than, its counterpart व्यवहार) as an ultimate fact of consciousness given in the form of 'belief', is the determinant of objective reality. abhāva is necessarily real. It was under a metaphysical, rather than a logical, necessity that abhāva had to be postulated in this system. And the necessity thus felt was twofold, arising (a) from the fundamental assumption of the school that Mokṣa is really negative*, (b) and from its doctrine of असत्कार्यवाद which allows of a real negative judgment. To illustrate this point we may revert to the position of सत्कार्यवाद such as that of सांख्य or योग to see that a really negative predicate can have no place in its theory of predication. It being assumed here that everything exists everywhere, or one thing is identical with another ("जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकं" Vyāsa's Com. on Yoga Sūtra III-14.) all negation would be merely verbal (वैकल्पिक). Let us take an example:

(A) The judgment घटो नास्ति or more explicitly मृत्तिकायां घटो नास्ति would be a real judgment according to the Vaiśeṣika and lend itself to a double interpretation—(i) it may mean that the jar, being not yet produced, does not exist in the Matter (मृत्तिका); this would be प्रागभाव; or (ii) it may mean that the jar, being destroyed, does not exist in the Matter (मृत्तिका); this would be ध्वंस । But both these kinds of abhāva are according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga really two forms of bhāva (there being no room for असत् in this system), the one known as the अनागतधर्म and the other as the

* According to the Vaiśeṣika Mokṣa being conceived as an absence of qualities, a separate category other than positive was rendered necessary. This was named अभाव.

अतीतधर्म of the Matter (मृत्तिका). Both are equally positive in content. The judgment घटो नास्ति, therefore as in (i) and (ii), or more strictly मृत्तिका घटाभाववती, would be a pseudo-judgment, the true (of course relatively) judgment taking the form of मृत्तिका घट-वती, even when the घट is not produced or is already destroyed. In other words, while in Sankhya-Yoga अभाव is not allowed to be a real predicate or धर्म, in Nyāya-Vaiśesika it is. It may be observed that the Vaiśesika allows only what is called in Sānkhya-Yoga वर्त्तमानधर्म i. e. उदितधर्म to be a positive predicate. That is, घट may be a positive predicate of मृत्तिका or मृत्तिका may be said to be the आधार of घट, *only* after its production and before its destruction, in other words when it is वर्त्तमान। And for explaining this presence or वर्त्तमानता of the product in the Matter, the relation of समवाय has to be assumed. But before the production and after the destruction घट is negatively predicable. This is a fundamental difference between the two systems, resulting necessarily from the two assumptions of सत्कार्य or असत्कार्य। Naturally therefore the अतीत & अनागत वस्तु, though admitted to be प्रमेय or object (विषय) of right knowledge, are held in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika as असत् or non-existing (but not तुच्छ,, or अवस्तु as the Bauddha might say), i. e. ध्वंस and प्रागभाव are respectively predicable of them.

(B) Similarly the judgment पटो घटो न where the identity of the objects पट and घट is denied would be a false judgment according to Sānkhya-Yoga. Really पट being identical with घट (तदात्मक) there is no ground for such negation. But since the Nyāya-Vaiśesika does not hold प्रकृतिकारणवाद or the doctrine of the Immanence and Unity of Matter of which the manifold (वैचित्र्य) given in experience is more or less (i. e. graded) a manifestation, and

consequently is an advocate of absolute difference (अत्यन्तभेद) between one thing and another, it cannot do without what is technically called अन्योन्याभाव.

(C) And so with अत्यन्ताभाव too. Everything being every where and so there being no possibility of any relation (संसर्ग) like संयोग or समवाय which implies the existence of two really distinct objects, अत्यन्ताभाव is no more than a verbal fiction.

Briefly speaking, then, the प्रकृतिवाद् of the Sāṅkhya, of which सत्कार्यवाद is an aspect, leaves it no room for real अभाव (or सम्बन्ध). All predication is reduced to identific-ation; धर्मी or logical subject i. e. कारण (उपादान) is identical with धर्म or predicate i. e. कार्य. Matter (प्रकृति) is the subject in the last resort, and all else, viz. the products (विकृति s), are its predicates. These predicates, all positive, are each threefold in character—अतीत, अनागत & वर्त्तमान, this division being founded on the bare fact of succession given in the limited consciousness (वृत्त्यात्मक ज्ञान) and not on the reality (स्वरूपत:) in which all the predicates co-exist and are identical with the subject. That is to say, time itself being a product predicates appear within it as successive, but beyond it-in Eternity—or in मूला प्रकृति, the predicates are already given as existing together and somehow in-explicably identical with it. This is तादात्म्य. [From this it will be plain why Sāṇkhya-Yoga does not feel the necessity of admitting सामान्य and विशेष, both predicates, as distinct categories. And real difference being denied, it is easy to understand how the necessity of समवाय also is dispensed with.]

The Vaiśesika, on the other hand, with his assumption of real difference corresponding to and necessitated by the difference in प्रत्यय and व्यवहार was thrown upon the असत्कार्यवाद

(which is, looked at from a slightly different standpoint, the same thing as आरम्भवाद & परमाणुवाद) which led him in logical course to maintain the reality of succession and with this of what are technically termed प्रागभाव & ध्वंस. Their अन्योन्याभाव also follows naturally from the view of the reality of difference given in consciousness, viz. घट is other than not-घट e. g. पट. This is in logical terms nothing but a combined statement of the principles of Identity and Contradiction, thus symbolically A = A, & A = not-not-A. It seems to have been the outcome of a reaction against the extreme views of the Sāṅkhya on one hand with whom A = B and of the Bauddha on the other with whom A = not-A. A real संसर्ग (संयोग and समवाय) being admitted, its absence led to the postulation of अत्यन्ताभाव।

Without entering into further detail in this place it may be just said that the concept of abhāva is so intimately bound up with this system as a whole that its denial would mean the overthrow of its distinctive character.

Then again in the actual texts of the older writers abhāva is found recognised. Cf. Ny. Sūt. 2.2.8. et seq., Nyāya Vārtika, pp. 278–280, 281–284: Tāt. Ṭīkā, pp 306–307 & Nyāya Mañjarī. Even Kaṇāda himself, though not mentioning it in his enumeration of the Categories (1.1.4), devotes some sūtras to a discussion of it in the 9th chapter. Thus the absence of Kaṇāda's mention of it by name in the उद्देशसूत्र is no proof against its recognition by him. Vallabhāchārya says—अभावस्य च समानतन्त्रसिद्धस्याप्रतिषिद्धस्य न्यायदर्शने मानसेन्द्रियतासिद्धिवदत्रापि अविरोधादभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तसिद्धत्वात्। Nyāya Līlāvatī, Nir, Sāgara Ed.

To this S'aṅkara Miśra adds the following explanatory notes in his Nyāya Līlāvatī Kaṇṭh bharaṇa (Ms. belonging to the Benares Sanskrit Library): तेषु लक्षितलक्षणत्वात् (Corr. reading लक्षितेष्वलक्षितलक्षणत्वात्) इत्यादि सूत्रे

न्यायदर्शने समाने तन्त्रेऽभावस्य व्युत्पादितत्वादत्र च तदप्रति-षेधात् परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतमिति न्यायेन सूत्रकृतस्तत्राभ्युप-गमनोन्नयनात् । यथा गोतमेन मनस इन्द्रियत्वं नोक्तमप्रतिषे-धादभ्युपगतञ्च ।

Fol 8 a^{5-6}

I think it has now been demonstrated that there is no warrant for asserting, as Mr. Chakravarti has done (loc. cit.), that S'ivāditya "*added*" abhāva "to the six categories of the older writers."* He simply explicated, giving to it the name of the *7th* category, what had already been recognised in the system as a real Category.

X.—VARADARĀJA.

The exact time of Varadarāja's life is very hard of determination. Dr. Venis places him in the interval between 1050 & 1300 A. D. or more definitely about the first half of the 12th century (Prefatory notice to Tārkikarakṣā, p. iii). Though a greater precision is not attainable on this matter in the present state of our knowledge, a word or two may be suggested here. Jñānapūrṇa, whose time cannot be later than the 13th century and possibly was much earlier, alludes in the beginning of his commentary called Laghudīpikā to Varadarāja as having lived long ago (पुरा). This would appear to furnish a plea for pushing back this date by some decades at any rate. And the constant references to Udayana in the Tārkikarakṣā seem to me to indicate, not merely

* Mr Chakravartī is equally wrong in his assertion (loc cit, 262) made apparently on the authority of Kandalī, p 331, that S'rīdhara "acknowledged only six categories". As indicated in the line quoted from the Kandalī on p. 118 above this assertion is unfounded. S'rīdhara did acknowledge abhāva (note the phrase न त्वभावात्) as a *real* category of existence. Compare also Kandalī p. 230, lines 3-23.

that Varadarāja was his admirer but that he was his close successor as well. As a provisional step, therefore, I would prefer to claim for him as his approximate date the middle of the 11th Century*.

Varadarāja is known to have written only three works :

A. Commentaries on

(a) Udayana's

i. न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि(=बोधनी). Mallinātha refers to it in his Commentary on the Tārkikarakṣā (p. 46): एतच्च ग्रन्थकृतैव स्पष्टीकृतं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिटीकायामित्यास्तां तावत्। Burnell (Tanjore Catalogue, p. 123) notices a copy of this Commentary existing in the Palace Library of Tanjore, where the name of the author's father is given as Mahāmahopādhyāya Rāmadeva Miśra.†

ii. किरणावली (See Aufrecht, Cat. Cat., I. pp. 107,550).

B. तार्किकरक्षा, sometimes called तर्ककारिका, a treatise on Nyāya consisting of 160 Kārikās distributed in three chapters (97+34+29) and of a Commentary named सारसंग्रह. The book is referred to in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha.

* Mr. Chakravartī's assertion (loc. cit., p. 265) that "Vardhamāna is the oldest Commentator known on Udayana's works" is thus found to be no longer tenable.

† A Ms. of this work, as far as Chap III, was obtained by the present writer in 1916. It had been transcribed in Śaka 1436 (1514 A. D.) and belonged to the private collection of Sarva Vidyānidhāna Kavīndrāchārya Sarasvatī whose name appears in bold hand on the first and last leaves. It has since been edited by the writer with a historical Introduction for the Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts, No. 4 (Benares).

XI—VALLABHĀCHĀRYA

Vallabhāchārya was one of the greatest authorities on Vaieśiṣika philosophy, next only to Udayanāchārya, in the *mediaeval period of its history. There are certain peculiar* views associated with his name in subsequent literature, but as we have dealt with them at length in our forthcoming work on the history of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy, there is no use *reverting to them here.*

He was the author of Nyāyalilāvatī, an independent * work on Vaiśeṣika This work has had the rare good fortune, viz. much like Gaṅgeśa's Tattva Chintāmaṇi, of finding a host of commentators.

Vallabha's nationality is not known. But his date may be assigned with tolerable certainty to the end of the 12th Century A.D.†

XII—ŚAŚADHARA

It is believed that Śaśadhara was one of the great Naiyāyikas of the pre-Gaṅgeśa School and that in Gaṅgeśa's Tattva Chintāmaṇi there is a reference to his definition of Vyāpti.‡ As there is no mention of Gaṅgeśa or his successors in Śaśadhara's work available to us there is no inherent improbability in the correctness of this belief.

* Nyāyalīlāvatī is apparently an independent work, based on and planned after, Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya. It is said that on this Vaiseṣika Bhāṣya there was a commentary by S'rī Vatsa called Nyāyalīlāvatī. If Śrī Vatsa is held identical with Vallabha, Nyāyalīlāvatī will have to be consideredred as a commentary on the Bhāṣya, just as the Bhāṣya itself is on the Sūtras.

† Vallabha is referred to in (a) Vādīndra's Rasasāra(about 1225 A.D.), and in (b) a Kanarese poem written by a poet under King Singhana of the Yādava dynasty of Devagiri (about 1226 A.D.).

‡ Tradition identifies "*Sinha*" (Lion) and "*Vyāghra*" (Tiger), whose definitions of Vyāpti have been quoted by Gaṅgeśa under

Śaśadhara may therefore be placed between Udayana to whom he refers and Gaṅgeśa, i.e. in the middle of the twelfth century.

He was the author of *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, an excellent treatise on Nyāya. *

XIII—VĀDĪNDRA

Mahādeva Sarvajña Vādīndra was one of the greatest polemic writers in the field of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika in mediaeval India and deserves to be ranked, so far as dialectical abilities are concerned, with Śrī Harṣa and similar other writers..

He is said to have been the pupil of one Yogīśvara His name Vādīndra is apparently due to his reputation among his contemporaries as a great controversialist, and we know that Chitsukha and other subsequent writers referred to him under this very name His pupil Bhaṭṭa Rāghava speaks very often, in his Commentary on Nyāyasāra, of his large following. Vādīndra was a votary of Śiva (cf. the benedictory verses of his works), and it is not unlikely that the words Śaṅkara Kiṅkara as used in Mādhava's Sarva darśana Saṅgraha (Ānandāśrama Ed., p 98) and Hara Kiṅkara as in the Colophon of the Mahā-

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the name सिंह व्याघ्रलक्षण, with Śaśadhara (or Śaśidhara) and Maṇidhara. It is not known whether this tradition has a historical basis, and if so, who these two persons really were Dr Satis Chandra is inclined to believe that the names 'Lion' and 'Tiger' represent the Jain Logicians, Ānanda Sūri and Amarachandra Sūri. See his Ind Logic, p 396.

* Aufrecht (Cat. Cat. I. p 638) ascribes the following works to Śaśadhara · (a) Nyāyanaya, (b) Nyāyamīmāṃsāprakaraṇa, (c) Nyāyaratnaprakaraṇa, and (d) Śaśadharamālā That the last is a separate work is evident. According to the Ind. Off Cat, p. 646, (c) is another name of Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa itself, while in Burnell (p 119)it(i e Nyāyaratna) is the name of a Com. on Nyāya Siddhāntadīpa by Dharmarāja Bhaṭṭa Nyāyanaya and Nyāyamīmāṃsā too are probably not different works.

vidyā viḍambana are to be understood as meaning a 'devotee of Śiva' rather than a 'pupil of the Āchārya named Śaṅkara or Hara'. He describes himself in his work on the Mahāvidyā as the Dharmādhyakṣa of King Śrī Siṃha, whom Mr M.R. Telang identifies with Rājā Singhana of the Yādava dynasty of Devagirī.

The manuscript of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's Nyāyasāravichāra, which exists in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares, is dated in Śakābda 1174 (=1252 A.D.). * But Rāghava was the direct pupil of Vādīndra as he says expressly in his colophons as well as in the beginning of his commentary. Vādīndra may therefore be placed in the early part of the 13th Century. This date synchronises well with the time of his patron, Rājā Singhana or Śrī Siṃha.

Vādīndra was the author of the following works:

(1) Mahāvidyāviḍambana:

It has been published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XII. It was perhaps the *magnum opus* of this gifted author and created quite a sensation in his time. His great controversialistic genius appears at its best in this work, where he attempts to prove the futility and defects of the so-called Mahāvidyā syllogisms, which played an important part in the history of mediaeval Indian Logic.

(2) Rasasāra:

This is a Commentary on the Guna Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana. It has been published in the Sarasvatī Bhavana Sanskrit Texts of Benares (No 5).

(3) Kaṇādasutra nibandha†.

(4) A Commentary on Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī :

Śeṣa Śārngadhara, in his Commentary, Nyāyamuktāvalī,

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* For a discussion of this date see under *Bhaṭṭa Rāghava*.

† See M. R. Telang's Introduction to the Mahāvidyā-viḍambana, p. XVI.

on Lakṣaṇāvalī, says: वादीशास्तु साधनशब्दस्य कारणवाचित्व-मभ्युपगम्य निर्विकल्पकजनकशरीरसंयोगाधिकरणत्वे सति यागजधर्माजन्यजन्यसाक्षात्काराविषयत्वे सति शरीरत्वानधिकरणमिन्द्रियमिति यथाश्रुतमेवैतद् व्याचक्षते (Ben. Ed., p 29). This passage would seem to show that Vādīśa whom I take to be identical with Vādīndra wrote a Commentary on Lakṣaṇāvalī. The name Vādīndra also occurs in the same Commentary (cf p. 23), and the term Vādīndra being only an honorific title there is no inherent difficulty in understanding the two names as representing one person. It is much like शङ्करकिङ्कर being substituted by हरकिङ्कर as already noted.

(5) A metrical philosophical treatise :

The name of this tract does not appear. But the quotations under Vādīndra's name as given in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha and Nyāyasāravichāra being in verse it seems likely that he was the author of a metrical tract.

XIV—BHAṬṬA RĀGHAVA.

Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's Commentary on Bhāsarvajña's Nyāya Sāra (न्यायसारविचार) is the only work from his pen known to philosophical bibliography, and though it does not seem to have ever been widely used in later times its importance is none the less very great. Apart from the fact that this book furnishes a clear exposition of Bhāsarvajña's doctrines which it professes to defend from the attacks of opponents, it contains a number of lengthy discussions relating to certain topics raised in the text which are historically of great value to a student of contemporary philosophy.

There exists a manuscript of this Commentary in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares (fols. 2—100), where in the Colophon the date of its composition is given as 1174 Śaka or 1252 A. D.*

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* The verse in which the date appears runs thus.
शकेऽब्दतः सप्ततिसत्त्वयुक्त शतैः शताधिक्यधिके च पंचभिः ।
द्विमासितस्तत्र बभूव वत्सरेऽमुं विचारः परिभाविता ॥

The name of Rāghava's father appears as Sārańga* and his Guru was Mahādeva Sarvajña Vādındra (See the Colophons at the end of each chapter : fols. 19a⁷-b¹, 72a⁷ &

[The meaning of the last phrase is not clear, but the reading is exactly as given above. There is no room for reading परिशाणि राघवः, as the late Mm. Satis Chandra (Introduction to Nyayasāra p. 7) has done. After शि of शाणि there is visible an i stroke, the consonant following having disappeared, and the last letter with which the next line begins is वा and not वः so that the final word of the verse cannot be read as राघवः। The Ms. is generally free from slips and is carefully corrected.]

Of the two ways of interpreting this verse, viz. (1) [(500 × 2) + 100] + 74 = 1174 Śaka or 1252 A. D., and (2) [(500 + 100) × 2] + 74 = 1274 Śaka or 1352 A. D, I should prefer the former interpretation. Apart from the convincing historical grounds adduced by Mr. Telang (Introduction to Mahāvidyāvidambana, pp. XII—XV) there is another fact to be considered. In the Ms named above there is an entry evidently by a later hand that the Ms was purchased by one Viṣṇu from one Udaya Sinha for 25 (?) pieces in Saṃ 1428 (= 1371 A. D.): विष्णुभिगृहीत पुस्तक पंचविंशति (ति (?) क्रयेण) श्री.देसिहात: ॥ संवत १४ ८ अद्वैमा समय नैशाख वदि २ द्वितीया रवौ ॥ श्रीरा-नार्थमस्तु ॥ श्री॰ ॥ श्री: ॥ श्री: ॥ This statement shows that the Ms. was purchased in 1371 A D. Consequently the date of transcription must be earlier and that of composition much earlier still In view of this circumstance the alternative of 1352 A. D. as the date of the composition of the work does not strike me as probable I therefore accept the former interpretation of the verse and take the date to represent 1252 A D. Cf also Hall (Bibl, Index, p. 26).

Sāraṅga is said to have been defeated in a public controversy by the Jain Logician Jaya Sinha Sūri (1366 A.D.), author of a commentary on Bhasarvajña's Nyaya Sāra, whose pupil Nyayachandra Sūri describes this event in his Hammīra Kavya. See T. M Tripathi's Introduction (p. xviii) to Ānanda jñana's Tarkasangraha (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. III).

100b[7])* ; this Vādindra is probably identical with the author of the same name to whom Rasasāra, a Commentary on the second part of the Kiraṇāvalī, is attributed (Hall, p. 67).

Rāghava was a Śaiva (see fols. 19b, 72a-b, 100b). His native country is not known for certain, but it seems likely that he was a man of the South. In his Commentary he quotes or refers to the earlier authorities as below

खण्डनमण्डना: †...4b[3],
वात्स्यायन मत...7a[7]
न्यायभाष्यकारा:...8b[4]
मीमांसका: ..} 8b[5]
चार्वाका: ...}
भूषण, भासर्वज्ञ—11b[4]
वार्त्तिककृत्—12b[6], 20a[7]
तथाचोक्तं— लौकिकी प्रतिभा यद्वत् &c—16a[3-4]
तदुक्तं—एकेन तु प्रमाणेन &c—16a[5]
तदाह—यदि षड्भि: प्रमाणै: स्यात्—16a[6]

(The above three quotations are from Kumārila's Śloka Vārtika, 4.32, 2.112 & 2.111, pp 143, 80 &79 of the Chowkhamba Ed.)

तदुक्तं·न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके &c —18b[3-4]

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* Cf. also the introductory verse in Nyāyasara vichara :
महादेवमहं वन्दे गुरुं सर्वज्ञमादरात् । ग्रन्थग्रन्थिपु शैथिल्ये शक्तिर्यस्मादभून्मम ॥
Ind. Off Cat., p. 609;

& the verse at the end :
श्रकार्यैम्यास पराय मया ग्रन्थच्छलादिह। वादीन्द्रकृति + + कं मागदेऽन्यावितन्वता ॥
Benares Sk. Coll Ms. fol. 100b [5-6]

† Is this Khaṇḍana Maṇḍana identical with the work of Paramānanda existing in the Deccan College Library ? (Cat. of Decc. College, p. 58).

(From Vākyapadīya, I.124).

वार्त्तिककार –18b^{4}

केचिद् विचक्षणाः—19b^{2}

(Apparently this is an ironical reference to an earlier Commentator on Nyāyasāra to whose interpretation Rāghava takes serious objection. Thus in Bhāsarvajña's definition of anumāna—सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानं –this unnamed annotator tries to establish a syntactical relation between the words सम्यक् and अनुभव which Rāghava would not allow.

Who is the Commentator meant here ?

रामभट्टप्रभृतयः 19b^{5}

Rāma Bhaṭṭa was another Commentator on Nyāyasāra whose name and work have been forgotten. In connection with the foregoing definition of anumāna Rāma Bhaṭṭa, as against the view already set forth, prefers to take सम्यक् in relation to the immediately succeeding word, on which Rāghava's criticism follows.

To be Continued.

THE MODERN PERIOD

The School of Mithilā

I.—GAṄGEŚA UPĀDHYĀYA

There is no man perhaps in the history of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy more frequently heard of on the lips of scholars than Gaṅgeśa or Gaṅgeśvara Upādhyāya of Mithilā. He gave to this philosophy a new line of development and created for it a new field of work ; and for practical purposes, he may be said to have been the father of that form of Nyāya Śāstra with which we are familiar to day. Essentially a keen dialectician and a brilliant controversialist, he made it the sole end of his literary life to make Nyāya Śāstra a Science of Debate. For this reason he devoted all his energies and intellectual abilities to the task of expounding problems of a methodological and epistomological character. The Tattvachintāmaṇi which forms the noblest monument of his genius deals almost exclusively with the Theory of Knowledge and the kindred logical questions प्रमाण), leaving very little room for pure Metaphysics or Ontology. Even the little theistic tract which has come down to us from his pen is more strictly a work on Anumāna Khaṇḍa, of which it is expressly stated to form a part, than an independent ontological piece.

It is usually believed t at it was Gaṅgeśa who for the first time gave to pramāṇa a place of great importance in the Science (& Art) of Debate and inaugurated its studies to the exclusion of every thing else in the schools with a rigour almost unprecedented in the history of modern philosophy. And, further, to Gaṅgeśa is universally ascribed the credit of founding the Neo-logic of Eastern India which with its militant dialectics and spirit of analytical criticism has won its way

into every form of intellectual life in the country. That the first of these propositions is unfounded needs no pointing out. For what Gaṅgeśa did for the orthodox system had already been accomplished by the Buddhist and Jain logicians who had preceded him. Dignāga's Pramāna samuchchaya, Dharmakīrti's Pramāna Vārtika and Pramāna Viniśchaya, Vidyānanda's Pramāṇa parīkṣā, & Deva Sūri's Pramāṇa naya tattvāloka are some of the works on प्रमाण which Gaṅgeśa had before him already in the field. But the second proposition may be accepted, for our notion of Neo-logic is bound up with Tattvachintāmaṇi and the series of Commentaries and subcommentaries upon it : but even here it must be remembered that our restriction of 'navya' to Gaṅgeśa is only of a practical value. In the Vidhivāda section of Śabda Khanda (p. 276, Bib Ed.) Gaṅgeśa himself refers to the views of Sondaḍa Upādhyāya as those of a modern scholar (नव्यास्तु), thus shewing that the term had already been in vogue even before the days of Gaṅgeśa. The word being only a relative term, it is intelligible why Udayana, Bhāsarvajña *before Gaṅgeśa* and Raghunātha, &c. *after him* should have equally been characterised as modern. Nevertheless, in the sense in which we employ the word नव्यन्याय at the present day it refers to Gaṅgeśa and to him alone.

Gaṅgeśa's date is not known with certainty. All that we know about it is that he quotes or refers to the views and statements of his predecessors some of whom he mentions by name. Of these Khaṇḍana Kāra (i. e. Śrī Harṣa, author of Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya), Jaran Naiyāyika (i. e. Jayanta, author of Nyāya Mañjarī), Mandanāchārya (author of Vidhi-viveka) and Śivāditya (author of Saptapadārthī) are admittedly very early, being assigned to periods approximately known. But these render us no help in clearing up the date problem of Gaṅgeśa The dates of Ratnakośa and

Nyāyalīlāvati, also quoted in Tattvachintāmaṇi, have not yet been ascertained, though we have found that the author of Nyāyalīlāvatī may tentatively be assigned to the 12th century A. D. The only conclusion therefore which the premises justify us in drawing in the present state of our imperfect knowledge is that Gaṅgeśa may be placed somewhere in the 13th century A. D.

Regarding his personal history we have no authentic records. There are certain *floating* traditions which make him in his early life a blockhead whose ascent to greatness was absolutely an act of Divine Grace.

II VARDHAMĀNA

Gaṅgeśa was succeeded in Mithilā by his son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya who followed in the wake of his illustrious father and kept alive the fire of the New Science which the latter had kindled. In point of scholarship Vardhamāna does not seem to have been in any way less than his great father, and the works which proceeded from him are still universally resorted to as of the highest authority in the subjects concerned. His style is elaborate, but free from verbosity and bathos. He is known to have been the author of the following works:—

A. Commentaries on

(a) Gotama's

i. Nyāya Sūtras (= अन्वीक्षातत्त्वबोध* or simply तत्त्वबोध).

The work is of the nature of a gloss and seems to have treated of the whole text. The प्रमेयतत्त्वबोध to which Ruchidatta and Jayarāma refer as the work of Vardhamāna

* A Ms of this rare work, dealing with the 5th chapter, exists in the Govt Sanskrit Library, Benares (New collection of 1917-18, Nyāya-section, Veṣṭana 9). It is named there अन्वीक्षानयतत्त्वबोध and not अन्वीक्षातत्त्वबोध, but as Vardhamāna himself refers to it under the second name in his Guṇa Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa we keep it unchanged here.

(Kusumāñjali prakāśa makaranda, Ben. Ed., p. 5 of Chap. 3; cf. Aufrecht, Cat. Cat., I, p. 554) and the प्रमाणतत्त्वबोध * also attributed to Vardhamāna in Ruchidatta's Commentary on Tattvachintāmaṇi (See *The Pandit*, Old series, VI, p. 128) may be only sections of अन्वीक्षातत्त्वबोध and no separate treatises.

(b) Udayana's

i. Nyāyakusumāñjali Prakaraṇa (= कुसुमाञ्जलि प्रकाश)

ii. Kiraṇāvalī (= किरणावली प्रकाश).

iii. Nyāya Vārtika tātparya pariśuddhi (= न्यायनिबन्ध प्रकाश).

iv. Nyāyapariśiṣṭa (= परिशिष्ट प्रकाश).

(c) Śriharṣa's

i. Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya. This work was utilised by Pragalbha in writing his own commentary on Śriharṣa's treatise. Vachaspati II, in his Khaṇḍanoddhāra†. refers to Vardhamāna's खण्डनफक्किकोद्धार which may be identical with it.

(d) Vallabha's

i. Nyāyalīlāvatī (= लीलावती प्रकाश).

and (e) Gaṅgeśa's

i. Tattvachintāmaṇi (= चिन्तामणि प्रकाश).

These are all the works of Vardhamāna with which we are acquainted to-day. But it is generally believed that Vardhamāna also wrote a Commentary on Udayana's Ātmatattvaviveka, but the work has since been lost.

We shall not be probably far in the wrong if we place Vardhamāna in the first quarter of the 14th Century, but

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* While explaining the meaning of the word शाङ्कर in Anumana didhiti—'अथ चानुमानस्य सङ्गतत्व तथा व्यस्तमाकर-Bhavananda (Bibl. Ed p 12) identifies it with Pramaṇatattvabodha. May it not be Vardhamāna's work of the same name?

† Reprint from the Pandit, p. 77.

there is no ground in Mr. Chakravarti's assertion, repeated by Dr. Vidyabhūṣaṇa (Ind. Logic, p. 455), that he is named by Mādhavāchārya in the Pāṇinidarśana section of his Sarvadarśana saṅgraha. The Vardhamāna, also a Mahopādhyāya, whose name is mentioned in Mādhava's work, was a grammarian, being the author of Ganaratna Mahodadhi.

III—PAKṢADHARA *ALIAS* JAYADEVA MIŚRA.

For a long time after the death of Vardhamāna there was no thinker in Mithilā to preserve, far less to enrich, the new philosophy of the country. Supposing that our assumption of Vardhamāna's date is practically right, we would find that during the long interval of over a century after his age Mithilā was without any scholar with any pretension to philosophical renown.

By the third quarter of the 15th century was born Pakṣadhara *alias* Jayadeva Miśra to whom we are indebted for the revival of interest in the study of Chintāmaṇi In plain truth Pakṣadhara was one of the greatest intellects that modern Mithilā has ever produced. He was the nephew and pupil* of Hari Miśra with whom he had read philosophy and whose memory he gratefully revered in the benedictory verse of his commentary on the Chintāmani : पितृव्यहरिमिश्रोपदिष्टः ।

He was the author of commentaries on

(*a*) Śaśadhara's

i. Nyāya siddhāntadīpa. A Ms of this work exists in the Govt. Sanskrit Library, Benares.

(*b*) Gaṅgeśa's

i. Tattvachintāmaṇi (= चिन्तामण्यालोक) and

(*c*) Vardhamāna's

*In the Navadvīpa mahimā, p 31, he is described as the pupil of Yajñapati Upādhyāya.

i. Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa
and ii. Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa (=लीलावतीविवेक).

It may be of interest to note that in the Govt. Sanskrit Library Benares there is a Ms of a commentary, called Ṭippaṇī, on the Chintamaṇi by Pakṣadhara—which is different from the Āloka. It is dated Saṃ 1667.

From a survey of the contemporary literature it seems certain that on its first appearance the Āloka, which formed indeed the best product of Pakṣadhara's labour, created a great sensation in the world of letters of that time. It was read and taught, admired and criticised in every circle. All parties set themselves to write commentaries upon it. What this general stir was really due to we have no means of knowing. But it is probable that Pakṣadhara's new interpretation was mainly responsible for it.

From Gaṅgeśa down to Pakṣadhara Navyanyāya had its sole home in Mithilā. The pandits of that place, who had made it their monopoly & been so long its trusted guardians, took especial care to see that this privilege of teaching the Śāstra did not pass away from them into what they perhaps thought unworthy hands*. Students from various parts of India used to flock to Mithilā to draw inspiration from its far-famed scholars ; and when they completed their studies they returned home with the diploma which their Guru had

* This cautiousness was pushed to its utmost limit. Thus we are told that Mss of Nyāya works which existed in Mithilā, having been left there by their authors, were not allowed to be copied, lest they should be borne away and the prestige of Mithilā for ever-destroyed Students had to commit the texts to memory, and before returning homes had to be very carefully examined by their teachers. It was in this way that the Kārikās of Kusumāñjali were brought to Bengal for the first time, according to tradition, by Haridasa Nyāyālaṅkāra (but according to Navadvīpa mahimā, pp. 35-36, by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma).

conferred upon them. This diploma was very highly prized, since to secure such a certificate from Mithilā, the Centre of the current philosophical thought and activities, was not quite an easy affair. And if a man could once manage to win for himself a diploma of this kind his scholarship was recognised all over the country without a note of grudging criticism.

IV —VĀSUDEVA MIŚRA.

Paksadhara had many pupils of whom Vasudeva Miśra, Ruchidatta and Bhagiratha Thakkura in Mithilā and Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Raghunatha Śiromani, &c in Bengal, were the most conspicuous.

Vāsudeva Misra was Paksadhara's brother's son* When Paksadhara s new interpretations were called in question and subjected to severe criticism it was he who came forward to vindicate his uncle's cause and establish his authority†. His commentary on the Tattvachintāmani, known as न्यायसिद्धान्तसार, refers to these overweening captious critics in these terms—

तर्कमधीते सर्वः कति न भवन्तीह पण्डितम्मन्या ।
वाचा विचारदक्षा विरला. पुनरत्र विद्वांसः ॥

meaning that it is easier to be quibbling and casuistic than to command real wisdom.

V.—RUCHIDATTA MIŚRA

But the most widely known of Paksadhara's pupils was Ruchidatta, popularly called Bhaktu, a native of the village of *Sodarapura*. His parents were Devadatta and Renukā He had two brothers named Śaktidatta and Matidatta Among

* Cf the colophon : इति श्रीन्यायसिद्धान्तसारे ... मिश्रवर्यपक्षधरमिश्रभ्रातृपुत्र-न्यायसिद्धान्तसाराभिध वासुदेवमिश्रविरचितायां ... टीकायां &c

Ind Off, no. 786, pp 621-2

† अयत्नेन गुरोर्वाचि ये केचिद् दोषदर्शिनः । प्रबोधाय मया तेषां दीपि भूयोऽभिदीप्यते ॥

his works the following three commentaries only can so far be traced : these are—

A. Commentaries on

(a) Gangeśa's

i. Tattvachintāmaṇi (=चिन्तामणिप्रकाश), referred to, in its several sections, in (b—i). In this work he speaks of having read the Śāstras with several Gurus.

and (b) Vardhamāna's

i. Kusumañjali prakāśa (=°मकरन्द). This is a very useful work. Though not a running commentary and quite original it makes an honest and generally successful attempt to make Vardhamāna's purport, often hidden and deep beneath the surface, intelligible to the reader.

and ii. (Dravya) Kiraṇāvali prakāśa (=द्रव्यप्रकाशविवृति). Vide Peterson's Ulwar Catalogue, No. 606, p. 26 ; ext. no. 146, p. 53.

There is a Ms of this work in the Govt. Sanskrit Library dated Saṃvat 1600 (=1543 A. D.).

The time when Ruchidatta flourished may be approximately fixed on the following data:

(a) There is a Ms. of his Makaranda in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares (No. 122) which bears the date 423 (अग्निपक्षनिगम) La Saṃ, corresponding to the year 1542 A. D. But as this is the date of transcription of the Ms. the author may be set down to some time earlier still.

(b) But the time of Ruchidatta is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by a look at the Ms. of a copy of Kiraṇāvali transcribed by himself in the year 386 (=रसवसुहरनेत्र) La Saṃ corresponding to the year 1505 A. D.*

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*रसवसुहरनेत्रे चैत्रिके शुक्लपक्षे,
प्रतिपदि बुधवारे वत्सरे लाक्ष्मणे च।

That this is the true date of Ruchidatta will become apparent when we shall find it synchronising with the age of his contemporary and fellow-pupil Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura. The date 1292 Śaka (=1370 A. D.) which appears in a Ms. of his Chintāmaṇiprakāśa, as reported by Peterson (Sixth Report, p. 76, no. 190), is therefore to be taken as a slip of the pen on the part of the scribe.

VI—RAGHUPATI

Raghupati was Mahāmahopādhyāya Ruchidatta's son. He was the author of a Commentary on Tattvachintamaṇi, of which two Mss, one of the Śabda Khaṇḍa (शब्दमणिपरीक्षा, dated Saṃ 1644=1587 A. D.) and the other of the Anumāna Khaṇḍa, exist in the Govt Sanskrit Library, Benares.

VII—BHAGĪRATHA ṬHAKKURA

Bhagīratha *alias* Megha Thakkura of Mithilā was also Pakṣadhara's pupil, as already stated. He himself says that he had received his philosophical training under Jayadeva and distinguished himself as a scholar of some renown at the early age of 20*. His parents were Chandra-

विबुधबुधविनोदं कारयन्तीं सुपुत्री-
मखिलदमलपाणिः श्रीरुचिः श्रमेणाम् ॥

(See V P. Dube's Introduction to Vaiśeṣika darśana with Kiraṇāvalī, p. 28).

* Babu Rajendranath Ghose, in his valuable work on Navya-Nyāya-Vyāptipanchaka (Intro p. 29), seems inclined to take the sentence विंशाब्दे जयदेवपण्डितकवेस्तर्काम्बिपारं गतः, occurring in Bhagīratha's commentary on Dravyakiraṇāvalī prakāśa, in the sense that Bhagīratha completed his studies of Jayadeva's works, at the age of 20. He understands कवेः with 6th case ending and denies any relation between Jayadeva and Bhagīratha. But it appears to me that though on any construction the sentence would be a faulty one, it would nevertheless yield a better sense if we were to take कवेः as with 5th case-ending. Moreover, Maheśa Ṭhakkura's time being ascertained on other

pati and Dhīrā, and Maheśa Ṭhakkura, of whom we shall speak shortly, was his youngest brother. Among his other brothers we find the names of Mahādeva and Dāmodara mentioned in Maheśa's Darpaṇa. Mahādeva was probably his elder brother and Dāmodara his immediately younger one *.

We know of the following works of Bhagīratha, viz. Commentaries on—

(a) Vardhamāna's

i. Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa (=किरणावलीप्रकाशभावप्रकाशिका) Mss. of this work, dated Śaka 1511 (शशिद्वययुत-स्मरवाणचन्द्र) or 1588 A.D. and Saṃ. 1654 or 1597 A.D. are in the Govt. Sanskrit Library, Benares.

ii. Nyāyakusumāñjali prakāśa (=कुसुमाञ्जलि प्रकाशिका)†

and iii. Nyāyalīlāvatī prakāśa† (न्यायलीलावतीप्रकाशिका)

All these commentaries are popularly known under the name of *Jalada*. Bhagīratha is called in a Ms of his Com. on Līlāvatī (in Govt. Sk. Library) "Śankara Bhagīratha".

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grounds also to be somewhere in the 16th century, the facts would square well if Bhagīratha were placed in the early part of that century and Jayadeva in the middle of the previous century. In Maheśa's time Āloka was a new work. Mr Chakravarti's hypothesis regarding Bhagīratha and Maheśa's date (1400 A. D.) is not very convincing.

* ज्यष्ठा महादेव भगीरथश्री दामोदरा यस्य तयोगुणाभ्याम् । स दर्पणं निर्मितवाननमेषा महादेवो विष्णुपदा महेशः ॥ (Anumānālokadarpaṇa by Maheśa Ṭhakkura). Hall (p. 66) and Pt V. P. Dube (Introduction to Tārkikarakṣā, p 24, f. note 1) are thus wrong in identifying Maheśa with his eldest brother Mahadeva That Mahādeva was Bhagīratha's elder brother is clearly stated by the latter in his Kusumāñjali Prakāśikā: महादेवनुपमः सोऽपि महादेवः कुलाग्रणी । अनुजस्तस्य कुरुतामिमां व्याख्यां भगीरथः (Ms belonging to Govt Sanskrit Library, Benares—fol. 126 a).

† Both these works are under edition and expected to be published very shortly from the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares.

VIII–MAHEŚA ṬHAKKURA

Maheśa Ṭhakkura was Bhagīratha's younger brother and founder of the present Raj family of Dārbhangā. He rose into prominence even more quickly than his brother. He was the author of an excellent commentary, called Darpaṇa, on Pakṣadhara's Chintāmaṇyāloka, which displays his great acumen. One of the main objects of his writing this commentary seems to have been, as in the case of Vāsudeva Miśra or Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura, to reclaim Paksadara's renown from hostile attacks. The phrase प्रमथितखलदर्पः as applied to himself in his Darpaṇa, is suggestive.

But it is strange that he did not prosecute his studies with the great Pakṣadhara whose name at that time must have been a household word in Mithilā. His brother Bhagīratha had been Pakṣadhara's pupil. What stood in the way of Maheśa then that he was compelled to travel all the way over to Benares and study with a Deccani Paṇḍit—Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa ? It is hard to discover the true cause of this. But two alternative explanations may be suggested :

(a) Either that Pakṣadhara had been recently dead or even if living he must have been too old to hold regular classes ;

(b) or that Maheśa's personal predilections for Vedāntic studies led him to come over to Kāśī, which had been the principal seat of Vedic culture ever since the days of Śaṅkarāchārya or even earlier, and seek instructions with a foreign though far-famed scholar.

At any rate his stay in Benares and his pursuit of what I take to be Vedāntic studies had the natural effect of broadening his outlook. His attitude towards Vedānta became tolerant and even respectful, being free from those prejudices which

were a characteristic feature of a Naiyāyika's mind. Thus in the light of what has been said above we are in a better position to understand the meaning of the following statement quoted from Maheśa's commentary (Anumāna Section): तदेतत् संक्षेपेण वेदान्तिमतं लिखितं न दूषितं श्रुतिपुराणस्मृतिशिष्टानुशिष्टत्वात्। This passage indicates a departure from the custom of the Nyāya writer and a leaning towards Vedānta.

Maheśa is known from expressions in his work to have been a Vaiṣṇava (विष्णुपरः) in faith, being an earnest votary of the Bālagopāla form of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

The age of Maheśa may be fixed with tolerable certainty. It is well known that he obtained the kingdom of Darbhanga as a free gift from the then reigning ruler of Mithilā (the last descendant of Kāmeśa's family). As to when this grant was made Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstrī assigns it to the early part of the 16th century, saying that the Charter was ratified by Sher Shah and Akbar. He further adds that a letter from Maheśa to Raghunātha (composed at Nadia in 1529 A.D.) is found in a Ms of Vaivasvata Siddhānta deposited in the Bengal Asiatic Society's Library*. Though this statement is contradicted by the date given for Maheśa's assumption of royalty in the well-known inscription on well at Dhanukhā in Mithilā,† the difference between the two dates is insignificant, and it may be taken for certain that Maheśa belonged to the middle of the 16th Century.

Maheśa seemed to have reigned long. We know of a work named सर्वदेशवृत्तान्तसंग्रह which describes a part of Akbar's reign and was composed in his reign. It is attributed to Maheśa Ṭhakkura‡. If this Maheśa be identical with the author of Darpaṇa, as is very likely, he was

* See Indian Antiquary, 1912, p.9.

† See V. P. Dube's Intro. to Tārkikarakṣā.

‡ Aufrecht, Cat. Cat. I, p. 701; Ind. Office, p. 1573.

certainly contemporary with Akbar and therefore lived into a part of the latter half of the 16th Century, Akbar's reign having commenced in 1556 A.D.

IX. JĪVANĀTHA MIŚRA

Jīvanātha was Śankara Miśra's uncle, being the elder brother of Bhavanātha. No work by him has yet been discovered, but from the statement in the Upaskāra (under Sūtra 9.2.1), where his view on the definition of पक्ष * is quoted, it appears that Jīvanātha left some written works behind him.

X—BHAVANĀTHA MIŚRA

Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, in his Preface to the Vādivinoda, p. 2, affirms, obviously on the strength of local tradition, that Bhavanātha, otherwise known as Bube Miśra (also known under the nickname Ayāchī) was a great scholar in various subjects etc. His works on Mīmāṃsā and Vyākarana are available, but nothing is known about his Nyāya and Vaiśesika treatises, if he had written any.

XI—ŚANKARA MIŚRA

Except perhaps the great Pakṣadhara, Śaṅkara Miśra had few equals in Mithilā since the days of Gaṅgeśa. His influence and popularity were immense, and though he was primarily no more than a commentary-writer, his services in the cause of the philosophy to which he owned allegiance were assuredly very great.

Regarding his personal history only a few fragments can be gathered. It is believed that he was born in the village of Sariṣaba, not far from Darbhanga, where the goddess Siddheśvarī enshrined by him is still in existence†.

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* उत्पाद्यसाध्यवत्तानिर्णयनिवर्त्त्यसंशयोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकमानत्वावच्छिन्नाभावः यत्र स पक्ष इति जीवनाथमिश्राः। This lakṣaṇa is also quoted by Śaṅkara in his

† Preface to Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā's edition of Vādivinoda, p. 2.

He is said to have been a precocious child, and anecdotes illustrating his possession of wonderful gifts are still widely current*. The names of his parents appear as Bhavanātha and Bhavānī to whom he never fails to pay homage†. If we can place any reliance on Śaṅkara's personal testimony it must be owned that Bhavanātha had been a man of great erudition; in almost all his works Śaṅkara acknowledges his deep indebtedness for his interpretation of the texts, especially in their knotty points, to the instructions received from his father.‡ It would seem from words used by Śaṅkara himself that he was taught by Bhavanātha formally who in his turn had been the pupil of his own elder brother Jīvanātha§,

Vadi Vinoda (p. 1 [16-17]).[उद्‌यान seems to be a better reading than उद्देश्य which is accepted by Dr Jhā] There is another reference to Jīvanātha in the Vādivinoda (p. 61[21-22]).

*Ibid, pp 3-4.

†See Vādivinoda, p 73, and Upaskāra (towards end, verse 1, Gujrati edition of Bakre, 1913, p 360) where he describes himself as and भवानीतनयः. Cf also his Kusumañjali Vyakhyā:

‡Thus (a) in the Līlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa

i. पितुर्व्याख्यां कृत्वा मनसि भवनाथस्य कृतिनो वयं लीलावत्याः प्रथयितुमिहोक्ति व्यवसिताः ॥ &c fol 1

ii. पित्रा यद् भवनाथेन व्याख्यातं तदिहालिखम् । fol. 165b

(b) in the Chintamaṇi Mayūkha

i. तात दर्शितचिन्तात्रसार &c Se Stein's Jammu Cat ,p 332)

ii. पित्रा यद् भवनाथेन व्याहृतं तदिहालिखम् ।

व्याख्यानगुणदेषाभ्यां संबन्धो मम पितुर्नमे ॥ Ib'd

(c) in the Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khadya ṭīkā

i. भवनाथसूक्ति गुम्फनमिह &c—fol. Ib[1-3]

ii. स्वभ्रातुर्यनाथस्य &c—fol. 119a[1-2]

(d, in the Upaskāra

i. याभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे सम्यग् व्युत्पादितोऽस्म्यहम् ।

कणादभवनाथाभ्यां ताभ्यां मम नमः सदा ॥

§Thus in the Līlāvati Kaṇṭhābharaṇam

That Śankara was a devoted Śaiva is proved by his benedictory verses (see the introductory verses of the Upaskāra, of the Lilāvati Kanthābharana, of the Kanādarahasyam, of the Vādivinoda, of the Khandanatīkā, &c) and by his describing himself as भवार्चन निरत. (end of Vādivinoda and of Upaskara). He was a voluminous writer, being the author of the following philosophical treatises —

A. Commentaries on

(*a*) Kanāda's

1. Vaiseshika Sutras (उपस्कार) Sankara's introductory verse (3) seems to imply that in interpreting the construction of the Sūtras he had no predecessors for his guidance or support. It was, he says, like the hazardous enterprise of a daring acrobat (खेल) who attempts at walking in the mid air on the nominal support of a piece of thread.

सूत्रमात्रावलम्बेन निरालम्बेऽपि गच्छता ।
खे खेलवन्ममाप्यत्र साहसं सिद्धिमेष्यति ॥

Here the words सूत्रमात्रावलम्बेन and निरालम्बे would seem to suggest that in Śankara's time no direct gloss on the Sutras was extant.

स्वभ्रातुर्जीवनाथस्य व्याख्यामाख्यातवान् मयि ।
मास्वता भवनाथो मां नामिहान्विखमुत्तमाम् ॥ fol 165b

The Śloka also occurs in the printed text of Śankara's Commentary on the Khandana Khandi Khadya (Lazarus &Co Benares, 1888, p. 732), where the name Jivanātha is replaced by Jayanatha; but it does not appear in the MS, No 134, dated Samvat 1529, belonging to the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares The statement, however, plainly shows that Śankara reproduced in his works, at any rate in the Commentary on the Lilāvati, what had been dictated to him by his father according to the teaching of his uncle, and that consequently he should not be held directly responsible for the views therein expressed.

Now, if this suggestion were true what are we to say of the *Vṛtti* to which Śaṅkara himself makes such constant references (Upaskāra, under Sūtras 1.1.2; 1.2.3, 6; 4.1.7; 9.2.13 &c)? Possibly to maintain his consistency we shall have to fall back on the only other alternative that the Vṛtti from which he quotes had not been, like the Bhāṣya itself, an immediate interpretation of the Sūtras.

The following authorities are referred to in the Upaskāra:

प्रशस्तदेवाचार्याः—1.1.8; 4.1.2; 8.2.3; 9.2.8
प्रशस्तदेवपादाः—9.2.6
प्रशस्ताचार्याः—9.2.13; 10.1.1
प्रशस्तदेवाः— 9.1.10
वृत्तिकार—1 2.3; 6.1.12; 9.2.8
वृत्तिकृत्—1.1.2; 1.2.6; 4.1.7; 7.1.3; 9.2.13; 10.1.3
उद्योतकराचार्याः—1.2.5
न्यायवार्त्तिक—9.1.1
कीर्त्ति—(धर्मकीर्त्ति) 8.1.2
दिङ्नाग—8.1.2
भूषण —7.2.1
सौतान्तिकाः—7.2.20
पदार्थ प्रदेश (?)—9.2 6
श्रीधराचार्याः—7.2.8
उदयनाचार्याः—7.2.8
वल्लभाचार्याः—4.1.10

The Upaskāra appears to have been composed at Benares. Cf the sentence-दृश्यते चेह वाराणस्यां &c under Sūt. 7.1.22.

(*b*) Praśastapāda's

i. Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (कणादरहस्यम्), referred to in the Upaskāra (7. 1. 6.). It reads more like an independent treatise than a commentary, and had it not been for the

intimation by the author himself that it is a "Vyākhyā"* it would never have been possible to class it under commentaries. No *pratīkas* from the original are given for the guidance of the reader and usually the order of the Bhāṣya too is not followed.

(c) Udayana's

i. Ātmatattvaviveka (आत्मतत्त्वविवेककल्पलता)

ii. Nyāya Kusumāñjali (आमोद)†. In the third introductory verse of this book the author refers to three previous commentaries, viz. Makaranda, Prakāsa and Parimala‡.

*See Kaṇāda rahasyam, p 1 (Chow: Ed) : द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुरिति प्रशस्तपादाचार्यभाष्यव्याख्यानच्छलेन कणादरहस्यं व्याख्यास्यामः ।

†Aufrecht, Oxf. Cat, p. 243, No. 601. Though the name of the Commentator does not occur here, there cannot be any question about Śaṅkara's authorship of the work The verse—भवानीभवनाथाभ्यां पितृभ्यां प्रणमाम्यहम्— and the expression—ततोऽधिकां पितुर्व्याख्यामाख्यातुमयमुद्यमः—prove the fact beyond any shadow of doubt There is no ground therefore for attributing this Commentary to Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma (*Sub Voce*) The Ms. of Āmoda, which exists in the Govt. Sanskrit Library Benares (fols. 1–116), calls itself in the colophon the work of S'aṅkara Miśra.

‡The verse runs :

मकरन्दे प्रकाशे या व्याख्या परिमलेऽथवा ।
ततोऽधिकां पितुर्व्याख्यामाख्यातुमयमुद्यमः ॥

(Mr. Chakravarti's reading of the Śloka (J. A. S. B, Sept., 1915, p. 281) is manifestly corrupt). Aufrecht's Latin interpretation of this stanza, as given in the oxford Catalogue, is hopelessly inaccurate. Putting aside for the moment the identity of Makaranda which might for aught we know appear to be the well known work by Ruchidatta (though there is every reason to question this

iii. Trisūtrī nibandha (त्रिसूत्रीनिबन्धव्याख्या). Śaṅkara mentions here (Intro. Verse 2) the existence of three excellent commentaries on Udayana's nibandha, *viz.* Prakāśa, Darpaṇa and Uddyota and adds that his own attempt is rather to bring out the plain meaning of the text. Thus we have

प्रकाशदर्पणोद्द्योत (not प्रत् as in the Notices) कृतिव्याख्या
कृतोज्ज्वला । तथापि योजनामात्रबुद्धिश्यासं ममोद्यमः ॥

Śāstrī's Notices, III. No. 136 pp. 88, 89. It is clear that the three Commentaries named in the above śloka were all on Udayana's Trisūtrīnibandha—the work on which Śaṅkara just proposes to comment. Of them Prakāśa is undoubtedly the Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa of Vardhamāna; but the remaining two are unknown. The identifications which Mr. Chakravartī (loc. cit., p. 269) suggests for these Commentaries will never hold: (a) The Prakāśa can in no wise be supposed to be the work of Ruchidatta, (i) because Ruchidatta was a later writer (La. Saṃ 386 = 1505 A.D.) than Śaṅkara Miśra and (ii) because he is not known to have written

identity). Aufrecht is wrong also in taking Prakāśa for Tattvachintāmaṇiprakāśa and Vyākhyāparimala (!!) to be the name of a single work—probably of Haridāsa's Commentary, as he suggests. In reality, there can be no doubt that Prakāśa stands here for Vardhamāna's Kusumāñjaliprakāśa and Parimala is the name of another Commentary on the Kusumāñjali (Parimala is quoted several times by Ruchidatta in his Kusumāñjali *Makaranda* : (see Chandrakānta's Ed., I 51, 52, 410, 518 ; II. 2, 141). As to the Makaranda mentioned in the śloka I do not think it can *well* be the work of Ruchidatta who, as belonging to the beginning of the 16th Century, must have been a later writer than Śaṅkara Miśra.

any Commentary on the Nyāyanibandha. His Prakāśa is a Commentary on Gangeśa's Tattva Chintāmani, and *not on the Nyāyanibandha* to which Sankara alludes. (b-c) Similarly, the Darpana and the Uddyota could not have been the respective works of Maheśa Thakkura and Vahinipati, for the double reason (i) that they are not Commentaries on the Nibandha (but on Paksadhara's Aloka) and (ii) that both Mahesa (1548 A.D.) and Vahinipati (later than the date of Vasudeva Sārvabhauma) were Śankara Miśra's successors and not predecessors.

(*d*) Śriharsa's

i. Khandana Khanda Khādya (आनन्दवर्द्धन) [A Ms. of this work (fols 1—118) on palmleaf and in early Bengali script, exists in the private library of a gentleman at Benares. It bears the date in Laksmana Era 423 i.e. 1542 A.D. The colophon runs thus: इति महामहोमिश्रश्रीशङ्करकृतप्रथमखण्ड खण्डखाद्यानन्दवर्द्धनं समाप्तमिति । हरनेत्रपक्षवेदैर्लक्ष्मणाब्दसम्मते । शिवार्चानिरत स्वार्थं श्रीमान्........यथरोऽलिखत् ।

(*e*) Vallabhāchārya's

i. Nyāyalilāvatī (न्यायलीलावतीकण्ठाभरणम्)

(*f*) Gangeśa's

i. Tattva Chintāmani (चिन्तामणिमयूख). It is referred to in the Upaskara (3.1.14, 17, 3.2.18, 7.2.20, 26) and the Vādivinoda, p. 59.

B. (*a*) वादिविनोद, an original treatise on the Science of Dialectics, referred to in the Upaskara (9.2.2).

(*b*) **भेदरत्नप्रकाश***. The main object of this book was to reclaim the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dualism from the attacks of Vedānta. And as this could not possibly be accomplished without in the first instance overthrowing the position already gained by Śrīharṣa in the Schools the work turns out practically to be a refutation of Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khadya itself. Though Śaṅkara, by commenting on the Khaṇḍana, appears to have been in sympathy with Vedānta, his real attitude towards it was always hostile.

Śaṅkara's time may be thus calculated. There is a Ms. of his Commentary on the Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares which

* This seems to me to have been the full designation of the work, which appears in R. L. Mitra's Bikaner Catalogue (p. 539, Ms No. 1146) It is also called simply Bhedaprakāśa, as by the author in the Vādivinoda (p. 44) or as in Hall's Bibliographical Index (p. 85) or simply Bhedaratna as in Jhā's Introduction to the Vādivinoda (p 4).

Aufrecht (Cat. Cat. I, p. 416) says that this book (Bhedaprakāśa) was "reproved in Saṅkṣepa Ś rīraka 2, 1." ! Leaving aside the question how a book written in the 15th Century could have been noticed in a work decidedly several hundred years earlier, I cannot make out how Dr. Aufrecht discovered the name of a book at all in the śloka above referred to. The śloka is reproduced below :

एवं समन्वयनिरूपणयाऽवबोधे,
जाताऽप्यखण्डविषयो ननु वाक्यजन्यः ।
मानान्तरेण परिपीडित एव जातो
<u>भेदप्रकाशनकृता</u>त्मनिबन्धनेन ॥

Probably the phrase here underlined made Dr. Aufrecht suspect it to be the title of a book !! It is strange how Dr. Satis Chandra could have accepted this blunder in his *Indian Logic*, p. 459 !!

bears Saṃvat 1529 (=1472 A. D.) as the date of its transcription. Hall saw (p. 85) a copy of Bhedaprakāśa dated 1519 of the Vikrama Era (=1462 A.D.)*. This supplies the lower limit of Śankara's age. The other limit however may be taken to be the time of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya whose Commentary on the Kusumāñjali is referred to in Śaṅkara's own Commentary, Āmoda. Thus it is highly probable, as Mr. Chakravarti holds, that Śaṅkara flourished about the second quarter of the 15th Century†. And this date of Śaṅkara would be in full agreement with the tradition that he was a contemporary of Vāchaspati Miśra II and Pakṣadhara Miśra‡.

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* This Ms. is now deposited in the Raghunath Temple Library of His Highness the Maharajā of Jammu and Kashmir. The date is thus entered : संवत् १५१९ समये चैत्र शुदि १५ पूर्णिमा गुरुदिने । [It is significant that the oldest MSS of Śaṅkara's works, so far brought to light, were both written at Benares— (a) the Khaṇḍana-ṭīkā in the Benares Library in 1472 A. D. by one Vasudeva, a native of Bengal and (b) the Bhedaprakāśa in 1462 A. D. by one Kāyastha Sūrya Dāsa (see Stein, Jammu Catalogue, p. 328)?]

† Dr. Gangānātha Jhā, in his Preface to the Vādivinoda, pp. 1-2, places Śaṅkara about Saṃvat 1585 But in view of the positive evidence adduced above it is no longer possible to accept this date as true.

‡ Cf the verse

शङ्करवाचस्पत्योः समानौ शङ्करवाचस्पती भवतः ।
पक्षधरप्रतिपक्षौ लक्षीभूतो न च क्वापि ॥

(Quoted in the Preface to Khaṇḍanoddhara, p. 3) Most probably the first two names Śaṅkara and Vāchaspati are to be understood as directly intended for Śaṅkarāchārya and Vāchaspati Miśra, the great champions of Vedānta, and not merely for Śiva and Bṛhaspati, and the point of the saying would then consist in the popular estimate that as Śaṅkarāchārya and Vachaspati were masters of Vedānta, in the same way Śaṅkara Miśra and Vachaspati II occupied a unique position in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

XII--VĀCHASPATI MIŚRA II

Śaṅkara Miśra's younger contemporary was Vāchaspati Miśra II. Vardhamana in his introduction to Daṇḍaviveka calls himself the pupil of these two scholars*, and according to tradition also Śaṅkara Vāchaspati and Pakṣadhara were all contemporaries. †

Vāchaspati was the Court Pandit of Rājās Bhairavendra *alias* Harinārāyaṇa Deva and his son Rūpanārāyaṇa *alias* Rāmabhadra Deva of Mithilā, and lived about the middle of the 15th Century. ‡

He wrote mainly on Hindu Law, but he was also a good Naiyāyika. The following philosophical works attributed to him display closeness of reasoning and great original powers :

A. Commentaries on

(*a*) Gautama's

1. Nyāya Sūtras (=न्यायतत्त्वालोक)

and (*b*) Gaṅgeśa's

1. Tattvachintāmani.

B. (*a*) Nyāyasutroddhāra : This booklet was intended to determine the number and true readings of the genuine sūtras as distinguished from those which have been interpolated into the text from time to time. This work is therefore, in its object, of a similar nature with its predecessor, the Nyāya-sūchī nibandha of Vāchaspati Miśra I Its

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* Śaṅkara Miśra and Vāchaspati Miśra II (and Gaṇḍaka Miśra) were the gurus of the *Smārta* Vardham-na, the contemporary of R ja Bhairavendra : Cf Daṇḍaviveka, As Soc. Ms., p. 1, verse 6 :—

ज्यायान् गण्डकमिश्रः शङ्करवाचस्पती च मे गुरवः ।

† शङ्करवाचस्पत्योः सदृशौ शङ्करवाचस्पती ।

पक्षधरप्रतिपक्षः लक्षीभूतो न च क्वापि ॥

‡ Chakravarti in J.A.S.B., 1915, pp. 270-1, 399-400, 426-430.

principal interest however consists in the fact that it represents the Maithila recension of the Sūtrapāṭha.

(*b*) Khaṇḍanoddhāra : This is a rejoinder to the objections brought forward by Śrīharṣa in his famous polemical treatise against the dualistic hypotheses of the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought. Though certainly the work does not rise up to the high level of Śrīharṣa's masterpiece it is neverthless an interesting study, as showing how cleverly the Naiyāyika brushes aside the charges of his opponents.

We have seen above that Śaṅkara Miśra too was a firm dualist and that his Bhedaratnaprakāśa was an attempt on the part of an advocate of realism made in defence of his realistic convictions. It was Śaṅkara's no less than Vāchaspati's religious instinct which impelled them to employ their pen against the authority of Śrīharṣa's masterly treatise. The controversy on the Vedānta side was resumed at a later date by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī whose Advaitaratnarakṣā is a scholarly reply to Śaṅkara's Bhedaratna. But Vāchaspati's Khaṇḍonoddhāra seems to have been left neglected by the Vedāntists.

XIII.—MADHUSŪDANA ṬHAKKURA.

It has been observed that the Tattvachintāmaṇi and more especially its Commentary, the Āloka by Pakṣadhara, were very seriously attacked on their first appearance, and that in consequence of this it became the fashion of the commentators to take upon themselves, in addition to the usual work of interpretation, the further task of defending tha text. Madhusūdana's claim to distinction, like that of the predecessor Vāsudeva Miśra, rests on the successful

accomplishment of a self-imposed task of a similar kind. In fact, his commentaries are all of the nature of defence.

Madhusūdana was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa. His age is still undetermined, but I feel strongly inclined to place him in the last quarter of the 15th Century or in the first of the 16th. Having commented on Vāchaspati II's Dvaitanirṇaya*, he must have been later than the middle of the 15th Century. But Mr. Chakravarti's surmise that he lived in the third quarter of the 16th century (J. A. S. B., Sept. 1915, p. 271) is hardly tenable. His conclusion is apparently based upon the evidence of a Ms. of Kaṇtakoddhāra transcribed in La Saṃvat 491†, but this is of no weight as against the positive testimony of another Ms. of the same work copied 32 years earlier in La Saṃvat 459 (See Mitra's Notices, No. 1909, Vol. V, p. 225) or 1578 A. D.

His Nyāya works are commentaries on

(a) Gaṅgeśa's

i. Tattvachintāmaṇi (°कण्टकोद्धार). This is known through Burnell's entry only (Tanjore Catalogue, p. 115 b), but is otherwise unknown. It is possible that on examination it will prove to be a commentary on the Āloka.

& (b) Pakṣadhara's

i. Tattva Chintāmaṇyāloka (कण्टकोद्धार or पक्षधरोद्धार as in Hall, p, 39). This is really his main

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* This Commentary is known as °जोर्णोद्धार. See Mitra's Notices, No. 1853 (Vol. V. p 156) where the Colophon is thus given: इति महामहोपाध्याय श्रीमधुसूदनठक्कुरकृतो द्वैतनिर्णयजीर्णोद्धारः समाप्तः।

† It may be pointed out here that there exists in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares, a Ms. of Kaṇṭakoddhra dated Samvat 1667 (=16..0 A. D.)———a date which is practically identical.

work, in which he describes himself as a master of Mimāmsā and Nyāya (**मीमांसान्यायपारगेन**)*

It is probably to this work that Viśveśvara Sūri refers in his Vyākarana Siddhānta Sudhānidhi (Chowkh: Ed., pp 58, 69). The Śabda Khanda of his Commentary, of which a Ms. in two sub-sections (marked here as *A* and *B*) exists in the Govt. Sanskrit Library, Benares, is found to contain the following references:

Section A :—

{ **वर्धमानवचन** 2 a[4]
{ **वर्धमानोपाध्याय वचन** . ....59a[2]

अनुमान कण्टकोद्धार (his own) 3a[3]
प्राभाकराः 28b[4]
अर्वाचीनाः 34b[1]
प्राचीनाः 34 b[8]
श्रीकरमत 39 a[9]
किरणावली (कालग्रन्थ) 42 b[5]
नव्याः 45 b[6], 60 b[1]
महार्णववत्सेश्वरौ 46 b[11]
दुर्गटीका 58 a[1]
महार्णव 58 b[11], 59 a[6]
हरदत्त 60 b[6] (The following verses are quoted from Haradatta

उक्तं च हरदत्तेन—

अनिदं प्रथमाः शब्दाः साधवः परिकीर्त्तिताः ।
त एव शक्तिवैकल्यप्रमादालसतादिभिः ॥
अन्यथा विवृताः पुंभिरपशब्दा उदीरिताः ।
स्मारयन्तश्च ते साधूनर्थधीहेतवः स्मृताः ॥

* See Ind. Off. Cat., p. 629.

Section B :—

कुसुमाञ्जलि 8b[8]

नव्या: 38 a[3]

उपाध्याया: 38 a[10], 48 a[10] b[1]

XIV.—DEVANĀTHA ṬHAKKURA

Devanātha is known to have written a supplement (परिशिष्ट) to Pakṣadhara's Āloka (including notes on the originsal text of Gaṅgeśa). He was a Śaiva (See the Intro. versel) and probably a pupil of Govinda*. A Ms. of this work, as noticed by Mm. Hara Prasāda Śāstrī (Notices, Vol. III, p. 74), was transcribed by one Rāghava at the instruction of the author himself and bears the date in La Saṃvat 443 or 1562 A. D.†. Thus Devanātha's time falls in the middle of the 16th Century.

XV.—GOPĪNĀTHA ṬHAKKURA

He was the son of the Maithila Ṭhakkura Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhavanātha of the Goghota family, and a Vaiṣṇava of the Bṛndāvana school of faith. He is known to have written only two works on Nyāya, viz.——

A. A Commentary on

(a) Keśava Miśra's

i. Tarkabhāṣā (तर्कभाषाभावप्रकाशिका), in which he quotes or alludes to the views of

मणिकृत—fols 7b[11], 20 a[10], 22b[12], 23a[8];

पक्षधरमिश्रा:—fols 7b[18], 23a[1,12];

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* ल सं ४४३ चैत्र वदि एकादश्यां चन्द्रे महामहाठक्कुर श्रीदेवनाथमहाशयानुशासनाद राघवेन लिखितम् ।

† Thus we read the 2nd introductory verse of the Commentary:

देवनाथेन गोविन्दचरणाम्बुजसेविना ।
चिन्तामणौ यदालोके परिशिष्टं तदुच्यते ॥

Who was this Govinda ? Could he have been the wel'-known author of Kāvyapradīpa, a Commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa ?

रत्नकोशकारः—fol. 23b⁴;

मिश्राः—fol. 23b⁶;

उपाध्यायाः—fol. 23a¹⁰(1)

and *B*. (a) चिन्तामणिसार or simply मणिसार (2).

It contains an abstract of the exposition of the fundamental concepts of Chintāmaṇi and may be held to be either a synoptic Commentary on the text or an independent work on the basis of it. Aufrecht is wrong in attributing it to Gopinātha Miśra (Cat. Cat. I. 217), for the author of the Commentary on Tarkabhāṣa himself affirms that मणिसार is his own composition:

Cf. इति प्रतिपादितं (प्रपञ्चितं) मणिसारे—
-fols 13a⁸, 13b⁶⁻⁷, 14a³,¹⁹, 29a¹ (Benares Sanskrit Library Ms.).

Gopīnātha's time is later than Gaurīkānta who refers to him in his Bhāvārthadīpikā. He may have lived therefore in the 16th Century (end).

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(1) The leaves are of the Benares Sanskrit Ms. Library.

(2) The Anumāna section of this work has been edited by Pandit T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī and published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series (No. XXXV), 1914.

To be Continued.

V.—NAIṢADHACHARITA AND SRĪHARṢA.

BY NILKAMAL BHATTACHARYA.

The present article aims at no detailed treatment of either the Naisadhacharita or Sriharsa, but a consideration of two points as they are manifest in the book, relating respectively to the work and its author. These points, to be clear, are, first, that the poem, as is current (with twenty-two cantos), is incomplete, and, second, that the poet was a Bengali.

The first point I shall deal with first, and my arguments in this connection will begin with the title of the poem. The title, though variously denominated in the concluding verses of the cantos (1), as 'Naisadhīyacharita,' 'Nalīyacharita,'

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(1) The first half (common to all the cantos)—

श्रीहर्षं कविराजराजिमुकुटालंकारहीरः सुतं
श्रीहीरः सुषुवे जितेन्द्रियचयं मामल्लदेवी च यम्।

The second half—

तच्चिन्तामणिमन्त्रचिन्तनफले शृङ्गारभङ्ग्या महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गोऽयमादिर्गतः॥ (I)
द्वैतीयीकतया मितोऽयमगमत्तस्य प्रबन्धे महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः॥ (II)
तार्त्तीयीकतया (the rest like II) (III)
तुर्यः स्थैर्यविचारणप्रकरणभ्रातर्ययं तन्महा-
काव्येऽत्र व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः॥ (IV)
तस्य श्रीविजयप्रशस्तिरचनातातस्य नव्ये महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गोऽगमत्पञ्चमः॥ (V)
षष्ठः खण्डनखण्डतोऽपि सहजात् क्षोदक्षमे तन्महा-
काव्येऽयं व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः॥ (VI)
गौडोर्वीशकुलप्रशस्तिभणितिभ्रातर्ययं तन्महा-
काव्ये चारुणि वैरसेनिचरिते सर्गोऽगमत्सप्तमः॥ (VII)
तस्यागादयमष्टमः कविकुलादृष्टाध्वपान्थे महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः॥ (VIII)
सन्दृब्धार्णववर्णनस्य नवमस्तस्य व्यरंसीन्महा-

'Vairasenicharita,' 'Bhaimibhartrcharitra', &c., has one point common to them all, and that is the word 'charita' or 'charitra', which defines the character of the work and classes it under a 'charita kāvya' (biographic or historical poem). Or, if, on the strength of arguments to be adduced hereafter one questions, as one may, the authority of the concluding verses which, evidently, are no parts of the subject of the poem, we have another, an indisputable one, in the mention of the Naisadha (meaning this same poem as is

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काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (IX)
तर्केष्वसमश्रमस्य दशमस्तस्य व्यरंसीन्महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (X)
शृङ्गारामृतशीतगावयमगादेकादशस्तन्महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XI)
तस्य द्वादश एष मातृचरणाम्भोजालिमौलेर्महा-
काव्येऽयं व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XII)
स्वादूत्पादभृति त्रयोदशतयादेश्यस्तदीये महा-
काव्येऽयं व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो रसाम्भोनिधिः ॥ (XIII)
यातस्तस्य चतुर्दशः शरदिजज्योत्स्नाच्छसूक्तेर्महा-
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XIV)
यातः पञ्चदशः कृशेतररसस्वादाविहायं महा-
काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XV)
काश्मीरैर्महिते चतुर्दशतयीं विद्यां विदद्भिर्महा-
काव्ये तद्भुवि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गोऽगमत्षोडशः ॥ (XVI)
यातः सप्तदशः स्वसुः सुसदृशि च्छिन्दप्रशस्तेर्महा-
काव्ये तद्भुवि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XVII)
यातोऽस्मिन् शिवशक्तिसिद्धिभगिनीसौभ्रात्रभव्ये महा-
काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सर्गोऽयमष्टादशः ॥ (XVIII)
एकामत्यजतो नवार्थघटनामेकान्नविंशो महा-
काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सर्गोऽयमस्मिन्नगात् ॥ (XIX)
अन्याक्षुण्णरसप्रमेयभणितौ विंशस्तदीये महा-
काव्येऽयं व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XX)
तस्यागादयमेकविंशगणनः काव्येऽतिनव्ये कृतौ
भैमीभर्तृचरित्रवर्णनमये सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XXI)
द्वाविंशो नवसाहसाङ्कचरिते चम्पूकृतोऽयं महा-
काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XXII)

clear from the context) by this same term in the body of a second work by the same author, the Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khadya (2). That the two books—the Naiṣadha and the Khaṇḍana—are by the same author is borne out by the use of the first person (अहम्) in the text of the Khaṇḍana referred to above, and the same indirect reference to Pāṇini by दाक्षीपुत्र in the Naisadha (3) and by दाक्षीनन्दन in the Khaṇḍana (4), disregarding the concluding verse of the 6th canto (on the ground referred to above) and the concluding verse of the book as it stands (5) (on the ground of its falling under the same category with the concluding verses of the cantos, as will be fully discussed later on), though both of them, the former directly by its mention of the Khaṇḍana as another work by Srīharṣa and the latter indirectly by its recurrence at the end of the Khaṇḍana also,—point to the same common authorship. Thus, then, it is clear that the Naisadha is a biographic poem. By a biographic poem we mean, and naturally, one that records, if not all, at least the leading events in the life of its hero or heroine. What of this kind do we find in the Naisadha ? There only one principal event—the wedlock with its preliminaries—occupying the early life of the hero exhausts the whole subject. The eventful after-

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(2) तथाहमकथयं नैषधचरितस्य परमपुरुषस्तुतौ सर्ग—(ch 1)

(3) दाक्षीपुत्रस्य तन्त्रे ध्रुवमयमभवत् कोऽप्यधीती कपोतः
कण्ठे शब्दौघसिद्धिक्षतबहुकठिनीशेषभूषानुषातः ।
सर्वं विस्मृत्य दैवात् स्मृतिमुषसि गतां घोषयन् यो घुसंज्ञां
प्राक् संस्कारेण सम्प्रत्यपि धुवति शिरः पट्टिकापाठजेन ॥ (XIX. 61)

(4) अन्यथा दाक्षीनन्दनोदीरितनदीसंज्ञाप्रत्यभिज्ञायां पाथः प्रार्थयमानः कानन-स्थलीमल्लीकाभिमानी भवानीहेत । (ch. 1)

(5) ताम्बूलद्वयमासनं च लभते यः कान्यकुब्जेश्वरात्
यः साक्षात् कुरुते समाधिषु परं ब्रह्म प्रमोदार्णवम् ।
य[illegible]व्यं मधुवर्षि धर्षितपरास्तर्केषु यस्योक्तयः
श्रीश्रीहर्षकवेः कृतिः कृतिमुदे तस्याभ्युदीयादियम् ॥

life of Nala (as we deduce from the Mahābhārata on which our poet has drawn for his subject) has been completely ignored. Even the scriptural injunction which prescribes marriage for progeny (पुत्रार्थे क्रियते भार्या) has been disrespected. The Hindu scripture, which only courteously assigns an equal place to conjugal sport (रति) with progeny (पुत्र) in the line (रतिपुत्रफला नारी) can hardly tolerate this outrage which allots the whole portion to रति and leaves none for the पुत्र! The poet's license has hardly a plea in the present case. For, however acute it may be, it cannot transgress the bounds of propriety. If close following of the original was never the intention of the poet, it was open to him to devise new events to give consistency to his poem. Silence is absolutely unwarranted. To suppose that no notable events characterised the life of the hero is grotesque in itself. Thus, it is the title itself that establishes the incompleteness of the poem, and the same has been amplified by numerous forecasts—mostly on the line of the original, the Mahābharata—in the book. Consistency of these places would be at stake if a continuation of the Naiṣadha were not admitted. For, a poet's hero is an independent creation. To understand him we must resort to his own work, and no extraneous source. Even in a case of complete likeness in character between the hero of a poem and his prototype, it would be an unnatural procedure to understand one for the other. Hence, the Naiṣadha alone is competent for the solution of points raised in the Naiṣadha. The Mahābhārata is perfectly foreign in this matter. I shall now refer to those exact places where our poet has given forecasts of his hero's after-life. In XIII. 37 where Damayantī on seeing five persons of the appearance of Nala cannot come to a decision, the poet describes her then perplexity in the following terms :—Nala's persecution by Kali was yet to come ; but Dvāpara (i. e. the doubt as

to which of these was the real Nala) had already begun his torment on the fair Damayantī (6). Here the poet has given a forecast of Kali's persecution on Nala. In XVI. 37 our poet in describing the knotting of the garments of the married couple says :—The all-knowing Priest then knotted the garment of the Vidarbha princess with that of her beloved, communicating in the act, as it were, the infidelity of Nala who would afterwards cut off her garment and run away (7). Here we are told how Kali in the guise of a bird would divest Nala of his garment, and how Nala would clothe himself in a half piece cut off from the garment of Damayantī and abscond. Again, in XVII. 14, in the poet's use of the term अक्षाविनय (where अक्ष means both dice and the senses) (8) we find an allusion to the fatal play at dice. But these are only covert allusions, and our poet has gone even farther. He has brought on the stage the root cause of all mischiefs—Kali, in person, made him pronounce his stern resolution—'I shall completely subjugate him, shall strip him of both his land and Damayantī' (9), set him on his journey for the execution of his resolve (10), escorted him to Nala's kingdom and to his capital (11), and

(6) कारिष्यते परिभवः कलिना नलस्य
तां द्वापरस्तु सुतनूमनुनोत् पुरस्तात् । (XIII.37)

(7) प्रियांशुकग्रन्थिनिबद्धवाससं तदा पुरोधा विदधे विदर्भजाम् ।
जगाद विच्छिद्य पटं प्रयास्यतो नलादविश्वासमिवैष विश्ववित् ॥ (XVI.37)

(8) अद्राक्षुराजिहानं ते स्मरमग्रेऽम्बरं सुराः ।
अक्षाविनयशिक्षार्थं कलिनेव पुरस्कृतम् ॥ (XVII.14)

(9) प्रतिज्ञेयं नले विज्ञाः कलेर्विज्ञायतां मम ।
तेन भैमीं च भूमिं च त्याजयामि जयामि तम् ॥ (XVII.138)

(10) द्वापरैकपरीवारः कलिर्मत्सरमूर्च्छितः ।
नलनिग्राहिणीं यात्रां जग्राह ग्रहिलः किल ॥ (XVII.159)

(11) मण्डलं निषधेन्द्रस्य चन्द्रस्येवामलं कलिः ।
प्राप म्लापयितुं पापः स्वर्भानुरिव संग्रहात् ॥

having lodged him secure on a bibhītaka tree in the garden adjoining his palace placed him an expectant for an opportunity for his persecution (12). With all this preparation, when the time comes for its fruition, the poet says a good-bye. How is this to be justified? In this connection let us also have a peep into the character of the boons which the gods respectively grant the couple. Indra gives his boon (to Nala)— 'For your residence a town will be built in your name near Benares on the other side of the Asi' (13). Agni gives his (to Nala)—'My energy which is conserved for cookery will be at your disposal' (14). Yama gives his (also to Nala)—'Even when badly situated, your mind will not swerve from virtue' (15). Varuṇa gives his (also to Nala)—'Water will become manifest wherever you will wish it, even though the place may happen to be a dry land' (16); 'also, by contact with your body, fading will not come over a flower and fragrance will be preserved' (17). Their joint boon to Damayantī is—'You are amazed to see how we cast off our disguise and resumed our native forms. You too by our grace will acquire the same power of assuming forms at pleasure' (18). Now where, one may ask, is the consistency of this introduction of boons in the poem? The author of the Mahābhārata has shown its denouement in the episode

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कियतापि च कालेन कालः कलिरुपेयिवान् ।
भैमीभर्तुरहम्मानी राजधानीं महीभुजः ॥ (XVII.161-2)

(12) तमालम्बनमासाद्य वैदर्भीनिषधेशयोः ।
कलुषं कलिरन्विष्यन्नवात्सीद् वत्सरान् बहून् ॥ (XVII.217)

(13) तवोपवाराणसि नामचिह्नं वासाय पारेऽसि पुरं पुरास्ति । (XIV.74)

(14) या दारुपाकौपयिकी तनुर्मे भूयास्त्वदिच्छावशवर्तिनी सा । (XIV.77)

(15) कृच्छ्रं गतस्यापि दशाविपाकं धर्मान्न चेतः स्खलतु त्वदीयम् । (XIV.81)

(16) यत्राभिलाषस्तव तत्र देशे नन्वस्तु धन्वन्यपि तूर्णमर्णः । (XIV.83)

(17) अम्लानिरामोदभरश्च दिव्यः पुष्पेषु भूयाद् भवदङ्गसङ्गात् । (XIV.85)

(18) कूटकायमपहाय नो वपुर्बिभ्रतस्त्वमसि वीक्ष्य विस्मिता ।
आप्तुमाकृतिमतो मनीषितां विद्यया हृदि तवाप्युदीयताम् ॥ (XIV.94)

of Damayanti's second Svayamvara. But nowhere in the character of either his hero or his heroine has the author of the Naisadha shown it in his poem. Should it be said that the reader of the Naisadha will supply the omission from the Mahābhārata, that cannot be, the two, as we have remarked before, being entirely distinct from the standpoint of each other. Even admitting for argument's sake, that such license is permissible, how are we to explain those cases where the author has deviated from the Mahābhārata ? The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that the current Naishadha is incomplete. But here a question may arise that if the current Naisadha is incomplete how are we to explain the presence of the four verses appended at the end of the poem (19) ? The plain answer to this is that the verses are spurious. Why we say so may be shown thus. First, one great discrepancy that staggers one at the outset in the verses is that the author has been designated in two of these (verses 1&3) by the first person, in one (verse 2) by suggestion, and in one (verse 4) by the direct mention of his name. Secondly, the style of the verses, if carefully examined, would strike one with the idea that they are not all of the same hand or of the same period. The stamp of a raw hand is also at places clearly manifest,

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(19) (*a*) यथा यूनस्तद्वत्परमरमणीयापि रमणी
कुमाराणामन्तःकरणहरणं नैव कुरुते ।
मदुक्तिश्चेदन्तर्मदयति सुधीभूय सुधियः
किमस्या नाम स्यादरसपुरुषानादरभरः ॥

(*b*) दिशि दिशि गिरिग्रावाणः स्वां वमन्तु सरस्वतीं
तुलयतु मिथस्तामापातस्फुरद्ध्वनिडम्बराम् ।
स परमपरः क्षीरोदन्वान् यदीयमुदीयते
मथितुरमृतं खेदच्छेदि प्रमोदनमोदनम् ॥

(*c*) ग्रन्थग्रन्थिरिह क्वचित् क्वचिदपि न्यासि प्रयत्नान्मया
प्राज्ञम्मन्यमना हठेन पठिती मास्मिन् खलः खेलतु ।
श्रद्धाराद्धगुरुश्लथीकृतदृढग्रन्थिः समासादय-
त्वेतत्काव्यरसोर्मिमज्जनसुखव्यासज्जनं सज्जनः ॥

(*d*) See footnote (4)

for example, in the expression यथा ..तद्वत् in verse 1. Thirdly, from the tenor of verses 1 & 3 it would appear that the poem did not find favour with a certain class of readers, and of the *intricacies* which were probably the cause of this disfavour a sort of explanation has been attempted in the verses. For, no body on the prompting of a possible disapprobation of his book will like by his own discourteous tongue to turn the fancied thing into a reality. Even supposing such foretaste to be the effect of an actual disapprobation previously experienced in respect of other works of the author the attitude is not fully justified. Hence it is probable that some succeeding writer—an admirer of our poet—mortified at the unmerited disparagement of his idol has disburdened his feeling in the above way. Fourthly, extreme self-conceit has found expression in the second verse. It sounds ungraceful when coming in the form of self-approbation. Such self-conceit has found expression in two other places also—the concluding verses of cantos 8 and 20—which also should therefore be construed in the same way as this. Fifthly, the fourth verse (as also the third) also appears at the end of the author's Khaṇḍana—khaṇḍa-khadya. Until, therefore, from other works of the author, it is definitely known that the same has been the procedure invariably adopted by him, we may safely take it that this (as also the preceding) has its right place in the Khaṇḍana, having, under the mistaken notion that the book had ended there, been subsequently appended to the Naiṣadha. The same remark in a slightly modified form applies also to the first two verses: viz., those too had their right place elsewhere, and it seems likely, for in those too there is nothing to show that they are exclusively meant for the Naiṣadha. Or, the spuriousness of the fourth verse can be shown in another way also. The verse is autobiographic in character. In this and also in affinity of style, it ranks with the concluding verses of the cantos.

About the concluding verses, in spite of their historical value, one feels constrained to believe that they are not genuine, or synchronous with the production of the Naiṣadha. The following are our grounds for the above belief.—

(i) The monotonous repetition at the end of each canto like the recurrence of the drop scene after each act of a play is most repulsive, and yet not indispensable like that other. The conceit of a new element here and there is far too weak to remove that repulsiveness. That the same master-poet, who has evinced wonderful command over the realm of thought in his *Pañcha-Nali* (a set of verses popularly so called, being equally applicable to the real and the pseudo-Nalas) and at several places to the same thought has presented a well devised variation of expressions, should exhibit such a poor stock of thoughts and expressions in the lexicon of his resources, is a thing hardly conceivable. (ii) In the concluding verse of Canto 16 which alludes to the appreciation of the poem by the scholars of Kashmir we meet with a discrepancy that hardly admits of a solution. The poem is yet in the embryo, for only sixteen cantos have been finished, yet there is the appreciation declaring the poem as an accomplished thing already. Even admitting, though such admission is prohibited by the third case-ending in काश्मीरैः, that the affix क्त signifies the present time, we are no safer. The whole Kāvya is not there, only a portion of it. If, again, on the precedence of the use in the Bhagavadgītā (I. 9)—अन्ये च बहवः शूरा मदर्थे त्यक्तजीविताः—we attempt to explain the affix as expressive of future, we shall be landing ourselves on a fresh inconsistency. For, there the fate of the accoutred heroes—though future—is as sure as the past. The same is not the case with the fate of the poem. For, the honour that claims record in a book is never an easy thing to gain. Chances of failure are quite possible. To seek

a solution in the supposition that the statement might be possible on the appreciation of the portion already finished would involve in the first place an error of expression, and in the second an error of judgment. (iii) Both the Naiṣahda and the Khṇḍana have in each a reference to the other (vide the concluding verse of Canto 6 and footnote (2)) which is another way of saying that the same in one place is anterior and in another posterior with respect to the other. Bhagavatāchārya, editor of the Khaṇḍana., not finding a solution of this riddle felt constrained to conclude the simultaneous production of the two books—a curious conclusion for a scholiast on a book of philosophy. We in plain terms shall simply class the concluding verse as spurious.

The above conclusion in no way detracts from the historic importance of the concluding verses. For, though no genuine products of the author, nor synchronous with the production of the Naiṣadha, they may yet have been composed subsequently by his son, pupil, or any other responsible person.

After such elaborate discussion no one will raise the question of bulk (I mean of the book) to disturb our conclusion. Yet that too has a reply In the science of poetics there is no maximum limit prescribed for the number of cantos as none for the number of verses in each canto, and there even exists a poem named Haravijaya with as many as fifty cantos.

If a continuation of the Naiṣadha is admitted, we must either say that the sequel is lost, or that the poet could not finish the book. But when we look into two facts it is well nigh clear that the book *was* finished: one, the mention of the Naiṣadha in the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (see footnote (2)): and the other, the appreciation of the Naiṣadha by scholars in Kashmir (Vide the concluding verse of Canto 16). For, by the first, though the priority of the Naiṣadha up only to the end of the 21st Canto (which forms the subject of

the psalm referred to there) is conclusively proved, yet it would be too much to suppose that the author could think of leaving his book unfinished at an advanced stage reaching up to the close of Canto 22 (up to which it is available) and beginning another so different in character and so stiff and bulky as the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa. As for the second, the appreciation of a *Mahākāvya* is not possible when there is only a portion of it (viz. 22 Cantos) there. For, besides poesy, it requires character-sketch, correlation of the parts, and many other things for consideration. This, therefore, is our final conclusion that the sequel also was written, but is now lost; and this is probable too, for, a good many of our poet's works—whose names we find—are lost to-day.

In connection with the above conclusion of mine I may casually remark that, in my solicitude to learn whether tradition lent any support to my view I referred the matter to many of my friends and acquaintances, and, among them, to Pandit Rāmagopal Smṛtibhūṣana of Benares, whereupon the last gentleman emphatically supported my view and said that many years back he had witnessed with his own eyes a manuscript of the sequel in Uria character with an Uriya pupil of his—named either Damodar or Rudranarayan (he did not recollect which). He also quoted two verses (one in full and the other in part) belonging, he said, to the same. The verses are :—

(1) वदन्ति ये चन्द्रमसं सुधारसं न पीयते तैः किमु नायिकाधरम् ।
सुरापगागम्भीर्य-(?,पिबज्जनेन किं रसत्तरं (?) नाराधिनीरमुच्यते॥

(2) उत्तुङ्गस्तनपर्वतादवतरद्गङ्गेव हारावली रोमालिं प्रतिपद्यते.....

The late revered Mahāmahopādhyāya Rākhāladāsa Nyāyaratna too is reported to have used to quote a half verse which, he said, belonged to the Naiṣadha, but is not found in the twenty-two cantos current of the poem. The half-verse referred to is this :—

सस्मार सस्मरमनाः प्रियदूतभूतं तत्रामरालयमरालमरालकेशी ।

II

I now come to the second part of my treatise.

In the auto biographic verses (I mean the concluding verses of the cantos and the concluding verse of the poem as a whole) we find mention of the poet's parents, his works, his realisation of the Chintāmani mantra, his honour at the court of the King of Kanouj, and many other things But nowhere do we find any mention of his native country. Yet there are evidences in abundance in the book which go unmistakably to show that his native land was Bengal. Those evidences are presented, one by one, before our readers.

The first evidence is the mention of the 'ulūlu' (a peculiar sound produced by the tongue, resorted to by women on festive occasions). The poet has introduced it in connection with the Svayamvara of Damayantī. The context is :—When Damayantī offered to place the garland on the shoulders of Nala, the characteristic festive song, inarticulate with ecstasy, came out as the sound of 'ulūlu' from the mouth of the ladies of the harem (20). Now, every body knows that the 'ulūlu', though extended as a thing to Assam and Orissa as well, is, as a name, confined to Bengal alone. The same finds corroboration in Nārāyaṇa's comment —'The name 'ulūlu' is used in Gauḍa for a class of festive songs indulged in on festive occasions like marriage &c.'— where Gauḍa in the opinions of the experts is Bengal. Mallinātha's interpretation of the term, though slightly diverging from Nārāyaṇa's, viz. he has termed it a custom of the north, also, when we view it from his own country— the south, points to the same conclusion, at least in part.

(20) कापि प्रमोदास्फुटनिर्जिहानवर्णैव या मङ्गलगीतिरासाम् ।
सैवाननेभ्यः पुरसुन्दरीणामुच्चैरुलूलुध्वनिरुच्चचार ॥ XIV. 51)

(21) विवाहादुत्सवे स्त्रीणां धवलादिमङ्गलगीतिविशेषो गौडदेशे 'उलूलुः' इत्युच्यते ।——Nārāyaṇa

Experience also tells us that, excepting Assam, Bengal & Orissa, nowhere else in North India is this practice to be met with. There too, the union of the name and the thing, as observed above, is peculiar to Bengal alone.

The second evidence is the use of the conch bangle. This too, as the writer has come to learn from his investigation, is characteristic of Bengal alone. 'The conch bangle and vermilion' is a common saying for an unwidowed woman in Bengal. The connection in which it finds mention in the Naiṣadha is this. 'The bride's arms, united with auspicious conch bangles, appeared as if they were being attended upon by fresh grown lotus stalks for acquiring tenderness from them' (23). That this practice of wearing conch bangles is current only in Gauḍa or Bengal finds support also from Nārāyaṇa whose words are—'गौड़देशे विवाहकाले शङ्खवलय-धारणमाचारः' (The wearing of conch bangles by the bride at marriage is a practice prevalent in Gauḍa). Just as the wearing of conch bangles characterises the beginning of married life, so does the breaking of them characterise the beginning of widowhood. The poet has referred to this second point also, in connection with his description of a certain king (the king of Kañchi) who attended the Svayamvara, as follows—'Swans in the shape of his glories carrying off lotus stalks in the shape of conch bangles breaking on the hands of the youthful consorts of the rival heroes, sport in fountains of the tears of the same wives of his enemies (24).

(22) उलूलुरितिवर्णाः कश्चिद्दूरेगात्मकः सुखाचार्यो ध्वनिविशेष उत्सवादौ स्त्रीभि-
स्क्रियते इत्युदीच्यानामाचारः ।——Mallinatha.

(See V. P. Dube's Introduction to Vaiśeṣika Darśana with (Kiraṇāvalī, 28).

(23) उपास्यमानाविव शिक्षितुं ततो मृदुत्वमप्रौढमृणालमालया ।
विरेजतुर्माङ्गलिकेन सङ्गतौ भुजौ सुपत्या वलयेन कम्बुनः ॥ (XV. 45)

(24) अमुष्य समित्सम्मुखवीरयोषितत्रुटद्भुजा कम्बुमृणालहारिणी ।
द्विषद्गणस्त्रैणदृगम्बुनिर्झरे यशोमरालालिरिवास्य खेलति ॥ (XII. 35)

The third evidence is the tying of the hands of the bridegroom and the bride with a kuśa blade at marriage. This is no scriptural injunction, but a usage (25), prevalent in Bengal, and, so far as I have been able to learn from investigation, in Bengal only. The poet has introduced this in the Naiṣadha in the following connection :—'The hand of the bridegroom is a delighter in homicide (i.e. in war), while that of the bride is a stealer of the lustre of a lotus (being equally beautiful). Is it for this reason that in the well-governed Vidarbha kingdom these two (a murderer and a thief) were bound with stiff kuśa ?' (26)

Now if, as we have seen, the three customs above alluded to are not found in the country (Vidarbha or Niṣadha) in relation to which they have been introduced, are we justified in inferring that these are the customs of the poet's own country ? Nārāyaṇa too in his comment on the 'ululu' expressed the same opinion, namely, that the poet has alluded to the custom of his own country (स्वदेशरीतिः कविनोक्ता). If so, then think what that country should be. Should it not be the same country of Gauḍa or Bengal, where the three customs unite ?

Besides the three places indicated above, the poet has in many other places followed the customs of Bengal or his own country. Such are——(i) The painting of the floors and walls of a house with the pigment of rice powder on festive occasions (27). (ii) The wearing of a crest and the holding of a mirror by the bridegroom while starting on the marriage procession (28). (iii) The entrance of the married

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(25) 'कुशैः पाणिबन्धनं देशाचारः ।' Nārāyaṇa,

(26) वरस्य पाणिः परघातकौतुकी वधूकरः पङ्कजकान्तितस्करः ।
सुराज्ञि तौ तत्र विदर्भमण्डले ततो निबद्धौ किमु कर्कशैः कुशैः ॥ (XVI. 14)

(27) क्वचित्सदालेपनदानपण्डिता कमप्यहङ्कारमगात्पुरस्कृता । (XV, 13)

(28) अनर्घ्यरत्नौघमयेन मण्डितो रराज राजा मुकुटेन मूर्धनि । (XV. 60)

couple into a room specially designed for the occasion, in which they are to pass the night in company with their friends (29). (iv) Niceties of fish and flesh in marriage feasts (XVI. 76, 81, 82, 87) &c. These customs, individually speaking, are more or less to be found in other parts of India as well, but collectively they are the specialities of Bengal alone. The nicety of fish and flesh is a notable feature of Bengal. Excepting Kashmir, nowhere else in India does a fish meal constitute a prominent part of a banquet like Bengal 'Fish and rice' is a by-word with the Bengali, and the same has its exact counterpart in our poet's 'अन्नमीन' (XIV. 78). Again, vermilion is a close associate of the hair parting of a married woman (whose husband is living) in Bengal, and our poet's predilection for this custom of Bengal has led him to introduce the thing even in Vidarbha where saffron is current. In the act he has not sacrificed consistency, having shown it not in the gynaecium of Vidarbha itself, but in the bevy of the royal consorts who had been invited to the wedding. The connection is this :—When the royal consorts who had come to attend the nuptials bowed at the feet of Damayanti with the express intention of winning her intercession against chances of widowhood at the hands of Nala, the lac of her feet appeared on their heads like auspicious vermilion for the longevity of their husbands (30). That saffron is current or profusely used in Vidarbha may be gathered from our poet's own words. In one place he says—'where the large tank infused with the saffron

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घने समस्तापघनावलम्बिनां विभूषणानां मणिमण्डले नलः ॥
स्वरूपरेखामवलोक्य निष्फलीचकार सेवाचणदर्पणार्पणम् ॥ (XV. 70)

(29) स कौतुकागारमगात् पुरन्ध्रिभिः सहस्ररन्ध्रीकृतमीक्षितुं ततः ॥ (XVI, 46)

(30) [illegible]ात्स्ववैधव्यमवाप्तुमागता नृपस्त्रियो भीममहोत्सवागताः ।
तदङ्घ्रिलाक्षामदधन्त मङ्गलं शिरःसु सिन्दूरमिव प्रियायुषे ॥ (XX. 55)

coming from the beautiful ladies while bathing, does not, like an unappeased woman, clear up by the whole night' (31). In another—'where at every sunset the saffron shops shone like the rays of the sunk down sun having turned on earth' (32).

With regard to the above customs one may urge that there is no knowing that they were current in Bengal even at the time of our poet. To this our answer is that the customs of a family or of a country do not change easily. Their authority is higher than even that of the scriptures. For illustration, look at the history of the present age and you will see how in the midst of innumerable adverse circumstances the ancient beliefs are still clinging to the people's mind. While the assembly hall is resonant with the cheers of equality, the seraglio is carefully guarding its own individuality. The predominance of local customs finds support in Śrīharṣa too. The following extract from Nārāyaṇa's commentary will bear testimony to this:—अत्र क्वचित् क्वचिद् विधिक्रमभङ्गो देशाचाराच्छाखाभेदात्कुलाचारविशेषाद् वा बोद्धव्यः । न पुनः श्रीहर्षकवेरज्ञानलेशोऽपि । (Wherever in this marriage concern scriptural injunctions will be seen to have been violated, this should be explained as having been done out of regard for usage (of the family or the country) or revelation. In no way is it a mark of the ignorance of the poet Śrīharṣa). From this same we are also to conclude that the customs of other countries too were very nearly the same at the time of our author as they are to-day.

Here a question may arise that, if the customs were the same even before, how are we to justify the two Vedic uses

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(31) सुदतीजनमज्जनार्पितैर्घुसृणैर्यत्र कषायिताशया ।
न निशाखिलयापि वापिका प्रससाद ग्रहिलेव मानिनी ॥ (II.77)

(32) रुचयोऽस्तमितस्य भास्वतः स्खलिता यत्र निरालयाः किल ।
अनुसायमभुर्विलेपनापणकाश्मीरजपण्यवीथयः ॥ (II.90)

'उलुलय:' (with its variant 'उल्लुलय:') (33) and उलूलव: (34)? For these undoubtedly are the prototypes of our modern 'उलूलु' and as such they prove, along with its antiquity, its diffusiveness also. Apart from the Vedic uses, in a comparatively modern poem too, we find reference to the 'ululu' (35). The author is a Gujrati, which means that the custom was in vogue in Gujrat as well in ancient times. As for the conch bangle too, from its reference in the Mahābhārata (36), as also in the Kadambarī (37), it is well nigh clear that the practice was in vogue in other countries as well, and not confined to Bengal.

In reply, we should take the cases individually. With regard to the two Vedic uses 'उलुलय.' (with its variant 'उल्लुलय ') and 'उलूलव:', we should first consider whether they conform to our 'ululu'. For, simply because there is sameness in expression, we are not necessarily to conclude that there is sameness in meaning as well. The same word very often

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(33) उद्धर्षन्तां मघवन् वाजिनान्युद्वीराणां जयतामेतु घोषः।
पृथग् घोषा उलुलयः केतुमन्त उदीरताम्
देवा इन्द्रज्येष्ठा मरुतो यन्तु सेनया ॥ Atharva veda III. iii 19 (6)

(34) अथ यत्तदजायत सोऽसावादित्यस्तं जायमानं घोषा उलूलवोऽनूदतिष्ठन्त सर्वाणि च भूतानि सर्वे च कामास्तस्मात्तस्योदयं प्रति प्रत्यायनं प्रति घोषा उलूलवोऽनूत्तिष्ठन्ति सर्वाणि च भूतानि सर्वे चैव कामाः। Chhandogya—III. 19 (3)

(35) हेषाभिस्तु तुरङ्गाणां वारणानां किलारवैः।
रथानामपि चीत्कारैर्भुजास्फोटैर्भुजाभृताम् ॥
नर्तनानां पटहध्वानैः उल्लूलैर्वामचक्षुषाम्।
सर्वं चकास्ति तस्याभूच्छब्दाद्वैतमयं जगत् ॥ (Jagaducharita)

(36) पिनद्धकम्बुः पाणिभ्यां तृतीयां प्रकृतिं गतः।
वेणीकृतशिरा राजन्नाम्ना चैव बृहन्नला ॥ (Virāta. 2. 27)
अथापरोऽदृश्यत रूपसम्पदा स्त्रीणामलंकारधरो बृहत्पुमान्।
प्राकारवप्रे प्रतिमुच्य कुण्डले दीर्घे च कम्बूपरि हाटके शुभे ॥ (Virāta 11.1)

(37) इन्दुकलया मार्द्रीभुक्तपतितैः स्वर्तीर्णस्वलतायां विगलितैः शङ्खवलयैरिव मृणालशकलैः कल्माषितम् (आश्रमपश्यम्।

is found to convey widely divergent meanings, and a philologist in such cases of divergency of meanings will not even admit the sameness of the word. So long, therefore, as we shall not find concordance of both word and meaning in the instances, we cannot admit their application to the present case. So let us see the extent of that concordance in the two cases. The 'उलुलयः' (with its variant उल्लुलयः) finds mention in a hymn of the Atharva Veda. It relates to warfare. The heroes are going to the war. The priest is offering his invocation for their victory. The meaning of the hymn is this :—"O Indra, let our heroes by your grace be inspired with warlike spirit, the warcry of the triumphant heroes rise deafening the ears of the enemies, the quarters resound with loud shouts of 'ullulu', the gods headed by Indra (yourself) come to our help in the fight". From what we get from the meaning of the hymn, we cannot class this 'ullulu' and our 'ulūla' under the same category' The 'उलूलु' is a mild auspicious sound peculiar to the gynaecium ; the उल्लुलु is a wild ecstatic shout peculiar to the battle field. Though ecstasy and auspiciousness are both inherent in both, yet in one they are primary, and in the other secondary (respectively taken). This double character of the 'ulūlu' as primary and secondary in its two aspects respectively understood finds eepression also in the particular śloka of our poet. (The use of उल्लुलु throughout in this topic for उलुलि or उल्लुलि in the readings उलुलयः and उल्लुलयः of the text is in accordance with Sāyana) (38). Now to उलूलवः. This occurs in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad. The context is this ; "When the sun had his birth, simultaneously therewith arose acclamations, as also all beings and all desires. Therefore, (even to-day) at his rising and also setting (or reappearing), rise acclamations, as also all beings and all desires.'—

(38) 'उल्लुलय इति । अनुकरणशब्दोऽयम् । उल्लुलु इत्येवमात्मकाः'—Sāyana

S'aṅkarāchārya. According to Śaṅkrara उलूलवः = उरूरवः = acclamatory; that is, he, in consonance with the dictum—'र and ल are identical'—read उरु for उलु (उलूलु = उलु + उलु = उरु + उरु = उरूरु), and construed the word as an adjective to घोषाः, and though by the remark 'as follows the birth of the first son of the lord' has apparently admitted the two aspects (ecstasy and auspiciousness) of the उलूलु, yet by his attaching the alternative meaning of 'setting' to प्रत्यायन has also partially discarded them. For where in 'rise' there is the suggestion of birth, in 'decline' that of death is inevitable. Hence what at one place has been prescribed because of its festive and auspicious character cannot, on the worldly standpoint, be justified at the other unless stripped of that character. Even omitting the alternative meaning of 'setting', the word 'उलूलवः' as taken by Śaṅkara cannot be admitted as suggestive of the 'ulūlu' which is purely of an onomatopoetic character. Truly speaking, the 'उलूलु' in question is completely unsuitable in the present case, for, at the first appearance of the sun, the absence of creation necessarily involves absence of the sound in question, and even after, nobody ever uses the 'उलूलु' at sunrise, at sunset never. By this Ānandagiri's interpretation of the word directly referring to our उलूलु (for he explains it as 'a peculiar acclamation on festive occasions confined to particular countries' which is clearly a periphrasis for उलूलु) is also discarded.

The reference in the 'Jagaḍucharita'—the modern poem spoken of before—is this: 'When his (Jagḍu Shah's) party started (on pilgrimage), the neighings of horses, the trumpetings of elephants, the rattlings of chariots, the arm slaps of the strong-armed, the panegyrics of bards and the 'ulūla' sounds of the fair-eyed, all contributed to turn the whole atmosphere into one of sound alone'. Here, with all deference to the

author's knowledge of the thing 'उलूलु', we are constrained to say that he was not fully informed about its application. For, nowhere in the parts of India where the practice of उलूलु is current, is it used on occasions of pilgrimage. This shortcoming only shows that the author's information was second-hand. Or, even admitting that the practice was prevalent in Gujrat at the time of either the author or his hero, it cannot affect our position until we meet with an exact parallel to the case we meet with in the Naiṣadha, and even then the other evidences that have been adduced will run counter.

Now for the conch bangle. The connection in which it finds mention in the Mahābhārata is this: The Pāṇḍavas having settled that they should pass the year of their incognito life in the city of Virāṭa are now coming to an agreement as to how each should pass that life. Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīma having communicated their own modes, Arjuna communicates his:—'I shall introduce myself as a eunuch named Bṛihannalā, and, concealing the bow-string-marks on the arms with bangles, wearing ear-rings and conch bangles and tying the hair into a braid, shall thus in the guise of a woman teach music to the queens and also amuse the hearts of the king and the ladies with tales. Thus I shall live incognito. Should the king ask my antecedents I shall say that I was formerly an attendant of Draupadī in the house of Yudhiṣṭhira.' After that Draupadī, Nakula and Sahadeva declared theirs in their turns. All the six, it should be known, emphasised their former connection with Yudhiṣṭhira as their common master. This done, the whole party prepared themselves for entering Virāṭa Here one may naturally think that conch bangles were current at that time in Virāṭa and other allied places. So we shall see whether any solution is possible of this. In the opinion of experts the name Virāṭa or Matsya applies also to a part of Bengal (viz. the districts of Dinajpur, Rangpur and Cooch Behar jointly taken) and the acceptance of that view would

solve the question vety easily and from the standpoint of distance that would indeed be very favourable to a life of concealment, for considering the importance of this life on the success of which rested the future of the Paṇḍavas, the safer such life would be the better. But from the separate mention of Vanga and Virāṭa in the description of the princes assembled at the Rajasūya of Yudhiṣṭhira in the Mahābhārata (39), and the geographical situation of the country of Matsya (40) mentioned in connection with the incognito life, it is clear that Matsya or Virāṭa is distinct from Bengal and located somewhere in the north-west of India. Therefore the solution of the question should be sought elsewhere. In the consultation above referred to we find that the five brothers and Draupadī all come to the agreement that if asked by the king of Virāṭa they would each say that they formerly served under Yudhiṣṭhira and would also describe the nature of their service. The object of mentioning Yudhiṣ-ṭhira is that if known to be complete strangers, Virāṭa would not admit them in his house, and the name of Yudhiṣṭhira carried with it not only a removal of that bar, but also his sympathy; for, they knew that king Virāṭa was loyal to the Pāṇḍavas (41), and for this reason particularly they sought the shelter of Virāṭa. In the above connection with Yudhiṣṭhira they want to show that they are not residents of Virāṭa, and they do not also want manifestly to show that they belong to the country of Yudhiṣṭhira. If so, the object of wearing

(39) पौण्ड्रको वासुदेवश्च वङ्गः कालिङ्गकस्तथा ।

विराटः सह पुत्राभ्यां मावेल्लश्च महाबलः ॥ (Sabhā 34. 11-2)

(40) उत्तरेण दशार्णांस्ते पञ्चालान् दक्षिणेन तु ।
उत्तरेण यकृल्लोमान् शूरसेनांश्च पाण्डवाः ।
लुब्धा ब्रुवाणा मत्स्यस्य विषयं प्राविशन् वनात् ॥ (Virața 5)

(41) मत्स्यो विराटो बलवानभिरक्तोऽथ पाण्डवान् ।
धर्मशीलो वदान्यश्च वृद्धश्च सततं प्रियः ॥ (Virāṭa I-16)

the conch bangle is to show their alien connection, and thus Bengal also may come. This is possible, and desirable too;—possible, because Arjuna, while out on pilgrimage wandered through *many countries and in the* course of his wanderings went to Bengal also (42), and was acquainted with the practices of the place;—desirable, because by creating the impression of a distant residence it would greatly contribute to the security of the disguised life, or, a combination of the practices of two distinct provinces, such as a bunch of bangles on the arm and conch bangles on the wrists, through a vagueness about residence, would the more strengthen that contribution. A side question also is possible here, and that is—If the conch bangle were not current in Virāṭa, how could Arjuna procure it there? To this we reply—The matter is not directly opposed to the principle of commerce, nor is there any justification for the belief that conch artisans were scarce in a flourishing city like Virāṭa. Further, it would not be an unreasonable supposition that in consequence of the extreme hardness of the incognito life, the subject was uppermost in the mind of the Pāṇḍavas and they had long been preparing themselves for it.

The place of the Kādambarī is the picture of a hermitage. The connection of conch bangles there is this: 'In the hermitage here and there were lying morsels of lotus stalks half swallowed by young elephants, which gave one the impression that they were conch bangles slipped out of the hands of Goddess Sarasvatī'.—(The Parrot's speech). For the all-white Sarasvatī such an ornament—the conch bangle—is most suited and natural. So the poet's conception in that respect is very nice indeed. But side by side with this an element of distaste also is there. That is the poet's ascription of slipping (from the hand) to the conch bangle. For, the

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(42) अङ्गवङ्गकलिङ्गेषु यानि तीर्थानि कानिचित् ।
जगाम तानि सर्वाणि पुण्यान्यायतनानि च ॥ Ādiparva 215. 9)

conch bangle is never worn in a way that would make slipping possible. Then, there is always associated with the conch bangle an idea of auspiciousness that urged the author of the Naiṣadha to introduce in the abundance of jewelled bangles the bangle of conch. From the afore-said conception of slipping as also from the suggestion of a broken condition to be supplied from the context the idea of auspiciousness has suffered, with the result that the attainments of the hermits which dictated the introduction of Sarasvatī in the hermitage have been negatived by the allied conception of her widowhood. Should one attempt a justification by construing it as a part of the उत्प्रेक्षा, it would not stand. For the potency of the उत्प्रेक्षा has been exhausted in the ascription of the material conch bangle to the spiritual Sarasvatī. Hence, it is clear that even admitting the prevalence of the conch bangle in Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa's time (7th century A. D.) in his country (Behar) it was certainly not in the way in which we find it introduced in the Naiṣadha. The latter is typically Bengali. Next, in consideration of Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa's extensive travels (for which his own admission in the Harṣacharita is the authority) and the peculiar association of Sarasvatī and conch bangles with Bengal, it would not be unfair to connect his introduction of the conch bangle with the influence of his acquaintance (however imperfect) with Bengal. Or, this may have been influenced by the Mahābhārata. Thus our position is unaffected from first to last, and our poet (Śrīharṣa) was not only an inhabitant of the country of conch bangles, but was also conversant with the art, as evidenced in the following extract :—

> ताराशङ्कविलोपकस्य जलजं तीक्ष्णत्विषो भिन्दतः
> सारम्भं चलता करेण निविडं निष्पीडनं लम्भितः ।
> छेदार्थोपहृताम्बुकम्बुजरजोजम्बालपाण्डूभव-
> च्छङ्कच्छित्करपत्रतामिह वहन्नस्तं गतोऽर्धो विधुः॥(XIX.57)

Purport:—The stars have disappeared. Lotuses are in bloom. The half set moon, hard pressed by the rays of the rising sun, appears like the conch cutter's saw white with conch dusts turned into clay by contact with water brought for facilitating the task of incision.

Devotion to the Sārasvata *mantra* after the Tantra also points to Bengal. For, Bengal is not simply the great centre of Tantra, it is its nursery. The influence of this *tantra* is fully reflected in our poet's character too. The realisation of the *Chintāmaṇi mantra* is the effect of that same. This finds allusion in XIV. 88—90 of the Naiṣadha (43).

An examination into the names of Śrīharṣa's works—the names are our only resort in the absence of the named—also points to the same conclusion of his connection with Gauḍa or Bengal. For, besides the Naiṣadha and the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa, Śrīharṣa is the author of a good many other works. Their names (so far as we know from their mention in the concluding verses of the cantos and in the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa) are—Sthairyavichāra, Vijayapraśasti, Gauḍorvīśakulapraśasti, Arṇava-varṇana, Chhinda-(Chhanda-) praśasti, Śivaśakti-siddhi, Nṛpa—(Nava—) Sāhasāṅkacharita, and Iśvarābhisandhi. Of

(43) अवामावामार्धे सकलमुभयाकारघटनाद्
द्विधाभूतं रूपं भगवदभिधेयं भवति यत्।
तदन्तर्मन्त्रं मे स्मरहरमयं सेन्दुममलं
निराकारं शश्वज्जप नरपते सिध्यतु स ते॥
सर्वाङ्गीणरसामृतस्तिमितया वाचा स वाचस्पतिः
स स्वर्गीय मृगीदृशामपि वशीकाराय मारायते।
यस्मै स स्पृहयत्यनेन स तदेवाप्नोति किं भूयसा
येनायं हृदये कृतः सुकृतिना मन्मन्त्रचिन्तामणिः॥
पुष्पैरभ्यर्च्य गन्धादिभिरपि सुभगैश्चारुहंसेन मां चे-
न्निर्यान्तीं मन्त्रमूर्तिं जपति मयि मतिं न्यस्य मय्येव भक्तः।
तत्प्राप्ते वत्सरान्ते शिरसि करमसौ यस्य कस्यापि धत्ते
सोऽपि श्लोकानकाण्डे रचयति रुचिरान् कौतुकं दृश्यमस्याः॥

these, the relation of the Gauḍorvīś akulaprasasti to Gauḍa is obvious, and while, it may be noted, that we are disposed to understand by the term गौड़ोर्वीश the Gauda kings in general, the commentator Gopīnatha understood by it a particular king of Gauda—viz. Vijayasena to whom we shall refer below. In the Nipa—(Nava—)Sāhasāṅka charita, the Sāhasṅka, with Mallināthа and Nārāyana, is the name of a Gauḍa king, which, however, is not conclusive as the same commentators have also observed that with some this Sāhasāṅka is Bhoja or Vikramāditya. The Chinda (with its variant Chhanda) in the Chhinda—(Chhanda—) praśasti is, with commentators, the name of a king not localised. This, therefore, though not supporting our case, is neither opposed to it. Or, by accepting the variant छन्द-प्रशस्ति all difficulty is solved. Nārāyana has even done so and explained छन्द as a treatise on metre. But on examination into the meaning and use of the word प्रशस्ति that reading does not appear to be appropriate. The Arṇava-varṇana whose subject matter is obvious from the name would be most appropriate to Bengal, though not improbable elsewhere. As for the Vijayapraśasti, though the commentators (of course such as were available) are all silent on the point, the 'Vijaya,' assuredly, is the name of an individual—I mean a king. For, to assign the meaning 'victory' would lead to an inaccuracy as observed above in connection with the Chhandapraśasti. If, then, it is the name of a king, it is now for us to determine who the king might be, and of what country. The history of the 12th century designates a Gauḍa king named Vijayasena—the father of the illustrious Vallālasena. Vallāla has referred to him in his work entitled 'Dānasāgara.' The time of Śriharṣa too, on examination, appears to fall somewhere in the same century. For Śriharṣa in many places in his Khanḍana has refuted the arguments of the

author of the Kusumāñjali—Udayanācharya(44), who flourished in the 10th century (45). And Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in his Tattvachintamaṇi has refuted the arguments of Śrīharṣa as embodied in the Khaṇḍana (46). His time has been ascertained to be the 13th century (47). Thus the two ends of Śriharṣa's time being limited, the convention of old writers that they never write on modern works by allowing a reasonable margin on both sides will present something like the same. That Śrīharṣa was never anterior to Vijayasena nor even posterior is testified to by the manner of Gopinatha's specification already referred to. Viewed in this light, the 'Vijayapraśasti' too favours the Bengal connection of the author. The Śivaśakti siddhi, as appears from the title, treats of a subject bearing on the Tantra, and none need be told of the sway which the *tantra* holds over Bengal. The subject matter of the remaining works is alien, as is manifest from the names, and so not a matter for the present consideration.

Even after this determination of the poet's country one might say that this is conclusive in so far as it proves that he was an inhabitant of Bengal. Until, therefore, it is definitely shown that his mother-tongue was Bengali, one cannot be convinced that he was a Bengali in the full sense of the term, I mean one born with the instincts of a Bengali. The question is the more urgent, as there already exists a tradition that

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(44) For reference, see such places as "तदिदमाहुः 'प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि' इति। तस्मात्—"; "द्वितीयस्तु व्याघातादेवासम्भवी 'परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः' इति"; and "तस्मादस्माभिरप्यस्मिन्नर्थे न खलु दुष्पठा। त्वदूगाथैवान्यथाकारमक्षराणि कियन्त्यपि॥"

(45) Thus his own word—

तर्काम्बराङ्कप्रमितेष्वतीतेषु शकान्ततः।
वर्षेषूदयनश्चक्रे सुबोधां लक्षणावलीम्॥ Śaka 906 (A. D. 984).

(46) So he says 'इति खण्डनकारमतमप्यपास्तम्।'

(47) See Rajendranath Ghosh's Introduction to his 'Navyanyāya.'

connects his nativity with Kanouj and only his domicile with Bengal. The solution will be easy from the mode of his pronunciation noticeable in the poem It is a well known fact that every vernacular has its own way of pronunciation in respect of certain letters, and Sanskrit which is no longer a spoken language is completely at the mercy of the Varnacular (mother tongue) in this respect. The Bengali tongue, it should be known, observes no distinction in the pronunciation of the three sibilants (श, ष, स), the letters ण, व and य (the last when it begins a word) are in Bengali invariably pronounced like न, ब and ज respectively, the ष in क्ष is treated invariably as ख, the विसर्ग is conspicuous by shortness, and there are other such peculiarities holding the Bengali tongue as distinct from others. This trend of our poet has revealed itself through his alliterations. Our poet is exceedingly fond of alliteration. There is hardly a verse where alliteration has not its share, and in most places it partakes of the character of an analogue (यमक) and so cannot be slighted. This fondness of our poet for alliteration or any verbal feat having transcended his poetry has made itself felt even in his philosophy. Two quotations are made from the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa—

(1)तदद्वैतश्रुतेस्तावद् बाधः प्रत्यक्षत· क्षतः ।
नानुमानादितं कर्तुं तथापि क्षमते मतं ॥
अद्वैतागमनासीरे साधु सा धुन्वती परान् ।
सेषामेवाजयत्यर्थापत्तिपत्ति परम्परा ॥
(2)समस्तलोकशास्त्रैकमत्यमाश्रित्य नृत्यतोः ।
का तदस्तु गतिस्तत्तद्वस्तुधीव्यवहारयोः ॥ '

Under such circumstances we may reasonably conclude that, wherever the adoption of the Bengali mode of pronunciation gives us prominent cases of alliterations, analogue-ridden or otherwise, that is there the pronunciation intended

by the poet. The truth of this will be ascertained from the following illustrations :—

1. श ष स—अमी ततस्तस्य विभूषितं सितं (I-57), अयोगभाजोऽपि नृपस्य पश्यता(I—100), सखा: सखाय: स्वनवश्रवो मम (I—136), कटु कीटान्दशतःसतः कश्चित् (II—4), अशासिषुः स्त्रीशिशुवालिशास्तं (X—32), बालामभाषत सभासत-तप्रगल्भा (XI—16),अश्वैरश्वैरवेगैः (XII—100), नाश्नाति स्नाति हा मोहात् (XVII—41) शानस्पर्शान्तरा मौनमानशे मानसेविनी (XX—13), विस्राणि विश्राणितवान् पितृभ्यः (XXII—50).

2 ज, य—मनस्तु यं नोज्झतु जातु यातु (III-59), उपेयमाधुर्य-मधैर्यसर्जि (VI—93), मनुष्यजन्मन्यपि यन्मनो जने (IX—34 , यातुं ततो जात न यातुधानः (X—11) , तरु-पत्रजन्मा यन्मारुतः (XI—39), जागर्ति यागेश्वरः (XII—38), यज्ञयूपघनां जज्ञौ XXII—172).

3 ण, न—पुण्यन मन्ये पुनरन्यजन्म (VIII—33 , स्फुरद्भिरा-नन्दमहार्णवैनवैः (XII - 2), अमूनि मन्येऽमरनिर्झरिणया (XXII—21)

4 ब,व—कुलं सुधांशोर्बहलं वहन् बहु (I—110), स्मरहरः किममुं बुभुजे विभुः (IV—60) बुबुधिरे विबुधेन्द्राः (V-60), त्रिविबुधी बुबुधे न (V—72), स विलोक्य बालाम् (VI—13). संविभ्रति श्रीर्श्रियविभ्रमं यत् (VII-100), स्तुये जगज्जीवपिबं शिवं वदन् (IX—124), ।

5. ख्य—नलस्य च स्वस्य च सख्यमीक्षते (I—38), अभिख्या भिक्षाधुना (VII—104), तव सौख्यलक्ष्यः XI—108), प्राचख्यौ चाक्षि-क्षमुम् (XVII—92), सख्यौ सक्षौमभावेऽपि (XX-129).

6. विसर्ग (The peculiarity attaching to the विसर्ग is prominent in the analogue alone. Hence that alone is considered here)—

आगत्य भूतःसकलो भवत्या भावप्रतीत्या गुणलोभवत्याः(III-115)
तं संवदत्यङ्कमृगस्थनाभि-कस्तूरिकासौरभवासनाभिः(XXII-86)

7. Miscellaneous—स राशिरासीन्महसां महोज्ज्वलः (I—1) असंवरे शम्बरवैरिविक्रमे (I—53), अवाह्यान्विष्यते (II—78), आसन्ननायकविषण्णमुखानुमेय (XI—12), पङ्कजसख्याशिक्षा (XI—102), सुश्रीपदसुचिह्ना श्रीः (XX—58) अङ्कस्थितसज्जशय्यम् (XXII—2).

Like his fondness for alliteration his fondness for rhyme too is so distinctly manifest in the Naiṣadha that it may be called a regular mania of the poet. A few examples may in quoted :—

धार्यः कथङ्कारमहं भवत्या वियद्विहारी वसुधैकगत्या (III-15)
अशक्यशङ्काव्यभिचारहेतुर्वाणी न वेदा यदि सन्तु के तु। (III—78)।
अपां हि तृप्ताय न वारिधारा स्वादुः सुगन्धिः स्वदते तुषारा। (III—93)
तं कापि मेने स्मरमेव कन्या भेजे मनोभूवशभूयमन्या। (VIII—6)।
जाता न वित्ते न गुणे न कामः सौन्दर्य एव प्रवणः स वामः। (X—13)।
मध्येसभं सावततार बाला गन्धर्वविद्याधरकण्ठमाला।
त्रयीमयीभूतवलीविभङ्गा साहित्यनिर्वर्तिततदकरङ्गा॥ X--73)

Such examples are profuse, not only in the Naiṣadha, but also in the Khaṇḍana so poor in verses. It is therefore no wonder that the influence of the Bengali tongue will be perceived in this rhyme too. Thus we have—

वचसामपि गोचरो न यः स तमानन्दमविन्दत द्विजः। (II-1)
आस्थितावितथतागुणपाशस्त्वादृशा स विदुषा दुरपासः। V-130)
तस्मिन् विषज्यार्धपथात्तपातं तदङ्गरागच्छुरितं निरीक्ष्य।
विस्मेरतामापुरविस्मरन्त्यः क्षिप्तं मिथः कन्दुकमिन्दुमुख्यः॥
(YI—42)

छायासु रूपं भुवि वीक्ष्य तस्य फलं दशोरानशिरे महिष्यः
(VI—43) ।

चन्द्राधिकैतन्मुखचन्द्रिकाणां दरायतं तत्किरणाद् घनानाम् ।
(VII—44)

यस्य कीर्तिरवदायति स्म सा कार्तिकीतिथिनिशीथिनी-
स्वसा । (XVIII—22)

कार्तवीर्यभिदुरेण दशास्ये रेणुकेय भवता सुखनाश्ये ।
(XXI—68)

With regard to this question of pronunciation one might say that deviations too are observable in the Naiṣadha. Such a one is च यं...चयम् (See the first half of the concluding verses of the cantos). Or, contending that this forms part of the concluding verse of a canto and the concluding verses have already been shown to be spurious, and also, the marks of the analogue (यमक) are not so conspicuous here, and hence negligible, there is another whose authority is unquestioned and where the marks of the analogue are also conspicuous in the extract—सुपर्वणां हि स्फुट-भावना या सा पूर्वरूपं फलभावनायाः । (XIV—7). How should that be explained ?

Reply—The question is a little complex no doubt, but not insoluble. In the solution we should first see what is the extent of the analogue, I mean whether it is confined to भावना alone or 'या–याः' also is to be included. If it is confined to भावना no difficulty arises. If 'या–याः' also is to be included, then the question will be—How to solve the विसर्ग ? For it cannot be separated from the vowel, and if not separated the analogue (यमक) will suffer. The analogue-difficulty is solved on admitting the Bengali pronunciation, but that very procedure will establish the Bengali pronunciation of the 'य' as well. Therefore, the analogue here is to be restricted to the भावना portion only and the Bengali pronunciation of य is intact.

Conclusive as the above evidences are in establishing the Bengali origin of the poet, doubts on some minor points are still not unlikely. Such are—(1) his mother's strange name 'Māmalladevī', (2) the addition of 'Miśra' after his name as found at the end of some chapters of his Khaṇḍanakhādya, (3) the traces, in many places in his Naiṣadha and Khaṇḍanakhādya, of his acquaintance with Pāṇini (48), (4) his high honours at the hands of the King of Kanouj (foot-note 5), and (5) the appreciation of his poem by scholars in Kashmir (foot-note (1)—canto XVI). So these too require to be cleared.

The first doubt attaches to a name and and our reply to this is that the name is no authority. Srīdharāchārya was a Bengali (which is an established fact), yet his mother's name was 'Achchhokā'. Besides, if the name 'Māmalladevī' is not current in Bengal, neither is it in other countries. So it is not a contrary point. Even supposing it to have a foreign origin, that would be no bar to our conclusion, for even in the modern age of narrowed nationalities instances are not rare of a Bengali being named Jangilal or a Hindusthani Venkatachari. About the second point, the surname 'Miśra' is no proof of one's being a non-Bengali. For, it was so before, and even now many Bengalis are found with 'Misra' for their surname. With regard to the third point, *viz.* acquaintance with Pāṇini, our reply is that the currency of Pāṇini in the Rajshahi district (Bengal) dates from olden times. The Bhāṣāvṛtti of Pāṇini is current only in Bengal. Its author Purushottam was a Bengali. The saying goes that it was written at the instance of King Lakshman Sen of Gauḍa. Also, the Dhātuvṛtti, Dhātupradīpa,

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(48) इह किमुषसि पृच्छाशंसिकिंशब्दरूप-प्रतिनियमितवाचा वायसेनैष पृष्टः ।
भण फणिभवशास्त्रे तातङः स्थानिनौ काविति विहिततुहीवागुत्तरः कोकिलोऽभूत् ॥ (XX-60). Also foot-note (4) and (5).

Tantrapradipa and Kāśikā-vivarana-panchikā (which last goes by the name Nyāsa—of course incomplete) have all been discovered by the Rajshahi Varendra Society and that in Bengal. Besides, the celebrated Naiyāyika Gadādhara Bhattacharya, a Bengali, has in many places in his glosses quoted *sūtras* from Paṇini. As for the last two points relating to Kanyakubja and Kashmir, these are no proofs to the contrary. It is the Indian adage which says **विद्वान् सर्वत्र पूज्यते** (The learned are honoured everywhere). Honouring the poet is a time-honoured custom in India. Distance was never an impediment to it.

My conclusion regarding the Bengali origin of Srīharṣa finds support in two ancient works also. Rājasekhara Sūri in his Prabandhakosha (Hariharaprabandha) says about Harihara that he was descended from Srīharṣa and belonged to Gauḍa (49), and Vidyāpati Thakkura—of nearly the same age—says in an anecdote of his Puruṣaparīkṣā that Srīharṣa was a native of Gauḍa. The anecdote in brief is this :—

In the country of Gauḍa there lived a poet and scholar named Srīharṣa. He composed a poem entitled Nalacharita and to show it to the Pandits for their approval went to Benares. There he read it to a Pandit named Koka. Koka went on hearing, but passed no remark though a greater part of the book had been read to him. Srīharṣa then asked him: 'Perhaps you are not listening'. Koka said, 'Oh yes, I am. But I reserve my opinion until I hear the whole, when I shall be in a position to judge the work. Afterwards, when the whole had been read, he gave his views and sent him away. (50).

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(49) 'गौडदेशीयः' इति 'श्रीहर्षवंशे हरिहरो गौडदेश्यः' इति।

(50) बभूव गौडविषये श्रीहर्षो नाम कविपण्डितः। स च नलचरिताभिधानं काव्यं कृत्वा * * * तत्काव्यं दर्शयितुं पण्डितमण्डलीमुद्दिश्य वाराणसीं जगाम। तत्र च कोकनामानं पण्डितं श्रावयामास। * * * श्रीहर्षस्तु तमनुगच्छन् पठति प्रत्यहम्। तदुत्तरं किमपि नाप्नोति। एकदा श्रीहर्षेणोक्तम्। आर्य

I shall conclude this second point of my article with an examination into the views (1) of those who by the authority of Rājaśekhara Sūri's Prabandhakoṣa (referred to above) say that Srīharṣa was a Pandit at the court of Jayantachandra (otherwise called Jayachandra and Jayachchandra), king of Benares, and at that time Kanouj and Benares were under one rule (51) and so he was a native of Benares or Kanouj, (2) of those who resting on the tradition relating to Ādisur, king of Bengal, say that he was a native of Kanouj, having subsequently transferred his residence to Bengal, and (3) of those who on the strength of the tradition which represents him as a nephew (sister's son) of Mammata believe that he was a Kashmiri.

With regard to the first view the question is—Had Srīharsa been a native of Benares or Kanouj, could he, consistently, have passed over the king of his own country (Benares or Kanouj) and written a charita or a praśasti of the king of a distant country (Gauḍa)? If it be said that his Vijayapraśsati refers not to Vijayasen, king of Gauḍa, but to Vijayachandra, father of Jayantachandra, even then his connection with Gauḍa (shown above) as revealed in the names of his other works, is not solved. Besides, we are

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महाकाव्ये कृतश्रमोऽहम्। तत्परीक्षार्थं त्वामुद्दिश्य बुद्ध्या स्वदेशीयवात्सल्येन च महतो दूरादागतोऽस्मि। * * * भवान्न निन्दति न चाभिनन्दति। तन्मन्ये कर्णमेव नार्पयति। कोक उवाच। आः कथमहं कर्णं नार्पयामि। किन्तु सम्पूर्णं श्रुत्वा शब्दार्थयोरूहापोहेन सन्दर्भशुद्धिं ज्ञात्वा विशेषं वक्ष्यामि। कोकपण्डितस्तस्य काव्यस्य गुणान् प्रस्तुत्य दोषान् समाधाय विशेषमुद्बोध्य तं श्रीहर्षकविराजं हृष्टमानसं कृत्वा गृहं प्रस्थापयामास। (Vidyāpati's Puruṣaparīkṣā).

(51) Thus Puruṣaparīkṣa—अस्ति भागीरथीतीरे कान्यकुब्जं नाम नगरम्। तत्र काशीश्वरो जयचन्द्रो राजा बभूव। Also ततः क्वापि गत्वा भुजदर्पेण पौरुषमर्जयामीति परामृश्य स कुमारः कान्यकुब्जं नाम जनपदं जगाम। तत्र च श्रीजयचन्द्रनाम्नो राज्ञः काशीश्वरस्य सुभटपरिपाट्या दर्शनं चकार। ..

still in darkness as to why he should pass over one he is directly concerned with—I mean Jayachandra or Jayantachandra—in favour of his father Vijayachandra. Again, all are not agreed about the name of Jayachandra's father. According to Rājaśekhara his father's name was Govindachandra. With others, Govindachandra was the name of his grandfather. Moreover, the verse that is often quoted in support of the Vijayachandra view (52) has nothing therein to show that it exclusively refers to Vijayachandra and not to Jayachandra. For,while the 'son of Govinda' (गोविन्दनन्दन) in the verse means in one view Vijayachandra, it may in the other mean Jayachandra as well In this way, as also from the fact that at the time of Vijayachandra's expedition (which is said to be the occasion for the verse) Srīharsa was a boy (this, too, is the version of the same party), and for a boy a verse like the above would appear, if not from the point of composition, at least from the point of conception, unnatural, its reference to Vijayachandra is hard to establish. To this if we add the view of the Prabandhakoṣa, the matter becomes altogether different. There, when Srīharṣa returned, equipped with scholarship, for the requital of his father's disgrace, he hailed Jayantachandra with that verse. Thus the connection of the 'Vijayapraśasti' with Vijayachandra can in no way be entertained, and the inconsistency about the title of the book remains unsolved as before. Moreover, in that view where is the solution of those other points (discussed in this paper) that go to establish the Bengali character? Above all, the same authority of Rājaśekhara's Prabandhakoṣa whose first part 'Srīharṣa-Vidyādhara-Jayantachandra Prabandha' by reason of its presenting Srīharṣa as a member

(52) गोविन्दनन्दनतया च वपुःश्रिया च मास्मिन्नृपे कुरुत काममधियं तरुण्यः ।
अस्त्रीकरोति जगतां विजये स्मरस्त्रीरस्त्री जनः पुनरनेन विधीयते स्त्री ॥

(53) See footnote (49).

of the court of Jayantachandra has been made the basis of establishing Srīharsa's non-Bengali origin, by the distinct mention, in its last part 'Harihara prabandha', of the expression 'Harihara in the line of Srīharsa was a Gauḍīya', only confirms our own view about the poet, viz. that he was a Bengali.

With regard to the second view, based on the tradition about Ādisur, the first question would be how far it would be possible for a foreigner having come to a place at an advanced age to completely identify himself with it, even to the extent of forgetting the trends of his mother tongue. Secondly, for a ritualistic Brāhmaṇa (for Ādisur brought the five Brāhmaṇas for the performance of a sacrifice) intensive studies of poesy and philosophy do not, from the point of taste and leisure, commune to reason. Thirdly, from our examination of the titles of Srīharṣa's works we nowhere find any reference to Vīrasimha who sent him to Bengal. How is this to be explained? Fourthly, the family registers (कुलपञ्जिकाs) give the name of Srīharṣa's father as Tithimedhā,—different from Hīra or Srīhīra. Fifthly, according to genealogist Vansīvadan Vidyāratna, it was some ancestor of Srīharsa and not Srīharṣa himself who was among the five Brāhmaṇas that hailed from Kanouj. This view, therefore, in spite of its conformity to the Gauḍa connection revealed in the works as aforesaid, cannot be accepted as tenable.

As regards the third view the first objection would come from the historians, who contradict the tradition where it relates to our poet's interview with the rhetorician by saying that the two were never contemporary. Secondly, it is hard to reconcile how when a distinguished Kashmirian critic like Mammata could not accord his approbation, the poem could still be given the credentials of one having won laurels at the learned assembly of Kashmir. Thirdly, the glorification in the

Kashmir honours. as also the alien notion attaching to the direct mention of Kashmir, would naturally expect one to connect these honours with impartial judges of a foreign land. Lastly, this offers no solution of the points going to prove a different view as shown above.

From the aforesaid examination of the three views we come to the following conclusions: (1) In spite of the possibility of his having lived in the court of the king of Kāsī or Kanouj, Srīharṣa was never a native of either of those places. (2) Srīharṣa in question was never among the five Brāhmaṇas reported to have come from Kanouj, and the view that an ancestor of our Srīharṣa hailed from Kanouj does not mar our position whose main point is that the author of the Naiṣadha was born with the instincts of a Bengali, for the distance of even two or three removes in a foreign land with all communication cut off with one's own country is sufficient for identification with the new place. (3) The alleged relationship between Mammata and our poet. coupled with the peculiar formation of the name मामल्लदेवी which, according to some, approximates a Kashmirian name, would at best establish his Kashmir connection on the mother's side, which, considering the peculiar relationship holding between Kashmir and Bengal in those days and comparative relaxation of marriage restrictions, would be no bar to his Bengal connection on the father's side, and that establishes our point.

VI.—INDIAN DRAMATURGY.

(BY P. N. PATANKAR)—9-3-12

Like most of the स्मृतिs, नीतिशास्त्रs, पुराणs &c., the नाट्यशास्त्र going under the name of भरत seems to be an enlargement of an original briefer work in the form of सूत्रs; भवभूति actually speaks of a तौर्यत्रिक सूत्र by भरत. The नाट्यशास्त्र speaks of भरत as the lecturer to an assemblage of ऋषिs and contains many verses professedly current in the mouths of the representatives of the particular branches of thought or art with reference to which they are quoted.

Though traceable to meanest performances like picture scenes, pantomimes and puppet shows—suggested by the etymology of words like सूत्रधार, and corroborated by existing remnants of those crude types yet to be seen in the less refined quarters of the country,—the drama in the early age to which we might trace the नाट्यशास्त्र had reached a stage of undoubted perfection so far as the detail of acting as well as decorative appurtenances went, to say nothing of the poetic art and the study of poesy in its abstrusest details.

The arts connected with the representation of the drama represent of course the type of refinement the society had reached. From the practical aspects of engineering applied to architecture, the various industries that supplied the means and materials of stage arrangements and decorations to the construction of musical instruments of a large variety of shapes and structures, the mind and hand of man can both be easily seen as hardly inferior to the perfections of any society one might imagine either past or present.

If effectual performance is the end of dramatic representation, भरत's teachings can never be excelled by any thinkers and students of the science and art of dramaturgy.

The नाट्य therefore has been appropriately raised to the dignity of a वेद् and in the early beliefs about the source of anything that is perfect in its conception or virtue, this वेद् has been rightly attributed to ब्रह्मन् himself, just in the same way that that god was the inspirer of the great वाल्मीकि in singing the story of राम.

भरत obtained the नाट्यवेद् and performed for the pleasure of the gods and demigods or demons representing their own exploits. The अप्सरस्s including गन्धर्वs of heaven are his assistants and from them sprang a class of performers on the earth. They were esteemed by ब्राह्मणs and नृपs and perpetuated the art in the world. जयदेव of the प्रसन्नराघव speaks of the actors as an inferior class to ब्राह्मणs; the special terms indulgently allowed to be used by नटी and सूत्रधार towards each other as आर्य and आर्या might imply an inferiority ; but the inferiority does not seem to have amounted to untouchableness in the festive dinners ; मैत्रेय in the मृच्छकटिक is invited to dine at the सूत्रधार's ; the सूत्रधार of the मुद्राराक्षस allows a dinner to be given to ब्राह्मणs by his wife. Learning even in the sacred lores is not denied to that class, as can easily be gathered by reference to any of the known dramas.

As already hinted, the society for whom the नाटक was performed was of the most refined आर्य classes ; and an adaptation to the taste of the time and the condition of the society is a principle that shows how perfect the ideals were both in the case of the Actors and that of the audience. Nor was this वेद् denied to the शूद्र class. In the literal attitude of the भगवद्गीता (स्त्रियो वैश्यास्तथा शूद्रास्तेऽपि यान्ति परां गतिम्), it was even intended for their enlightenment.

If poetic justice means anything, it is fully maintained in the भारतीय ideal of the नाट्य. The नाट्य must be an honest picture of existing phenomena (in the moral and

spiritual world more especially, the physical being often left to the imagination) and the possibilities from them. The drama *must have a moral aim.* What could be superior to this conception of the matter? Everything that would mislead, offend or corrupt is to be eschewed from the representation. Nothing could be more touching than the care of the guardian of the souls of the receptive spectators when he warns you against what may harm the sensibilities and thoughts of the innocent souls.

Unlike the modern ways, a dramatic performance was not a very frequent affair. Only important occasions were availed of for the performance and usually the aspices of some powerful patron were sought by the profession. It was a solemn affair, not a mere entertainment. It was therefore commenced with proper 'pomp and circumstance' from the religious point of view. It was thus a quasi-religious performance. Worship and prayers and sacrificing preceded the representation and the effect could be expected to be correspondingly great.

The sage takes care to teach with the very elements and beginning with the units of measurement, he details the construction of the theatre in a thoroughly practical and scientific spirit. It is interesting to note the principles of every art that bears on the author's main subject. Some of these will be treated further below.

Every care is taken to propitiate the spiritual powers from beginning to end of every main part of the whole business. The choice of place and time and persons in safeguarding the spiritual side in full keeping with the existing superstitions is enjoined and full practical directions given about the measurement, material and structure with all the minor particulars required for the convenience of situations in the acting.

All materials required to make the apparatus needed for the scenes, the directions to construct the the same, the personal decorations including costumes, jewels, have been given in full detail, that throws immense light on the fashion of social life of a very important period of Aryan history. Lists of these are interesting in a variety of ways.

The drama involves poetics, music, singing and dancing. The last as a matter of fact is intimately connected with the very idea of acting. The author has devoted abundant space and patience to the treatment of these four subjects. Each of these has given rise to different branches of study in later times. The साहित्यदर्पण treats fully of poetics including general poetry as well as particular Technical works exist on singing and musical instruments especially the मृदङ्ग—arts familiar in the courts of India. A reading of these would throw light on the obscurities in the understanding of the tunes of the songs in some of the older dramas as well as the nature of some technical terms that but for this as an original authority would be unintelligible. It is true that a thorough appreciation of the details is almost impossible, but the chapters on these subjects serve as a mine from which much valuable matter is discoverable.

The details of अभिनय (inclusive of the modulation of the voice) can never be surpassed. The observation both of the nicer shades of acting and of the corresponding effects is a matter belonging solely to the province of genius and in everyone of the above branches, the power of the Indian mind indicates the possibilities which set forth hidden treasures of the soul. Later authors could not give all the detail, that is too vast to follow but yet too valuable to be neglected.

It has been already said that Actors made a separate caste. Males and females both acted on the stage. Pro-

fessional female dancers and female singers are mentioned, but the वेश्या or harlot class must be considered as a distinct one from the भरत caste. The dancing girls are even spoken of as high-born.

The acting of female parts by male persons and vice versa was in vogue to a little extent. But the sexes seem most usually to play their own parts, the females belonging to the भरत caste of course being the female players. While the वेश्या or गणिका is a separate class altogether, though she was notwithstanding her profession held respectable in the social scale. वसन्तसेना's mansion and honourable position are a sufficient instance in point.

For the history of language, of society and of different peoples in the geographical situations, much research is possible with the help of भरत's नाट्यशास्त्र. Names of countries, of peoples, of particular features and fashions among the variety of nationalities are matters of supreme interest to the student of history. The study of prosody given here will suggest the stages in the history of Sanskrit and Prakrit that will be very useful in determining the periods of development or otherwise in the variety of languages described or illustrated There are numerous miscellaneous features that deserve attention.

The worship of gods can very nearly be traced as mediaeval between Vedic worship and later image-worship, a kind of the गृह्य rites with the later and local superstitions. गणपति and महागणपति in their later characters are nowhere, while the now neglected ब्रह्मन् as a deity worshipped in image is highly prominent.

...श... seem to have been the common expression of ...astronomy instead of the more popular राशिs of the

Numbers of miscellaneous points may be noted. सरस्वती is spoken of as हरिप्रिया : कषायवसन is an ill omen. नाडापुडी used in modern worship seems to have had an early origin, श्मश्रुकर्म has been prescribed for particular purposes. While technical terms belonging to the fine arts occur in innumerable details and form in themselves an indication of the taste and intellectual development of the age represented in the work.

The नाटक is of course the principal subject. The abstract as well as concrete features of the subject find perfect expression here and the history of the Sanskrit drama can start from this work as the most valuable material. As already noted, the drama being a काव्य, भरत has detailed all the characteristics of the काव्य on which later writers on the subject have amply drawn to make their own systems.

There is some question with regard to the unities :— But the idea of the Greek unities is almost absent because of the free spirit in which the Indian drama was conceived and constructed. The question has been started with the assumption that India owes something to Hellenic models in the art. The unities are naturally given up in so far as there may be no need for them, the Elizabethan drama in England did so and the Sanskrit drama did that in the early age.

Some early dramas have been mentioned in the नाट्यशास्त्र Some are hinted later on by Patanjali. अमृतमन्थन, त्रिपुरद & बलिबन्धन, कंसवध &c. are instances.

The age of the writing of the नाट्यशास्त्र is an interesting question. There is no doubt that Kalidas had known it well. भवभूति did know, but he speaks of भरत as the तौर्यत्रिक सूत्रकार. भवभूति has made use of the poetic fact of the machinery of the अप्सरस्s being employed by भरत. Worship of ब्रह्मन् is mentioned by कालिदास. The triad of ब्रह्मन्, विष्णु and महादेव has been recognised. The point of नक्षत्रs being used for sacred purposes and not राशिs lends data in inferring the date. We must at any rate go behind कालिदास, i. e. behind the fifth century in settling the date of the work.

A more careful and patient study will enable one to develop all these subjects more fully.